THE

WORKS

Of the late

Right REVEREND and LEARNED

Dr. *FRANCIS HARE,*

LORD BISHOP of

CHICHESTER.

VOL. IV.

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CONYBEARE,

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BRITISH MUSEUM

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THE CONTENTS OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

THE Treaty between her Majesty and the States-General for Securing the Succession to the Crown of Great-Britain, *and for Settling the Barrier for the States-General against* France, *consider'd.* Page 1.

The Allies and the late Ministry defended against France, *and the present Friends of* France. *In Answer to a Pamphlet, intitled,* The Conduct of the Allies. *Part* I. Pag. 32.

The Allies and the late Ministry defended against France, *and the present Friends of* France: *Containing a Vindication of the Barrier Treaty, and of our Alliances with* Portugal:

Portugal: *With a particular Defence of our faithful and good Allies the* Dutch, *from the Charges imputed to them in the Management of their Part of the War. Part* II. Page 98.

The Allies and the late Miniſtry defended againſt France *and the preſent Friends of* France: *In which are conſider'd all the Objections made againſt the* Emperor, Portugal, *and the reſt of the Allies: With a farther Vindication of the* Dutch, *and ſome Reflections on the* Spaniſh *War; on the Nature of Alliances in general; and on the apparent ill Deſigns of that Author. Part* III. Page 188.

The Allies and the late Miniſtry defended againſt France, *and the preſent Friends of France: Containing a Vindication of the late M——y in relation to the Management of the War on the Part of* England; *with an Anſwer to the Author of the* Conduct's *Five Reaſons for making a Peace with* Spain *and the* Indies. *To which is added a Poſtſcript, in Anſwer to his Remarks on the* Barrier Treaty. *Part* IV. Page 282.

THE

THE TREATY BETWEEN Her Majeſty AND THE STATES-GENERAL,

For ſecuring the Succeſſion to the Crown of *Great-Britain*, and for ſettling the Barrier for the States-General againſt *France*, conſider'd.

THE Treaty of the Succeſſion and Barrier is every Day talk'd of in ſuch a Manner, that one may reaſonably conclude thoſe, who talk of it, have no diſtinct Idea what is the Foundation and Purport of it.

9*

As the great Efforts, jointly made by *England* and *Holland*, have principally contributed to reſcue their Liberties, and the Proteſtant Intereſt, from the Oppreſſion of *France*; ſo the only Way to obtain a ſafe Peace, and ſecure the Bleſſings of it, is, for the two Maritime Powers to come to a good Underſtanding, and preſerve a perfect Friendſhip with one another. If this be done, they will have ſuch a true Strength at Sea, as to fear nothing on that Part, and the Proteſtant Intereſt will always maintain its due Weight in *Europe*.

The two great Points, that in a Manner equally affect both theſe Countries, and that ſo viſibly, that no one, who ſpeaks ſincerely, can miſtake, are, That the States may be ſecure againſt *France* by a ſtrong Barrier in the *Spaniſh Netherlands*; and that *England* may be ſecure in a Proteſtant Succeſſion to the Crown, in caſe of the Death of the Queen without Iſſue.

If the *Dutch* want ſuch a Barrier, *England* will ſoon be cut off from the Continent. On the other Side, if *England* be ſubject to a Prince educated, ſupported and directed by *France*, the Maritime Power is broken, and *Holland* will ſoon be ſwallowed up.

This is plain Matter of Fact, and conſequently the firſt wiſe Step that can be taken, towards making a good Peace, is to ſettle a

Treaty

Treaty between theſe two Proteſtant Powers, by which theſe two great Points of the Barrier and Succeſſion might be fixed with their mutual Guaranty.

If *England* ſhould let ſlip the firſt Opportunity of engaging her Proteſtant Neighbours to become Guarantees of the Proteſtant Succeſſion, or, having done it, ſhould be deluded by any fallacious *French* Pretence to let go that Hold, it would be a Demonſtration ſhe is not in good Earneſt for a Proteſtant Succeſſion.

We may be told, that the Proteſtant Succeſſion is very well ſecured; that we have Acts of Parliament that do it ſufficiently; that a great Number of Addreſſes have declared for it; that the Natives of *Britain* are ſworn to it; that *France* is weary of the War, and will agree to ſend away the Pretender; and that it may not be good Senſe or Policy to engage a Foreign Power in defending our Succeſſion, becauſe we cannot alter it, without their Conſent perhaps afterwards.

But is it poſſible to be caught with ſuch groſs Deluſions, or to believe that any Man, who talks at this Rate, has any other Thing in his Meaning, but to betray the Proteſtant Succeſſion to the Pretender.

Are we to be indifferent or at Eaſe in this Point? Is there not a known Popiſh Com-

petitor, who has publickly inſiſted upon his Title, and has, with open actual Force, endeavoured to take Poſſeſſion; who is harboured in *France*, when an actual Treaty for a Peace with *France* is ſet on Foot, and no one Attempt (that is heard of) is yet made to remove him from thence? When there is a known Party of Men in the Kingdom, who diſown the Title of the Poſſeſſor; and when it is plain, that the moſt powerful Prince in *Europe*, and one who has made War for ſo many Years with both the Maritime Powers, is the publick Supporter of his Pretences, and the neareſt Neighbour to both Countries: Is this a Time to leave Things to Chance, or to apprehend leſt we ſhould make the Proteſtant Succeſſion too ſecure from being diſappointed, by calling for the Aid of a Foreign Proteſtant State, in caſe of any future Danger?

Let it be conſidered, that there is no other Way whereby we can ſafely and reaſonably ſtrengthen our Proteſtant Succeſſion, but by Foreign Alliances: We ſee manifeſtly how the Caſe ſtands with reſpect to the Enemies to that Succeſſion. Our Conſtitution will not conſiſt with a Standing Army: *France*, on the other Side, cannot be without one; and the Genius and Temper of that Nation is ſuch, that it cannot ſuffer ſuch a Force to be unactive; ſo that we muſt be always a ready

Prey,

Prey, or, at leaſt, hourly expoſed to Affronts. But by making a wiſe Alliance with a neighbouring Proteſtant Power, for whom, by the ſame Treaty, we make ſuch a wiſe Proviſion, that they not only may, but muſt always maintain a gallant well-diſciplined Proteſtant Army engaged to ſupport this Succeſſion, we may reaſonably hope that *France* will be kept in ſome Reſpect, and that the Pretender will not think that he may diſturb us with Impunity, as often as our Naval Force may be, by any Accident, out of the Way.

This may, perhaps, ſuffice at preſent to ſay, with reſpect to the Succeſſion. Let us, in a few Words, conſider what may be ſaid as to the Barrier. It has been the concurrent Opinion of all *Europe*, *French* as well as *Spaniards* and the Empire, that if the *French* become Maſters of the *Low-Countries*, it will be impoſſible for the States to ſubſiſt. It is as demonſtrably evident, that *Spain* cannot, or at leaſt will not, while the *Spaniſh Netherlands* are in their own Hands, be at the Expence of maintaining effectually this Barrier. It is as evident, that unleſs this Barrier be really firm and effectual, all the Princes concerned do but deceive themſelves; and the Concluſion will be, that it will fall a Prey to *France*, as has been plain by Experience from the Time of the *Pyrenean* Treaty.

Time, with Experience very dearly bought, have produced ſeveral Expedients, which have contributed towards bringing this Treaty to bear, ſo far as related to the Barrier. The Grand Alliance in the firſt Place; the Preliminary Treaty in the next Place; which, though it failed as to the main Point, by the Treachery of *France*, yet had a very good Effect as to the principal Allies, by bringing them to agree with one another, as to many important Points, and in particular as to that of the Barrier; which Agreement has at laſt produced this happy Treaty, which was lately concluded, and has ſolidly united the two Maritime Powers in the mutual Guaranty of the Succeſſion and Barrier.

The Grand Alliance concluded between the Emperor, the late King, and the States, *September* 7, 1701, being the Foundation of this Treaty, it may be proper to ſet down the Articles of that Alliance, on which this Treaty is grounded, as well in reſpect to the Barrier, as to the Regulation of Commerce mentioned in the 15th Article of the ſaid Treaty.

ARTICLE V.

The Confederates, in order to the Procuring the Satisfaction and Security aforeſaid, ſhall, amongſt other Things, uſe their utmoſt Endeavours

vours to recover the Provinces of the Spaniſh *Low-Countries, THAT THEY MAY BE A FENCE AND RAMPART, COMMONLY CALL'D A BARRIER, SEPARATING AND DISTANCING* FRANCE *FROM THE* UNITED-PROVINCES, *FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATES-GENERAL, as they have ſerved in all Times, until of late, that the moſt Chriſtian King hath ſeized them by his Forces,* &c.

ARTICLE VI.

It ſhall be lawful for his Royal Majeſty of Great-Britain, *and the States-General, by common Advice, and for the Benefit and Enlargement of the Navigation and Commerce of their Subjects, to ſeize, by their Forces, what Lands and Cities they can, belonging to the* Spaniſh *Dominions in the* Indies ; *and whatſoever they ſhall ſo take, ſhall be their own.*

ARTICLE VIII.

It ſhall not be permitted to either Party, when the War is once begun, to treat of Peace with the Enemy, unleſs jointly, and with the common Advice of the other Parties ; and no Peace ſhall be made, unleſs an equitable and reaſonable Satisfaction for his Imperial Majeſty, and the particular Security of the Kingdoms, Pro-

vinces, Dominions, Navigation, and Commerce, for his Majeſty of *Great-Britain*, and the States-General, be firſt obtained; *and unleſs Care be taken by fitting Security, that the Kingdoms of* France *and* Spain *ſhall never come and be united under the ſame Government; nor that one, and the ſame Perſon, ſhall be King of both Kingdoms; and particularly, that the* French *ſhall never get into the Poſſeſſion of the* Spaniſh Indies; *neither ſhall they be permitted to ſail thither on the Account of Traffick, directly or indirectly, on any Pretence whatſoever: And, laſtly,* unleſs full Liberty be granted unto the Subjects of the King of *Great-Britain*, and the States-General, to exerciſe and enjoy all the ſame Privileges, Rights, Immunities, and Franchiſes of Commerce by Sea and Land; in *Spain*, the *Mediterranean*, and all Lands and Places, which the King of *Spain*, laſt deceaſed, did poſſeſs, at the Time of his Death, as well in *Europe* as elſewhere, which they uſed and enjoyed, or which the Subjects of both, or either of them, by any Right acquired by Treaties, Agreements, Cuſtoms, or any other Way whatſoever, might have uſed and enjoyed before the Death of the late King of *Spain*.

ARTICLE IX.

At the Time that the ſaid Tranſaction or Peace

Peace ſhall be making, the Confederates ſhall agree amongſt themſelves about all the Things that they ſhall think neceſſary, for maintaining the Navigation and Commerce of the Subjects of his Majeſty of Great-Britain, *and the States-General, in the Lands and Dominions they may acquire, and that were poſſeſſed by the laſt deceaſed King of* Spain; *and alſo in what Manner the States-General may be ſecured by the aforeſaid Fence or Barrier.*

It will be likewiſe neceſſary to ſet down here the 22d, 23d, and 29th Articles of the Preliminary Treaty, concluded at the *Hague* in *May* 1709. Signed by the Miniſters of the Emperor, *Spain*, the Queen, and the States, ſome Months before the Treaty for the Barrier, and the Succeſſion, was concluded.

ARTICLE XXII.

And as to the States-General, his Majeſty ſhall yield, and make over to them, in the moſt expreſs Terms that ſhall be judged proper, the Place of Furnes, *with the further Ambacht or Diſtrict belonging to the ſame, the Fort of* Kenock *being therein included*; Menin *with its Verge*, Ypres *with its Caſtellany and Dependencies, which from henceforward ſhall be* Bailleu, Warneton, Commines, Werwick, Popperinguen, *and what depends on the Places above-*

above-mentioned, (the Town and Caſtellany of Caſſel *remaining to his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty :)* Liſle *with its Caſtellany, (the Town and Government of* Doway *excepted)* ; Condé *and* Maubuge *with all their Dependencies, the Whole in ſuch Condition as the ſaid Places are at preſent ; and particularly with the Cannon, Artillery, and Ammunitions of War therein, to* ſerve, with the reſt of the *Spaniſh Netherlands,* for the Barrier of the ſaid States-General ; *upon which they may agree with the ſaid King* Charles, *according to the Tenor of the Grand Alliance,* as well with regard to the Garriſons which the ſaid States-General ſhall maintain therein, *as to all other Things in the* Spaniſh Netherlands ; *and* particularly as to their having in Propriety and Sovereignty the upper Quarter of *Guelderland, according to the Fifty-ſecond Article of the Treaty of* Munſter *in the Year* 1648, *as from Time to Time they ſhall think fit. But it is to be underſtood, that if there is a general Magazine in* Tournay, *the Quantity and Quality of the Artillery and Ammunition to be left in the ſaid Places, ſhall be agreed upon.*

ARTICLE XXIII.

His moſt Chriſtian Majeſty ſhall alſo deliver up all the Towns, Forts, and Places, which he ſhall have poſſeſſed himſelf of in the Spaniſh Netherlands, *in the Condition they are now in, with their*

their Cannon, Artillery, and Warlike Stores. But it is to be underſtood, that if, ſince the Troops of the moſt Chriſtian King entered Namur, *any Magazine has been erected, or Stores of Artillery and Ammunition laid up in that Town and Caſtle, more than for their Defence, they ſhall be removed by the Officers of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, in concert with thoſe of the States-General, at the Time of Evacuation, which ſhall not, on this Account, be retarded, but ſhall be done within the Time that ſhall be limited. The Whole on this expreſs Condition, That the* Roman *Catholick Religion ſhall be maintained in all the ſaid Places to be delivered up, and in their Dependencies, in the ſame Manner as it is now eſtabliſhed there; except* that the Garriſons of the States may exerciſe their own Religion, as well in the Places yielded and made over for enlarging the Barrier, as in the Places of the *Spaniſh Netherlands* that are to be reſtored.

ARTICLE XXIX.

And for what relates to the Garriſons, which, on the Part of the States-General, are now, or may be put hereafter into the Town of Huy, *the Cittadel of* Liege, *and the Town of* Bonn, *they ſhall remain there till it is agreed otherwiſe with his Imperial Majeſty and the Empire.*

By

By the above-mentioned Twenty-ſecond Article of the Preliminary Treaty it is expreſly ſtipulated, that the States-General ſhall keep Garriſons in the Towns which are to be yielded by *France*, and which are ſpecified in this Article; and their Pretenſions to the upper Quarter of *Guelderland* are likewiſe aſſerted and allowed.

By the next Article, the Towns belonging to the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, at the Death of King *Charles*, and which ſince that Time had been ſeized by *France*, are to be delivered up to the States for them to keep Garriſons in them.

And by the laſt of theſe Articles, the States are to keep Garriſons in *Huy*, *Liege*, and *Bonn*, till it is agreed otherwiſe with his Imperial Majeſty and the Empire. So that it appears plainly, that the *Dutch* had, by theſe Articles, ſecured to themſelves their Barrier, with the Conſent of their Allies, purſuant to the ninth Article of the Grand Alliance; and that by the Treaty of Succeſſion and Barrier, which was made ſome Months after the above-mentioned Treaty, her Majeſty agrees only to ſupport the States in ſuch a ſufficient Barrier, as had been yielded to them before by all the Allies, under ſuch Regulations as are neceſſary both to preſerve it, and to ſecure our Commerce in the *Low-Countries*; engaging them,

at the ſame Time, purſuant to the Addreſs of both Houſes of Parliament in 1708, to become Guarantees of the Proteſtant Succeſſion: Which Advice has been repeated by the Houſe of Lords in this preſent Seſſion.

Neither can it be objected, that the Preliminary Treaty is of no Force, the *French* having refuſed to ſign it. For though that is true ſo far as it relates to *France*; yet the Miniſters of the Allies having ſigned it, and it having been approved by their reſpective Maſters, it is obligatory as to all the Stipulations contained in it, which relate purely and ſolely to the ſaid Powers, and in which *France* is in no Ways concerned, more eſpecially when ſuch Stipulations are the Conſequence of former Engagements, as theſe Articles are of the Grand Alliance.

It being, therefore, evident by what goes before, that this Treaty is founded upon the Grand Alliance, and conformable to the Conceſſions made to the States by the Emperor and the King of *Spain* in the Preliminary Treaty; I ſhall now proceed to ſhew,

1. That the Towns, in which the *Dutch* are to have Garriſons, are no more than what are neceſſary to make the Barrier effectual.

2. That the States, by having Garriſons in thoſe Towns, cannot, by virtue of this Treaty, moleſt,

moleſt, diſturb, or any way influence the Trade of *Britain* to the *Low-Countries*.

As to the firſt Point, it is notorious that this Barrier is weaker than what was left to *Spain* by the *Pyrenean* Treaty; and it is as well known, that the Inſufficiency of that Barrier, and the Acquiſitions the *French* made by that Treaty, gave them ſuch a Footing in the *Low-Countries*, that laid the firſt Foundation of their Power on that Side; ſo that no one, who is really concerned to ſee the *Netherlands* effectually ſecured againſt the Encroachments of *France*, can be ſo abſurd as to think this Barrier too extenſive for that Purpoſe, which at the ſame Time is leſs than that, under Favour of which the *French* acquired moſt of the Dominions in *Flanders*, which they were poſſeſſed of at the Beginning of the preſent War.

And as it is of abſolute Neceſſity that the States ſhould have a ſufficient Barrier, ſo it is of no leſs Neceſſity they ſhould have a ſecure and open Communication with their Garriſons; it is requiſite, therefore, for that End, that they ſhould have Garriſons in the Caſtle of *Ghent*, and in *Dendermonde*; nor would the Caſtle of *Ghent* alone have been ſufficient: For ſhould the *French*, in Concert with the People of the Country, who are Papiſts and addicted to their Intereſt, by Treachery or Surprize,

prize, make themſelves Maſters of *Dendermonde*, as they did of the Caſtle of *Ghent* in 1708, they would eaſily become abſolutely Maſters of the *Scheld*, the Caſtle of *Ghent* being ſo weak, and the Town very much inclined to the *French*; and conſequently the *Dutch* would not only be entirely cut off from their Communication with their own Garriſons, but likewiſe from any Succours that can be ſent them from *England* by the Way of *Oſtend*.

But it is objected by ſome, That allowing a Barrier to be neceſſary, and that granted in the preſent Treaty to be no ſtronger than is requiſite; yet the Territories and Revenues, aſſigned the States for maintaining their Barrier, are too large and opulent, and may give them ſuch an Over-balance of Riches and Power, as may in Time prove formidable to their Neighbours. This Objection will be found of no Weight: For whoever will conſider, that if the *Spaniards*, with the whole Revenues of the *Netherlands*, were not able to ſecure that Country from being over-run; it is not to be thought, that a Million of Livres *per Annum*, over and above the Revenues of thoſe Barrier Towns only, that were not in Poſſeſſion of the late King of *Spain* at his Death, can poſſibly defray the neceſſary Encreaſe of Expence, which the States muſt be

at

at to repair and keep up the Fortifications, to pay the Garriſons, and provide Magazines, and all other Warlike Neceſſaries, to cover that whole Country from the Inſults of the Enemy.

As to the ſecond Point, which is to be proved, That the *Dutch*, by having Garriſons in theſe Towns, cannot by this Treaty moleſt, diſturb, or any Ways influence the *Britiſh* Trade in the *Low-Countries*: It is to be obſerved, That the *Dutch*, by this Treaty, are to have nothing but the military Power in the Places where they are to have Garriſons; the Sovereignty, as to all Rights Civil and Eccleſiaſtical, being expreſly reſerved to King *Charles* by the ninth Article, and that, as well in the Towns that were in the Poſſeſſion of the Crown of *Spain*, at the Death of King *Charles* the Second, as in thoſe that are to be yielded by *France*: By which the States have debarred themſelves from doing any Acts of Sovereignty either Civil or Eccleſiaſtical, even in thoſe Towns of which they are to have the Revenues: And they are likewiſe, by the fifteenth Article, abſolutely tied up from any Pretence of diſturbing our Trade in the *Low-Countries*, being, on the contrary, obliged to aſſiſt in maintaining the Commerce of both Nations upon the ſame Foot.

The fifteenth Article of this Treaty is founded

founded upon the fourteenth, fifteenth, and ſeventeenth Articles of the Treaty of *Munſter*, and purſuant to the Grand Alliance.

By the fourteenth Article of the Treaty of *Munſter*, between the King of *Spain* and the States, it is agreed, That the Rivers of the *Scheld*, as well as the Canals of *Sas*, *Zwin*, and the other Out-lets to the Sea on that Side, ſhall be kept cloſed on the Side of the States.

By the fifteenth Article, the Veſſels and Merchandizes coming in or going out through the Harbours of *Flanders*, ſhall be charged, by the King of *Spain*, with all ſuch Impoſts and Duties as are raiſed upon the Merchandizes going and coming along the *Scheld*, and other Canals mentioned in the foregoing Article.

By the ſeventeenth Article, the Subjects and Inhabitants of the Country, belonging to the ſaid States General, ſhall have the ſame Security, and Liberty in the Countries of the ſaid King, which has been granted to the Subjects of *Great-Britain* by the laſt Treaty of Peace, and ſecret Articles made with the Conſtable of *Caſtile*.

So that by theſe Articles the Trade of *Holland* to *Spain*, as well as to the *Low-Countries*, was ſettled upon the ſame Terms by the above-mentioned Treaty, as that between

England and the *Spaniſh* Dominions; and upon this Foot it continued till the Death of the late King of *Spain*; and, purſuant to this, it is directly ſtipulated by the eighth Article of the Grand Alliance, That the Subjects of *Great-Britain*, and of the States, ſhould enjoy the ſame Liberty and Privileges in Trade to *Spain* and the *Spaniſh* Dominions, as they had at the Time of the Death of King *Charles* the Second of *Spain*: And ſuch farther Care was taken by the ſaid Grand Alliance, to keep the Trade of *England* and *Holland* to the *Spaniſh* Dominions upon an equal Foot, that though by the ſixth Article a Liberty was given to either Nation of Conquering, in Concert with one another, any Part of the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, and that each of them ſhould keep all the Places they ſhould take; yet by the ninth Article it is ſtipulated, that at the negociating or making of Peace, they ſhall agree upon all that is neceſſary for eſtabliſhing the Trade of both Nations, in the very Places they may have taken, that did belong to the Crown of *Spain* at the Death of King *Charles* the Second.

What has been ſaid does fully prove, that the Towns, in which the States are to have Garriſons, are no more than what are neceſſary to make their Barrier effectual; that by having Garriſons in thoſe Towns, the States cannot,

cannot, by virtue of this Treaty, give any Diſturbance to the *Britiſh* Trade in the *Low-Countries*; and that the Regulation of Commerce to the *Spaniſh* Dominions, between the two Nations, is merely purſuant to the Grand Alliance.

But it may be objected, That though we have no Reaſon to apprehend any Moleſtation of our Trade from the *Dutch*, as long as we continue Friends; yet, in Caſe of a Rupture with us, the *Dutch* will have ſo much Power by their Garriſons, as to put a Stop to our Trade in the *Low-Countries*.

This Objection ſuppoſes an abſolute Diſſolution of this Treaty; but we are ſo happy in this Reſpect, that even, in Caſe of a Rupture with us, the *Dutch* would hardly venture, either by their Garriſons of *Ghent*, *Dendermond*, *Newport*, or of any other Places, to interrupt the *Britiſh* Trade in thoſe Countries. For any Attempt of that Nature would be an Invaſion upon the King of *Spain*'s Sovereignty, as is expreſly reſerved to him by this Treaty: And *Britain* being in Friendſhip with that Prince, we ſhould have a Right to demand Reparation of him for any Violence committed by the *Dutch* on our Trade in his Dominions; which the States would be obliged to redreſs, unleſs they reſolved to break with the King of *Spain* alſo, whoſe own par-

ticular Intereſt, as well as that of the *Low-Countries*, is ſo eſſentially concerned to protect the Trade paſſing through the Harbours of *Flanders*, that he will never connive at any Encroachments of the *Dutch* in that Reſpect. And nobody can imagine, that they would, for the Sake of incommoding our Commerce in the *Low-Countries*, be ſo imprudent as to bring the Houſe of *Auſtria* upon them, and thereby loſe their whole *Spaniſh* Trade, at a Time that they are in War with *Britain*.

Having thus endeavoured to ſet this Treaty in a true Light, I ſhall conclude with this Remark only, That when *Britain*, *Holland*, and the Houſe of *Hannover* were rejoicing in the happy Concluſion of this Treaty, and endeavouring to carry it on, by engaging every one of the Allies in it, and even *France* itſelf, if ſhe intended in good Earneſt to have a Peace, ſome ſtrange Changes have happened, of which it is hard to give a clear Account. But ſo it is, that this Treaty for ſecuring the Proteſtant Succeſſion, lies ſo much in the Way of ſome favourite Purpoſe, that right or wrong Objections muſt be made to it: Objections of ſuch a Nature, that one would not have thought they could have come from the Perſons in whoſe Mouths they are met with, nor from any Body elſe but utter Strangers to the Treaty. But it is Time to break off theſe melancholy

choly Thoughts, and to comfort ourſelves, by calling to Mind what the Queen has been pleaſed to declare in her Speech at the Opening of this Seſſion, and ſince by her Meſſage to both Houſes of Parliament: "That ſhe "looks upon the Intereſt of her Allies as in- "ſeparable from her own: That her chief "Concern is, that the Proteſtant Religion, "and the Laws and Liberties of theſe Na- "tions, may be continued to us, by ſecuring "the Succeſſion to the Crown, as it is limit- "ed by Parliament to the Houſe of *Ha- "nover*; and that her Plenipotentiaries have "begun, in Purſuance of their Inſtructions, "to concert the moſt proper Ways of pro- "curing a juſt Satisfaction to all in Alliance "with her, according to their ſeveral Trea- "ties."

APPENDIX.

Extract of Cardinal Mazarine's *Memorial to the* French *Plenipotentiaries at* Munſter. *Dated the* 20*th of* January 1646.

I Promiſed you, Gentlemen, in my laſt, to give you at large my Reaſons for thinking it would be very much for the Service of this

Crown, to conſent to the withdrawing its Arms out of *Catalonia* and *Rouſſillon*, if the King of *Spain* would yield to us the *Low-Countries* and the County of *Burgundy*, either by Favour of a Marriage, or for an Exchange, taking Care at the ſame Time to obtain all the Advantages and Security we can for the *Catalans*, according to what I have ſaid in ſeveral of my former Letters. I will now make Good my Promiſe, being more at Leiſure than I was laſt Week, and give you my Thoughts of this Matter, deſiring you would alſo give me yours. Firſt, the Acquiſition of the *Low-Countries* would be ſuch a Defence to *Paris*, as would be impregnable; and it might then be truly called the Heart of *France*, and would be ſituated in the ſafeſt Place of the Kingdom. Our Frontier would then be extended quite to *Holland*, and on the Side of *Germany* (from whence alſo we have Reaſon to fear) to the *Rhine*, by keeping *Lorrain* and *Alſace*, and by the Poſſeſſion of *Luxemburg* and the County of *Burgundy*.

In the next Place, by this Means we ſhould get out of this War with ſo much Advantage and Reputation, that the moſt Malicious would be put to it to find Fault with it. All the Blood and Treaſure it has coſt would, by the moſt difficult Perſons, be allowed to have been well employed, if they ſaw all the ancient

cient Kingdom of *Auſtraſia* annexed to this Crown, which has furniſhed the Princes that were Maſters of it, not only with Means to reſiſt *France*, but to give it a great deal of Trouble, as every body knows.

Thirdly, Thoſe who are obnoxious to the Government, the Factious and Diſcontented, loſing by this Means their Place of Retreat, would loſe the Opportunity of embroiling Affairs, and making Cabals with the Aſſiſtance of the Enemy; it being obſervable, that all the Parties againſt the State, and all the Conſpiracies have ordinarily been formed in the *Low-Countries*, in *Lorrain*, and in *Sedan*.

Fourthly, The Power of *France* would become formidable to its Neighbours, *and particularly to the* Engliſh, *who are naturally jealous of its Greatneſs, and who will let ſlip no Opportunity to hurt or leſſen it, if a conſiderable Acceſſion to it does not put an End to all their Hopes of ſucceeding in ſuch Deſigns. And one might be aſſured, if they know ſuch a Negociation was carrying on, and their inteſtine Quarrels did not embaraſs them to the Degree they do, there is nothing they would not hazard to hinder its taking Effect.*

The *States* would have more Regard to us, and would become more tractable than they are. The Catholick Religion would receive a great Advantage and Support from it in their

Dominions; the Catholicks being not ſo much perſecuted there for their Religion, as for their Affection and Adherence to *Spain*.

There is no Reaſon to apprehend, if Meaſures were rightly taken, and well conducted, that the States would be for croſſing ſuch an Accommodation, ſince they would find their own Intereſt in it no leſs than we; for then they might be for ever ſure of enjoying a profound Peace, without being at the exceſſive Charges they have hitherto; for then all Talk of a Truce would be at an End, and, the *Spaniards* giving up *Flanders* to the King, all Occaſions of War would ceaſe.

Beſides, though the *Spaniards*, whoſe Intereſt it is to leſſen the Power of this Crown, ſhould give us the *Low-Countries*; they would, no Doubt, give up to the States all the Rights and Pretenſions they have to the United Provinces; and *France* conſenting thereto, and ratifying it in the moſt ſolemn Form, and as ſhould be moſt to their Satisfaction, the States would be able to ſecure to themſelves a laſting Tranquility, with all the Advantages that an univerſal Commerce ordinarily brings with it, the rather, becauſe the Situation of their Country is ſuch, and ſo well fortified both by Art and Nature, that it will always be uſeleſs to endeavour to make any Progreſs there, and imprudent to embark in ſuch Deſigns.

There

There is nothing but inteſtine Diſſenſions, which kindle eaſily in Peace, can diſturb their Quiet; which is a Reaſon why *France* ſhould prefer Acquiſitions on this Side to all others, becauſe, without any Breach of the Laws of Friendſhip or its Alliance, it may in Time make notable Advantage of their Diviſions.

And whoever ſhall examine, according to the Rules of good Politicks, the Affairs of the States, will certainly find, that they cannot very eaſily ſubſiſt, if in the Peace that is treating, their Security againſt *Spain* is not provided for, eſpecially ſince the Prince of *Orange* is not only advanced in Years, but ſubject to ſuch Infirmities, that his Life begins to be deſpaired of; particularly ſince it is known he is ſo threatened with a Dropſy, that in the Conſultations that have been held at *Paris* by his Order, they have unanimouſly been of Opinion, that it would be very difficult for him to avoid it.

And this ought extremely to oblige us to make an Accommodation with *Spain*, ſince the Death of this Prince would, on all Accounts, be very prejudicial to this Crown, the Princeſs of *Orange* being hated to that Degree, that it is thought the *Dutch* would ſend her away, and Prince *William* but young, and, as it is ſaid, given more to his Pleaſures than to Buſineſs, and conſequently leſs fit to recover the

Credit

Credit of his Fathers, if they ſhould loſe him.

It is likewiſe thought the States would immediately ſet about the Leſſening his Authority, not only becauſe they are very uneaſy under that of his Father, but becauſe of the Jealouſy they have conceived upon the Marriage he has made in *England*, and the ſtrict Underſtanding he is in with *France* ſince the Death of Cardinal *Richelieu*.

If *France* has any Thing to apprehend from the Houſe of *Auſtria*, it can be only on the Side of *Flanders*, and on that of *Germany*; as well on account of the Union they can make of their Forces, theſe two Countries being contiguous, as becauſe, whatever Advantages we may have over them, one good Succeſs got by them, either by the Surprize of any Place upon the *Soam*, or by a Battle, or any other Way, might put *Paris*, which is ſo near, into ſuch a Conſternation, as there was upon the Taking of *Corbie*, and upon the Loſs of the Battle of *Honnecourt*, and oblige us to withdraw, or at leaſt leſſen the Troops we have in diſtant Parts, for Example, in *Catalonia* and *Italy*, and leave thoſe Places naked, as we did for *Corbie*, which made us raiſe the Siege of *Dole*, which was upon the Point of Surrendring, although we were then engaged in no War on the Side of *Spain*.

The

The Acquiſition of the *Low-Countries* delivers us for ever from theſe two Fears; there would be no more any Junction of the Enemies Troops, ſince *Spain* would have nothing on that Side; and our Frontier being every Way extended to the *Rhine*, we ſhould be ſo far from fearing any Thing from the Emperor, that he would find himſelf obliged to cultivate carefully a good Union with us; and this would not contribute a little to the Separation, which *France* has Reaſon to wiſh for, of the *Spaniſh* Branch of the Houſe of *Auſtria* from that of *Germany*.

In my Opinion it is, in Point of Prudence, moſt adviſeable to leave thoſe Parts to the Enemy that they can eaſieſt retake. It is certain, that as it is purely Neceſſity that obliges them to make Peace, fearing a greater Evil by the Continuance of the War, whenever they ſhall think themſelves in a Condition to renew the War, with any Hopes of Succeſs, (which they will much flatter themſelves with, from the long Minority of the King) they won't want Pretexts for it, let us take what Precautions we can; and in that Caſe, altho' we ſhould by a Peace remain Maſters of what we poſſeſs at preſent in *Catalonia* and in the *Low-Countries*, it will be much eaſier for the Enemy, by making great Preparations of Men and Money, and by the Correſpondence they will

will cultivate in *Catalonia*, (where the beſt Place we have, is the Love of the People, which is not to be much depended on) to recover that Principality, either by Force or Intelligence, or by ſome Advantage gained on the Side of *Flanders*, than to recover the *Low-Countries*, when they have once quitted them; or to make any Progreſs in *Languedoc*, ſince they would then be oppoſed by all the Forces of *France*, which would be then more powerful than ever ſhe was before; which would not be diverted by thoſe of *Flanders*, which put us in ſo much Pain for *Paris*.

And this, in my Opinion, would be the true Security for the Peace to be laſting, which we ſhould find in our own Strength. For Things being brought to this, it would be Madneſs in the Enemy to think ever of a Rupture with this Kingdom: For, if we conſider the Advantages we ſhould have in *Germany*, or the old Friendſhips and Alliances we ſhall preſerve there, and the New ones we might make; or how much the Emperor will be weakened by the Concluſion of the Peace; we have not only nothing to fear on that Side, but there is Reaſon to believe, that though we had not hindered the Emperor from aſſiſting the *Spaniards*, as we ſhall by this Peace, his own Intereſt, and his Fear of our Forces, would prevent his taking Part in

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any Attempts the *Spaniards* might make. And thus having nothing to employ our Troops on the Side of *Flanders* and *Germany*, what they would be capable of doing, if we were to employ them only in *Italy* and *Spain*, may be judged by the Progreſs they make at preſent in thoſe two Provinces, although the King of *Spain* is active to oppoſe us in one of them, and we make our greateſt Efforts, and with an incredible Expence, on the Side of *Flanders* and *Germany*, where our beſt Troops uſually ſerve. One of the Reaſons, by which the ableſt Miniſters of *Spain* flatter themſelves they ſhall get out of the Difficulties, which the Conditions of Peace, which ever Way they are turned, will throw them into, is the great Hopes they have, that a Peace hindering us from purging *France* of its ill Humours, inteſtine Diviſions will ſoon ariſe, of which they expect to make Advantage. Now it is certain the *Spaniards* cannot give any conſiderable Aſſiſtance to any Faction in the State, but on the Side of *Flanders*, where they have Troops always in Readineſs for it, which are the more to be feared, becauſe they are *moſt fit for Service*. When the *Spaniards* formerly perſuaded the Duke of *Orleans* to carry the War into *Languedoc*, although this is a Province contiguous to *Spain*, they could give him no Succour on that Side, but they did it from

from *Flanders*. And in the laſt Treaty with the late Monſieur *de Grand*, every body knows all the Aſſiſtance was to come from the *Low-Countries*.

The People of *Flanders*, who ſuffer prodigiouſly by their Countries having been ſo long the Seat of War, would like ſuch a Change ſo much, that we cannot but doubt, we ſhould ſoon gain their Love, when they found themſelves out of Danger of any Invaſion, and like to enjoy for ever a profound Tranquility, with all Sorts of Conveniencies and Advantages, under the Dominion of this Crown.

And our Expence would be ſo far from being increaſed by the Acquiſition of ſo many Places, (beſides that we might receive conſiderable Aſſiſtance from them, without laying any Burthen on the People) that we might ſave a great Part of the Expence we are at for Garriſons in *Picardy*, and might raze moſt of the Places, and the others would be kept with a ſmall Charge; for bordering upon the States, it cannot be thought they would ever engage to attack or ſurpriſe us, for Fear of provoking a Power ſo much ſuperior to them, and which would ſo many Ways be able to make them feel its Reſentments.

It would be too tedious to enter into a Detail of all the Conveniences and Advantages we ſhould have in Trade and otherways, by ſo important

important an Acquiſition, and by the Port of *Mardick* and *Dunkirk*, which is the beſt in the Ocean, and moſt conſiderable for us, * *with reſpect both to the States and to* England.

Perhaps I may be miſtaken; but I dare ſay the *Spaniards* would conſent rather to give us the *Low-Countries* and *Burgundy* for *Catalonia* and *Rouſſillon*, with the Hopes of recovering *Portugal*, when the Truce is expired, without the Marriage with the King, than with it, giving for a Dowry the greateſt Part of what they are to yield to us. My Reaſon is, that all the Advantage they would have from this Alliance at preſent, would be to ſatisfy a certain Appearance, and the Vanity of leaving to us, by way of Dowry, the Conqueſts we have made. But as this would only ſave a little their Reputation with the common People, it would be found that we ſhould have all *the Solid*; and the Infanta being married to his Majeſty, we might pretend to the Succeſſion of *Spain*, whatever Renunciation be made; and this would not be a very remote Proſpect, ſince there is only the Life of the Prince her Brother, that can put us by it.

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* *Pour nous approcher de Meſſieurs les Etats & pour regarder comme il faut l'Angleterre.*

THE

THE ALLIES AND The Late Miniſtry

Defended againſt

FRANCE,

And the Preſent Friends of *France*;

In Anſwer to a Pamphlet, intituled,

The Conduct of the ALLIES.

Nulla ſalus bello? Capiti cane talia demens
Dardanio, rebuſque tuis ——.

THE Pamphlets that have been hitherto publiſhed in Favour of an inſecure and falſe Peace, have been moſt of them ſo meanly writ, that I have of late thought it loſt Time to look into them; and by that Means this curious Piece of the *Conduct of the Allies and the late Miniſters*,

niſters, had eſcaped me, had it not been for the mighty Commendations *Abel* gives it in his *Poſt-Boy* of the 29th paſt; for whoſe Judgment I have ſo much Deference, that I could no longer delay looking into a Paper, in which I was to expect an infinite Number of undeniable Truths, and Truths indeed they are in *Abel*'s Style, who has inverted the Senſe of Words, and with his Friends is teaching the Nation a new Language, and to call Things by the contrary Names to thoſe they have hitherto been known by. I could not read even a few Pages of this great Performance, without thinking of the *Medley*'s Story of the *Colliers* and the *Sailors*, and methinks I ſee this Writer, in almoſt every Page, engaging to his Friends in the *Colliers* Words, that *though we cannot make ourſelves as clean as they are, we ſhall quickly make them as black as ourſelves.* This is plainly the Deſign of this elaborate Piece, with what Succeſs, we ſhall ſee by going over it. But my Concern is not ſo much with the *late Miniſtry*, and the Arts uſed to blacken them, which are all in vain, and can only ſerve to make their Merit ſhine brighter in the End, which will infallibly be the Conſequence of ſuch an unjuſt and violent Perſecution, as that with which they have been and are ſtill purſued. What affects me in this and the like Attempts made upon the

Reputation of the *late Miniſtry*, is the Purpoſe all this is chiefly intended to ſerve; and that is, to perſuade us out of our Senſes, to change all the Notions we have had of Things for theſe twenty Years and more, and to give up contentedly all the Fruits of a moſt ſucceſsful War, in a mean inglorious Peace. I do not know what Effect this Maſter-piece of the Party may have on other People, but I muſt confeſs, a very haſty Reading of it has convinced me, that if what is advanced in it be the Senſe of the Nation, a Peace is indeed neceſſary; for it is high Time to make Peace with our Enemy, when we declare open War againſt all our Friends: Nay, could I ſuppoſe the Senſe of the Nation would not be firſt asked in Parl---t upon ſo important a Subject, the Spirit of this Pamphlet would convince me of what ſome People have a good while ſuſpected, that our Peace was already made, and that a *Congreſs* was to be held for no other End, but for us to act the Mediators, and tell our Allies what Terms we expect each of them ſhould be contented with. For if we were not ſure of Terms for ourſelves, to inſult our Allies in ſo open a Manner, and to expoſe the Weakneſs of the Nation, and our Inability to continue the War, *would*, to uſe this Author's Words, *not only be very indiſcreet, but might perhaps be dangerous.* Which

is

is one of the Reaſons this Writer gives, *p.* 78, for *not publiſhing his Diſcourſe ſooner*; but ſure it is even now too ſoon, if the Bargain be not already made. Another Reaſon for his coming out ſo late is, he ſays, *becauſe he would give Way to others, who might argue very well upon the ſame Subject from general Topicks and Reaſon*, (that is, declaim well) *though they might be ignorant of ſeveral Facts, which he had the Opportunity to know*, from which alone a true Judgment can be made, and which he therefore knew how to miſrepreſent; for I hope to convince every impartial Reader, that is all the Uſe this Writer has made of his great Knowledge.

Theſe are the two Reaſons this Author thinks fit to give for *not publiſhing his Diſcourſe ſooner*, to which I will venture to add a Third, as true a one as the Laſt, and much truer than the Firſt; for nobody can believe he declined appearing ſooner, becauſe it might be *dangerous at this Juncture* to expoſe the ill Condition we are in, for that his Friends have already done in very ample Manner; and if that were a Reaſon for not publiſhing two Months ago, it is as good a Reaſon ſtill, unleſs, as I have ſaid, the Bargain be made. The principal Reaſon therefore for publiſhing his Diſcourſe no ſooner, was to wait the critical Minute, which might be moſt likely to give

it its Effect. The great Skill of Dealers in *Political Lies* conſiſts in knowing how to time them nicely, and to proportion the Strength of the Colours to the Length of the Time it is intended they ſhould laſt. How much the Welfare or Miſery of this Nation depends on the firſt Reſolutions of the next Seſſion, nobody wants to be told; on them depends a good or bad Peace, provided it be not a Thing done: It is therefore of great Conſequence to the Promoters of an ill one, to have a Flood of Lies in Readineſs to let out of a ſudden on thoſe, whom it is ſo much their Intereſt to ſurprize into wrong Meaſures, by the moſt artful Diſguiſes they can uſe. It was with this View this Book did not make its Appearance till the Day appointed for the Seſſion; in Hopes the Members, deluded by the falſe Lights of ſo many pretended Facts, would go whither they ſhould lead, without ſuſpecting they were going wrong: And becauſe there was, for Reaſons of State, a Poſſibility that the Seſſion might ſtill be put off a few Days longer, as it has proved in the Event, it was contrived to be of ſuch a Length, as might find many Readers work for ſome Days, or at leaſt make it impoſſible to give a timely Anſwer to it before the Reſolutions were taken, which it was deſigned to influence.

But the Strength and Force of Argument, with which the oppoſite Side of the Queſtion has been maintained in many Pamphlets, the evident Goodneſs of that Cauſe, the groſs Miſrepreſentations of this Writer and his Friends, and the many Marks that appear throughout, of Malice and Falſhood; the great Court that is made to *France*, and the ſtrange rude Treatment of our beſt Allies, make me greatly hope, that theſe new Politicians will find themſelves extremely diſappointed; and that a *Britiſh* Parl——t will not, in a Matter of the utmoſt Conſequence, believe what comes from ſo ſuſpected a Hand, without hearing both Sides, and examining into the Facts themſelves.

As this Writer finds his Account in coming out late, and being long to ſerve an ill Cauſe, I ſhall, to ſerve a good one, take the contrary Courſe, and be as ſhort as poſſible, that I may not appear to be too late in the Defence of that, which, when it is once gone, is never to be retrieved.

I ſhall, therefore, paſs over many Pages of this Book, which contain nothing in them but general Reflections and Repetitions of the ſame Thing; of which, in this elaborate Piece of Scandal, there are many Inſtances, as if it were not enough to miſrepreſent one Fact once, but it muſt be made, by Repetition,

two or three: By which Artifice, all the Dirt that is thrown is multiplied, that the Allies, and the late M——y, might be ſure to look black enough.

After many wiſe Reflections upon War in general, in order to tincture the unwary Reader's Mind with uſeful Prejudices for what is to follow, this Author deſcends to conſider thoſe Wars *England* has been engaged in ſince the *Conqueſt*: Upon which he wiſely obſerves, That while we make War in our own Country, we carry no Money out of it; a great Commendation, this, of Civil Wars! Even the *Dutch* Wars, in King *Ch.* II's Reign, did *not carry out any Money, nor did it leave any Debts upon the Nation.* And thus this Reign is paſs'd over, without any other Remark on it, but that thoſe Wars were carried on under *a very corrupt Adminiſtration*; ſo corrupt an one, that I hope this Nation, in many Years to come, will not have ſeen above one more ſuch. It is to this Adminiſtration we owe the Change of the Balance of *Europe*, and the great Difficulties which the *exorbitant Power of France* has ſince reduced us to. Thoſe *Dutch* Wars, as this Writer obſerves, were *much to the Diſhonour of the Crown*; and ſo *Dutch* Wars very probably will always be, though this Author, in many Places, is ſounding an Allarm, raiſing all the ill Blood he can,

can, and infuſing Jealouſies between the two Nations, whoſe Intereſt it is to be in the moſt inſeparable Union. Speaking of our Succeſſes in *Flanders*, *p.* 28. he ſays, *We are deſtroying many thouſand Lives, exhauſting all our Subſtance, not for our own Intereſt, not for a Thing indifferent, but perhaps to our own Deſtruction: We may live to feel the Effects of our Valour more ſenſibly, than all the Conſequences we imagine from the the Dominions of* Spain *in the Duke of* Anjou: *We have conquered a noble Territory for the States*, &c. And *p.* 71. *We, inſtead of labouring to make them ſafe* (the *Dutch*) *muſt beggar ourſelves to render them formidable.*

Had King *Charles*, inſtead of thoſe ſcandalous Wars againſt the *Dutch*, exerted himſelf with Vigour againſt *France*, the Expence of a few Millions then would have ſaved us an Hundred ſince; but by his Treaties with *France*, and his Wars with *Holland*, he ſhewed he was not in the true Intereſt of his Country; nor can any Prince be ſo, who, in ſucceeding Times, ſhall tread in the ſame Steps: Even his Parl——t, as corrupt as they were, could not be brought to give Countenance to ſuch ruinous Meaſures; much leſs can any other M——y expect a *Britiſh* Parl——t will deſert the Intereſt of the Nation, when its Liberties are eſtabliſhed upon

ſo much a better Bottom than they were at that Time.

From the *Dutch* Wars our Author paſſes to the *Revolution*, when *a general War broke out, to check the ambitious Deſigns of* France; *and here the* Emperor, *the* Dutch, *and* England, *were Principals.* A little after we are told, *That the Ground of this War, as to the Part we had in it, was to make* France *acknowledge the late King, and to recover* Hudſon's *Bay.* That theſe were two of the particular Ends we propoſed by the War, is true; that it was the Whole, is not true; for, as he ſays himſelf, the War was general, to *check the Ambition of France*, who had been for thirty Years encroaching upon their Neighbours, and had ſhewn they could be bound by no Treaties: To *check this Ambition*, therefore, was a general Concern, and a juſt Cauſe of entring into the War, to prevent that *univerſal Monarchy*, which had been compaſſed long ſince, if we had tamely ſat ſtill; for the King of *France* had begun the War by the Invaſion of the *Empire* the Summer before the *Revolution*; and had the Revolution been prevented or diſappointed, there had then been an End of the Liberty of *Europe*, and of our own too; and therefore I beg Leave to obſerve by the Way, that the End of that War was not chiefly to ſettle the *Revolution*, which

the

the Enemies of it would inſinuate; it was neceſſary for the Preſervation of ourſelves, and the Powers in Alliance with us, who, without us, would have made no Stand againſt *France*, and we muſt have neceſſarily been involved in the ſame Ruin with them. And to pretend the *Sea was neglected, and the greateſt Part of Six Millions annually employed to enlarge the* Dutch *Frontier, becauſe the King was a General and not an Admiral; and although King of* England, *a native of* Holland, is all ill-grounded Scandal, that has at the Bottom no Foundation; the Increaſe of the Power of *France*, upon the Continent, made it neceſſary to make the greateſt Efforts againſt him there; and all that were made were, as appeared by the Event, too little: Nor did that Service, after all, employ the greateſt Part of Six Millions, as any body may ſee by the Eſtimates laid before the Commons every Seſſions, for the *Flanders*-War. As to the Fleet, it was ſo far from being neglected, that we not only recovered the Diſgrace we received in the Beginning of the War off of *Beachy*, but afterwards in a ſucceſsful Engagement we made ſuch a Deſtruction of the Naval Strength of *France*, that they never appeared again at Sea all that War. But let us ſee what an Account is given of the End of this War, *After the Loſs of an hundred thouſand*

thouſand Men, and a Debt remaining of Twenty Millions, a Peace was concluded with great Advantage to the Empire and Holland, *but none at all to us, and clogged ſoon after by the famous Treaty of Partition.* I would be glad to know, whether *England* has no Advantage in a War they engage in to *check the Ambition of* France, if *France* be conſiderably weakened by the advantageous Terms given to the *Empire and Holland?* Whether theſe Terms are not transferring ſo much Strength from the Side we would weaken to thoſe we would ſupport? And if ſo, whether the Reaſon of going into ſuch a War is not anſwered, and we may not properly be ſaid to find our Account in it? But had it not been to raiſe an *Odium* againſt the late *King*, this Author would not have ſaid, *that War was concluded with great Advantages to the Empire and* Holland, *but none at all to us*; for he very well knows, it was a very diſadvantageous Peace to the Allies, very ſhort of what they propoſed, and the natural Effect of an unſucceſsful War; and why that War ſucceeded no better, he can tell us too if he pleaſes. It was the Effect of the Oppoſition of a diſcontented Party, of unhappy Miſunderſtandings between Prince and People, of late Seſſions, and ill Trade, and a bad Credit, which was the neceſſary Conſequence of the reſt. Theſe and the like

Cauſes

Cauſes made it impoſſible for the King to puſh the War with Vigour; and if *France* made better Offers to put an End to it, than the Confederates from their ill Succeſſes could expect, it was no Secret what that was for, it was that he might be at Leiſure to purſue his Deſigns upon the *Spaniſh Monarchy*, which ſucceeded but too well by his Management of the *Partition-Treaty*, which this Author knows the King was forced into, as the leſſer of the two Evils, the Nation, in all Appearance, being neither in Temper, nor, as he was made to believe, in Condition to begin a new War; and having no Body of Troops that could be able to make Head againſt *France*, upon the King of *Spain*'s Death, who was in a moſt languiſhing Condition at the Time the *Reſwick-Treaty* was made; which was the true Reaſon the King of *France* was in ſo much Haſte to put an End to that War, and promiſed ſo readily to give up many Places to *Spain*, which, if his Deſign on that Monarchy ſucceeded, was in Effect giving to himſelf. But as to the Advantages to the Empire and *Holland*, I know none he gave the laſt but an advantageous *Tariff*, of which he never executed one Article; and for the *Empire*, People muſt have ſhort Memories to forget, how he embroiled them by the fourth Article about Religion, with

with what Contempt he treated the Emperor about *Strasburg*, and how he, after the Peace, refuſed to ſurrender *Old Briſac*, till he had built *New Briſac* juſt over-againſt it, which was to all Purpoſes defeating the Deſign of the Reſtitution of that important Place. But to comfort ourſelves for the Loſs of Men and Money in this War, this Writer could have told us, that Monſieur *Vauban* in his *Diſme Royal* reckons *France*, at the End of that War, weaker by Two Millions and more than before, and gives us ſuch a miſerable Account of the Poverty of the People, and of the Increaſe of the King's Expence, beyond what the Kingdom could bear, as might be ſome Conſolation to us at the End even of ſuch a War; if the Uſurpation of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy had not been built upon the Peace that concluded it. In this War *began the Cuſtom among us of borrowing Millions upon Funds of Intereſt.* This is repreſented in this and other Places of this Book as a *moſt deteſtable Project*, a Plot to ruin the landed Intereſt, and there is nothing bad enough to be ſaid of it. Sometimes it is imputed to *the Security* of a new Prince not firmly ſettled on the Throne, ſometimes to a Deſign of a few cunning Men, to involve the Nation in Debt, and enrich themſelves; ſometimes to the ambitious Views of a M——y. Any Reaſon, in ſhort, is given

for

for it but the true one; for it is certain, this Method of raiſing Money was not taken up by Choice, but Neceſſity: There were a Set of Men in Parl——t at that Time, whoſe Merit it was to oppoſe the Court right or wrong; and there was nothing theſe Patriots ſo much abhorred, as any Thing that look'd like an Exciſe, which the Nation has inſenſibly, in great Meaſure, come into ſince; and had they done ſo at firſt, there might have been almoſt the ſame Sums raiſed without any Debt upon the Nation. And, after all, there is nothing in this Method of raiſing Money by Funds of Intereſt, but what all other Nations engaged in theſe Wars have come into as well as ourſelves, and before us; ſo that in this Reſpect we are upon the ſame Foot with other People, but ſo much better as our Debts are leſs than thoſe either of *France* or *Holland*, as every body knows that is acquainted with Foreign Affairs, and has any Inſight into political Arithmetick.

Our Author having brought down his Hiſtory to the preſent War, and ſpent ſix Pages in raiſing as much Duſt as he thought neceſſary to ſhew his Tricks in, without being preſently diſcovered, which, conſidering how ignorant moſt Readers are of Foreign Affairs, how generally we love Scandal, how weary we all are of a long War, and how pleaſing

that

that has made the very Name of Peace, to thoſe whom Sounds perſuade as well as Senſe, is no very hard Matter for a Perſon much leſs skilled in the Arts of Jugling, than this Writer muſt be allowed to be. After a Prologue of twenty Pages, this Farce of a Hiſtory opens with this noble Propoſition, *That no Nation was ever ſo long or ſo ſcandalouſly abuſed by the Folly, the Temerity, the Corruption, the Ambition of its domeſtick Enemies, or treated with ſo much Inſolence, Injuſtice, and Ingratitude by its Foreign Friends.* And this he undertakes to make appear by plain Matters of Fact.

Though I cannot by any Means conſent my Country ſhould be ruined by an ill Peace, when we have ſo fair a Proſpect of a good one, which is the plain Deſign of this Writer and his Friends; yet if this Propoſition can be proved, I will readily conſent the late M———y ſhould be given up to the Fury of their Enemies, provided the ſame Juſtice may be done on their Accuſers, if it cannot.

The Propoſition to be proved is, indeed, at firſt Sight ſo ſtrange a Paradox, that the Undertaker muſt have a great Opinion of his Skill in ſecret Hiſtory to venture at it; and I have Reaſon to think this is not his firſt Eſſay: He is much improved ſince this Time Twelvemonth, and now boldly affirms the groſſeſt Falſities, which he then ſcarce dared to hint at.

at. Then the M———y only were attacked, and that upon ſome Points only, the Allies were ſpared, or rather good Words were given them; but now there is nothing too bad to be ſaid of the late M——y; all is wrong in their Adminiſtration from Beginning to End; and, for their Comfort, the Allies are as bad as themſelves. In ſhort, both Allies and Miniſters are Fools and Knaves, and all the Virtue and Wiſdom in the World lies in two or three Hands, where nobody before ever thought there was any; but with this ſurprizing Difference, that Affairs have for many Years ſucceeded to a Miracle under this ſottiſh and corrupt Management, when it is next to a Miracle if this new Virtue and Wiſdom do not ruin us. But to come to our Author's Proofs of what he has with ſo much Truth and Modeſty advanced; he will make his Propoſition good by proving theſe three Points.

" *Firſt*, That againſt all Manner of Pru-
" dence or common Reaſon we engaged in
" this War as Principals, when we ought to
" have acted only as Auxiliaries.

" That we ſpent all our Vigour in purſu-
" ing that Part of the War which could leaſt
" anſwer the End we propoſed by begin-
" ning it; and made no Efforts at all where
" we could have moſt weakened the Com-

" mon

" mon Enemy, and at the ſame Time enrich-
" ed ourſelves.

" *Laſtly*, That we ſuffered each of our
" Allies to break every Article in thoſe Trea-
" ties and Agreements by which they were
" bound, and to lay the Burden upon us."

Every one of which Propoſitions I will ſhew to be ſcandalouſly falſe, and conſequently the Propoſition they are to prove is no leſs ſo. And the hard Words of *Folly*, *Temerity*, *Corruption*, and *Ambition*, can properly belong to none but thoſe from whom they come.

His firſt Propoſition, That *to engage in this War as Principals, is againſt all Manner of Prudence or common Reaſon*, is ſo very new and extraordinary, that I heartily congratulate him upon this great Diſcovery. He is the firſt Writer I have met with of his Side, who has had the Hardineſs to ſpeak ſo plain, though it is what I have long ſuſpected to be their Meaning; and it is no Wonder they are in ſo much Haſte to get out of the War any how, ſince they now openly declare it was wrong to go into it. This is a Key to the whole Book, and nothing that follows, no Reflections on the late M----y, no ill Uſage of our Allies, no Endeavours to explain away Treaties, no abſurd Opinion about Credit, not even his thinking the Fall of Stocks upon the

Change

Change of the M——y, *a good Omen*, can ſeem ſtrange after ſuch an extravagant Declaration as this, which contradicts the Senſe of all the Parliaments we have had ſince the Uſurpation of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, the unanimous and conſtant Senſe of the Queen and her Allies, the Senſe even of the preſent Parliament, nay, what's more, the Senſe even of theſe Writers themſelves a Year ago: For then they had not brought themſelves to think at this abſurd Rate, or did not think it Time to tell the Nation ſo. That the Juſtice and Neceſſity of the War has been all along allowed and inſiſted on by the Queen and her Allies, and by all our Parliaments till this laſt, has been ſhewn by ſo many Collections of Speeches, Addreſſes and Votes, as well as by the Articles of the ſeveral Treaties made with our Allies, that I ſhall not repeat any Thing that has been already publiſhed of this Kind, but ſhall take Notice rather of what has not been ſo much obſerved, and that is the Senſe of the preſent Parliament, eſpecially of the Lords in their *Repreſentation* preſented to her Majeſty the 10th of *February* laſt, in the ſecond Paragraph of which they applaud her Majeſty's '*engaging generouſly* in this War 'for aſſerting the Liberties of *Europe*, and the 'Rights of the Houſe of *Auſtria* to the *Spaniſh* 'Monarchy, which had been wreſted from them

'by the Artifices and Uſurpations of the *French* 'King, when a Prince of that illuſtrious Fa- 'mily came to her Majeſty for Refuge againſt 'Oppreſſion; and that her Majeſty had re- 'ceived him into her Protection, moved 'thereunto not only by her own innate Good- 'neſs, but by the Voice of her People too, 'who were ready to ſacrifice their Lives and 'Treaſure for the Support of her Majeſty in 'Defence of ſo righteous a Cauſe: And as 'the Fruits of a ſucceſsful War they mention '*the Honour of her Majeſty, the Safety, Wealth,* '*and Proſperity of her own Dominions, and* '*the laſting Peace of* Europe.' And the Commons, in the ſecond Paragraph of their *Repreſentation*, ſpeak of the *abſolute* 'Neceſſity of 'carrying on the War, to ſay nothing of the 'Aſſurances both Houſes gave her Majeſty in 'their Addreſſes at the Opening of the Seſ- 'ſions.' So that our Author's firſt Propoſition is directly contrary even to the preſent Parliament, which I recommend to the Conſideration of thoſe Gentlemen, who have in due Veneration and Eſteem the Sentiments of this P——t, how much ſoever they may undervalue all preceding ones; though I cannot but put them in Mind, that there has been, even in their own Opinion, one P——t this Reign as good as the preſent; I mean the firſt, which yet declared their Senſe of the

Juſtice

Juſtice of the War, and the Neceſſity of puſhing it with Vigour, as much as any that came after them: But this Writer's Aſſertion is not only contrary to the Senſe of the preſent P———t, but I preſume I may add of the preſent M——y laſt Seſſion, ſince nobody can have any Pretence to ſuſpect, that their Sentiments upon this Point differed at that Time, whatever they may do now: But what makes the monſtrous Abſurdity of this Propoſition ſtill more evident is, that it is inconſiſtent with the Senſe of theſe Writers themſelves a Year ago: For in the many ſcandalous Pamphlets of that memorable Year, which came no doubt out of the ſame Mint with that now before me, there is not one Word to condemn our Manner of engaging in the preſent War, as imprudent or unreaſonable, or ill adviſed; and yet thoſe Writers have ſufficiently ſhewn, they wanted no Inclination to blacken the late M——y, their Malice was work'd up to the laſt Pitch, and it was extremely for their Purpoſe to ſay all the Ill of them they could deviſe, true or falſe; and by what they have ſaid, one may be ſure they left nothing unſaid, which they thought could hurt their Reputation; and the Silence of ſuch keen Adverſaries muſt be allowed to be a conſiderable Argument, that they did not then think the Engaging the Nation in the preſent War

any Crime; and that ſuch an Accuſation was at that Time too groſs to paſs upon the Nation.

But how now comes that which was right a Year ago, to be exclaimed againſt as *imprudent* and *againſt all Reaſon*, and to be made a capital Crime in the late M——rs? How comes it to be now declared, that the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy was none of the Ends that engaged *Britain* in the preſent War; that her Majeſty by the Grand Alliance is not obliged to it, and that it is Madneſs to think of it? How can this mighty Difference in the ſame Perſons in ſo ſhort a Time be reconciled? Is it that they have really changed their Sentiments, and by the Force of wrong Thinking for a Twelve-month together, have at laſt brought themſelves to be in Love with ſuch abſurd Notions, in Oppoſition to their own Senſe, as well as to that of all Mankind beſides? Or, are they indeed not in theſe Sentiments themſelves, but think it convenient to impoſe them on the People, as ſoon as they are prepared by the Poiſon they have, with ſo much Diligence for ſome Time, infuſed into them? If this laſt be the Caſe, I confeſs a Twelve-month is but a reaſonable Time to prepare a Nation for ſuch Abſurdities; a Nation, not trained up in Ignorance and Slavery, cannot bear to have all the

the Notions they have been bred to, with reſpect to publick Affairs, contradicted at once; a free People, that have been uſed to reaſon about *Liberty*, and *Trade*, and *Alliances*, and *Peace*, and *War*, cannot of a ſudden reſign their Underſtandings implicitly to the ſtrange Dictates of their new Maſters: It will require Time to manage ſuch a People to their own Turn; and if this mighty Change can be compaſſed even in a Year, they muſt be allowed to be able Politicians. And this, I confeſs, I take to be the true Reaſon why theſe Secrets in Politicks have not been produced ſooner. Things were not ripe for it; and even now, it ſeems, they do not think fit to bring theſe monſtrous Propoſitions into the Light, without a Guard of Reaſons, ſuch as they are, before to make Way for them, and another to ſecure the Rear. To judge of the Strength and Goodneſs of theſe Reaſons, I ſhall take them out of the confuſed Order they are in, which is not confuſed by Chance, it is the *moſt proper* for the Nature of Deceit, and moſt agreeable to the Genius of the Author, if I am not extremely miſtaken in my Gueſs of him. The Subſtance then of what he urges in Proof of his firſt Propoſition is this: *Upon the Duke of* Anjou's *ſucceeding to the Monarchy of* Spain, *in Breach of the Partition-Treaty, the Queſtion here in* England

was, Whether the Peace ſhould be continued, or a new War begun? Let me add, That the King had a little before changed Hands, and taken in a *Tory* M——y, but was thought to be ſtill influenced very much by thoſe he had parted with. The new M——rs and their Friends were againſt beginning a new War, *by reaſon of the Debts and Difficulties we laboured under*; that *France* was now much more formidable than in the laſt War, by the Acceſſion of the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy, and the Alliance of *Cologn* and *Bavaria*. By which Means he reckons the Allies would be weaker upon the Balance by one hundred and twenty thouſand Men than laſt Year, *the Succeſs of which we had no Reaſon to boaſt of*. He might have added, that beſides *Cologn* and *Bavaria*, *France* had engaged on their Side the Duke of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Savoy*, and the King of *Portugal*; but the firſt perhaps was paſſed over, becauſe the Mention of it would make too much for the Honour of the then Emperor, who had the Courage to begin this War alone, and made a ſucceſsful Campaign in *Italy* againſt the whole Power of *France*, and made his Way into the *Milaneze*, between the Duke of *Mantua* on one Side, and the Duke of *Savoy* on the other. It is hard to ſay, whether the Courage or Wiſdom of the Court of *Vienna*, in this Enterprize,

terprize, was moſt wonderful; for it was impoſſible to begin a War under greater Diſadvantages: It put the Emperor to a vaſt Expence, which his Condition could very ill bear, and ruined a Body of the braveſt Troops and beſt Officers then in *Europe*; but he thought all was at Stake, and therefore was reſolved to venture all: The Juſtice and Neceſſity of his Caſe, which would draw the Fate of all *Europe* after it, made him wiſely judge, that *England* and *Holland* would not be idle Spectators, while *France* was graſping at Univerſal Monarchy, and, I may ſay, had it in her Hands. Thus he judged, and thus it proved: And to that glorious Enterprize of his we owe it, that there was Room for beginning a new War, without which the Liberty of *Europe* had been long ſince loſt without Retrieve; and therefore if ſome of the Failures, charged on the Houſe of *Auſtria* in the Sequel of this Libel, were as great as this Author would have them thought, this firſt and wonderful Campaign in *Italy* makes no ſmall Amends, and at the ſame Time accounts for them; for it waſted ſo much of the Emperor's Treaſure, as he has no Way been able to make up; and that great but neceſſary Expence there has unavoidably made all their Efforts weaker ever ſince.

This impartial Writer ſinks this Campaign

upon us, and, that we might not think of it, declines mentioning the Duke of *Mantua* and the Duke of *Savoy* here in their proper Place. But there was another Reaſon for his not mentioning the laſt and the King of *Portugal.* It was very much to his Purpoſe to tell us, they were in Alliance with *France*, ſince that increaſed ſo much the more the Danger of the War; but then it would have led his Reader to reflect on the Wiſdom and Abilities of the M——y he was to run down, that they were able to bring off from *France* two ſuch conſiderable Allies: And it would, at the ſame Time, have furniſhed an Anſwer to the Objections he makes to the Treaty entered in with *Portugal*; for can any body ſuppoſe a Prince, actually engaged in Alliance with *France*, could be brought off, without offering him very favourable Articles, or engaging to ſecure him as effectually as we could againſt the Reſentments of the Side he left, whoſe Nearneſs and naval Force he had great Reaſon to be apprehenſive of; and therefore if ſuch an Alliance was worth having, as I dare ſay every body then thought it was at any Rate, it was not only juſt and reaſonable, but abſolutely neceſſary to give him all poſſible Aſſurances of Protection; which could no Way be done but by a Squadron of Ships at his Service. This was the leſt we could promiſe;

miſe; and nobody but a Fool can imagine, that this was giving up a Part of our Fleet to his Caprice or Humour, as this Author would inſinuate, ſo as that the Queen or her Admirals would not uſe their own Diſcretion, if he pretended to ſend our Ships upon ridiculous or unreaſonable Services, which could not be ſuppoſed to be within the Meaning of theſe Articles.

The *Portugal* Alliance, when rightly underſtood, is highly for the Honour of the late Miniſtry, and therefore the true State of it is concealed. And there was alſo a good Reaſon for taking no Notice in this Place of the Duke of *Savoy*. This was another great Service of the late M——y; but it is plain this Author acts with ſtill farther Views, with reguard to that Prince; for this is not the only proper Place in which he omits to mention him; he might have found, had he been in Humour, as many Faults in our Treaty with *Savoy*, as in that with *Portugal*; for as the Gaining him from *France* was a great Point, ſo very advantageous Articles were granted for it; how then could he eſcape the Laſh of this unmerciful Cenſor? This we may be ſure is not for nothing; there is a Myſtery in it, which perhaps I may explain before I end theſe Papers: Yet at preſent I ſhall only ſay, that in this Author's Scheme ſome Uſe is

hoped

hoped to be made of him towards diveſting the Houſe of *Auſtria* of their Right to the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, and by that Means facilitating an ill Peace.

Having thus accounted for our Author's Silence with reſpect to the Duke of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Savoy*, and the King of *Portugal*, when the Mention of them was ſo much for his Purpoſe, they being all in Alliance with *France* at the Beginning of the War, I proceed now to conſider the Force of his Argument. The Debts of the Nation and the Power of *France* were the Arguments the *Tories* uſed againſt engaging in a new War. Very well! and they were the ſame Arguments that frightned the King into the *Treaty of Partition.* Yet his Miniſters were impeached upon a bare Preſumption of their having adviſed it. But *France*, by the actual Poſſeſſion of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, and the Alliances it had made, was ſo much an Overmatch for us, *that human Probability ran with mighty Odds on that Side*; and in that Caſe, ſays our Author, *nothing under the moſt extreme Neceſſity ſhould force any State to engage in a War.* I ſay ſo too; but then I affirm, that was our Caſe, and ſo thought all thoſe who adviſed entring into the War; *They alledged how dangerous it would be for* England, *that* Philip *ſhould be King of* Spain, *that we could*

could have no Security for our Trade, while that Kingdom was ſubject to a Prince of the Bourbon *Family, nor any Hopes of preſerving the Balance of* Europe, *becauſe the Grandfather would in Effect be King, while his Grandſon had but the Title, and thereby have a better Opportunity than ever of purſuing his Deſign of Univerſal Monarchy.*

The Arguments for entring into the War may be ſet in a ſtronger Light, but I am content to take them in his own Words: The Preſervation of our *Trade*, of our *Eſtabliſhment*, and of the *Balance of Europe*, which could none of them be tolerably ſafe while the *Spaniſh* Monarchy was ſuffered to be in the Houſe of *Bourbon*, were of the utmoſt Concern for the Welfare of the Nation, and *nothing*, to uſe this Author's Words, *but the moſt extreme Neceſſity ſhould force* a Nation tamely to ſubmit to ſuch a *Uſurpation*, as in all human Probability muſt in a few Years bring on them certain Deſtruction. But that we were not under that extreme Neceſſity, the Event, God be thanked, has ſufficiently ſhewn. To ſet now this Matter in a true Light, whether we ſhould enter into a new War or not, was a Point that deſerved the moſt careful Conſideration, a great deal might be ſaid on both Sides; the Danger of ſuffering *France* to continue in the quiet Poſſeſſion

of

of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy was allowed on all Hands, the Diſpute was, whether there was a Poſſibility of preventing by a War the Danger that threatened us? Thoſe who were againſt a War thought of two Evils the leaſt was to be choſen, that if we kept quiet, the Danger was at ſome Diſtance, and the greater the Diſtance, the more Room for ſome lucky Chance that might alter the Face of Things; and with theſe Reaſons and Fears Party and Paſſion mixed themſelves, as it almoſt always happens in free Countries. The *Tory* M—y the King had taken, found they were but upon a very uncertain Foot, and that he did not heartily go into them. This made them apprehenſive he would, in a little Time, change Hands again, as in Effect he began to do before he died; that then the Adminiſtration would return into that Set of Men, that they had the greateſt Averſion to. All the ill Conſequences, that aroſe from the ill Humour of the Parliaments, from their Slowneſs to give Money, and the Inſufficiency of the Funds, which unavoidably occaſioned high Intereſt and great Diſcounts, were imputed ſolely to theſe Miniſters; and while Credit was in ſuch an ill State at Home, it was impoſſible any Thing could go well Abroad; the Differences would have continued between the King and his Parl——ts, and the publick Credit and

the

the Management of the War muſt have been upon the ſame ill Foot as before, in Spite of all the M———y could do. This made wiſe and honeſt Men exceeding fearful of the Conſequences of entring into a new War; in which it was impoſſible to ſucceed without Credit and Union at Home, and that under theſe Appearances there was little Hopes of. Beſides, the extreme ill State of the King's Health made it impoſſible for him to command in *Flanders* himſelf; and they did not then know how the Place of ſo great a General could be ſupplied; or at leaſt, his Authority and Influence over the *States* and a *Confederate* Army, they thought could not: And his Death at the Beginning of a new War, they apprehended, would throw all Things into Confuſion, and diſſolve the Alliances, that his Credit and Reputation were the chief Cement of. It was theſe Conſiderations made the *Tory* M——y and their Friends think, that upon the Whole a War was not adviſable, but others were of another Mind, they had a better Opinion both of the King himſelf and his M———s, and hoped that Things might be managed better than they had been; that the Greatneſs of the Danger we were expoſed to would make us lay aſide our Heats, and unite us at Home, and that the People would join heartily with the King,

and

and enable him with effectual Supplies to carry on the War with Vigour, and then Credit would revive of Courſe, and all Things would go well, which ever Side he took into the M———y. And in a new Parliament called to give his Majeſty the freſh Senſe of the Nation upon this important Subject, though their Affection to the King appeared by their Impeachments towards the latter End of the Seſſion, they adviſed him to make Alliances, and aſſured him he ſhould be ſupported in them. But what is of moſt Weight in this Queſtion, was the King's own Senſe of it. He knew the Affairs of *Europe* better than all his M——y together, and was a very good Judge of the Intereſts of the Empire and the Houſe of *Auſtria*, of the Power of *France*, and of the imminent Danger *England* and *Holland* were expoſed to by the Seizure of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy. And he uſed his utmoſt Endeavours to make the Nation ſenſible of the Neceſſities of a War, which could alone prevent the Ruin of them and the *States*. And that the King was very ſincere in his Opinion, we are very ſure from the Treaty of *Partition*, which ſufficiently ſhewed he had no Mind to enter into a new War, if it could poſſibly be avoided. For that was plainly the Deſign of that Treaty; the ill Succeſs of the former War, the Difficulties

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his Affairs were perplexed with, the Heats and Diviſions of his Subjects, the Treatment he met with from his Parl—ts, and his own ill Health, all together broke his Spirits, he had no Heart to think of a new War; but was willing to purchaſe Reſt at any Rate for the Remainder of his Days. And this he has been very liberally upbraided with by thoſe who were ſo angry at the *Partition* Treaty, that he gave up the Intereſt of the Nation to his own Eaſe, and did not care what became of the reſt of the World, ſo he were but quiet himſelf. But if this Prince, who was ſo weary of War, ſo deſirous to be at Eaſe, if he was of Opinion a new War was, upon the Violation of the *Partition Treaty*, abſolutely neceſſary, his Judgment will have more Weight with all impartial Men, than all that this Author or his Friends, at this Diſtance, can ſay to the Contrary. To diſpute now of the Neceſſity of the *War*, is the ſame Thing as to diſpute the Neceſſity of the *Revolution*; we are ſure thoſe who were beſt Judges of both, when Things were freſh, and they had the full View of all before them, thought both neceſſary; but when the Diſtance of our Dangers has made us forget the Greatneſs of them, we are to be taught that neither was ſo, by deſigning Men, who take Advantage of

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our Ignorance or Forgetfulneſs to impoſe on us the falſeſt Reaſonings, by a Miſrepreſentation of Facts, which the Generality of Readers are to judge of at ten or twenty Years Diſtance, when many of the moſt material Circumſtances are forgot; and they are to judge by ſuch only as theſe Writers think fit to give them, and thoſe are pickt and cull'd at their own Pleaſure, and either are partially repreſented, or quite altered, as beſt ſerves their Turn. But honeſt and impartial Men will be upon their Guard; they will not be beat out of their Senſes, and believe every abſurd Notion that ſhall be ſtarted, becauſe they do not diſtinctly remember all that relates to a Matter that was tranſacted many Years ſince. A Man that was once perſuaded of the Neceſſity of the War, has as much Right to maintain his Concluſion, that it is neceſſary, though he does not carry in his Mind exactly all the Proofs of it, as a Mathematician has to abide by a Propoſition in *Euclid*, though he has forgot ſome Part of the Demonſtration: He is ſure he could demonſtrate it once, and therefore is ſatisfied it is true, though he cannot readily prove it, it being many Years perhaps ſince he looked into the Proof of it. And as it would be great Impudence to tell ſuch a Man a Propoſition is falſe that he knows is true, and to go about by ſpecious Arguments

ments to make him believe the Contrary, it is no leſs impudent or abſurd to pretend to prove, at this Time of Day to a true *Britain*, that there was no Neceſſity for our entring into the War, when we are under the greateſt Conviction of the Truth of the Contrary; and it has been ſo long the unanimous and undiſputed Senſe of the Nation.

This Author does indeed allow the Caſe of the *Dutch* to be extremely dangerous, as they have ſet forth in their Declaration of War; but then he ſays, *The Grounds of their Quarrel are ſuch as only affect themſelves, or at leaſt more immediately than any other Prince or State*; and that *they were neareſt and moſt expoſed to the Fire*. What then? Were not we near enough to be burnt, becauſe they were a little nearer? Men that can remember that Juncture of Affairs, muſt own they could not think of it without trembling, the Danger was ſo extremely great; and what is very remarkable, it is probable nothing ſaved *Holland* ſo much as the Backwardneſs *England* ſhewed to come into the War. *France* hoped we ſhould be content to lie ſtill, if they did not preſs too hard upon *Holland*, and that Conſideration diverted the Storm, and gave them Time to make Alliances, and provide for their Defence; but the very Sight of ſo near a Danger was ſufficient to convince us it

was not our Buſineſs to lie ſtill, but to rouſe ourſelves while we could, ſince ſuch an *exorbitant Power* might at any Time execute the Deſtruction it then threatened; and when they ſhall ever be ruined, our Turn is next; and next to the neareſt ſure is near enough, though this Author would perſuade us, we are no more concerned to be one of the *Principals* in this War than *Pruſſia*, or any other Power that came afterwards into that Alliance; than which nothing can be more falſe, unleſs the Preſervation of *Great-Britain* be of no more Conſequence than that of a little Dukedom or petty State. Shall we be no more concerned at the *exorbitant Power* of *France*, which brings our *Liberty* and *Trade* into the utmoſt Danger, than People who have neither Liberty nor Trade to be concerned for, and can ſuffer little by the Change, whatever Maſters they are under? Is the Preſervation of *England*, which is the great Support of the Proteſtant Religion, of no Conſequence? And if it be, ſhall we not think it in Danger from *France*, becauſe ſome other States have nothing to apprehend upon this Head, as being of the ſame Religion with the *French*: But ſuppoſe all other Princes and States in the Alliance as much expoſed to *France*, by the Uſurpation of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, as ourſelves; what if they are ſo

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feeble that they cannot help themſelves, or ſo indolent that they won't, or that they are govern'd by a Faction in the *French* Intereſt, muſt we therefore be inſenſible of our Danger, or not exert ourſelves to prevent it? By this Author's Argument, *Pruſſia*, *Savoy*, *Portugal*, or any other ſmall State, ſhould contribute as much to the War as *Great-Britain*, becauſe they are as much intereſted in it; and if more, they ſhould contribute more. *Thoſe, who muſt in Courſe be the greateſt Sufferers, ought*, he ſays, *to bear the greateſt Weight*, without conſidering their Strength. And this he illuſtrates by a very apt Compariſon: *If a Houſe be on Fire, the Owner is ſure to be undone firſt, and it is not impoſſible that thoſe at next Door may eſcape by a Shower from Heaven*, &c. Lord have Mercy upon us, if this is all we have to truſt to. It would be a pretty Sight, when a Houſe is on Fire, to have a Conſultation held in the Neighbourhood, what each ſhould do towards extinguiſhing it, and if it ſhould be ſeriouſly debated how many Buckets and Hands each ſhould employ, and the Council ſhould end in this wiſe Reſolve, that the Number of Buckets and Hands ſhould be in exact Proportion to the Nearneſs each was at to the Houſe where the Fire began. This is ſo ridiculous a Rule, that it would be impoſſible

to be complied with, unleſs People's Abilities alſo were exactly proportioned to the Nearneſs of the Danger; and if nobody would do their Part, or more than their Part, till the reſt of their Neighbours did theirs, I humbly conceive the whole Neighbourhood would be burnt out. Suppoſe a *Lord*, a *Merchant*, a *Draper*, a *Mechanick*, and a poor *Alms-houſe* were next to one another; that a Fire broke out in this laſt, and the *Lord*'s Houſe particularly were next the Water, would not any body think this *Lord* a Madman, who had a great Number of Servants about him, and more Buckets perhaps than the whole Street, if he would not ſuffer a Bucket to be touched, or a Hand to ſtir, till the poor *Alms-Women* had furniſhed their Part, in Proportion to the Danger, though they have not perhaps one Servant nor one Bucket, and muſt inevitably periſh without Help? Or ſhall he ſtay to ſee this Houſe burnt, and the next on Fire, and whether the *Mechanick* and the reſt do their Part, for Fear of doing more than his Share? If what this Author advances concerning other States, to prove that we ſhould do no more, be Senſe, ſo is this; and if this be not Senſe, no more is the other. It is his own Compariſon, and there is in the Caſes no Difference. If a Houſe is in ſo much Danger of Fire, that nothing can ſave it but a *Shower*

from

from Heaven, a Man muſt be mad that won't do all he can to extinguiſh it; and ſo are we, if we do not exert ourſelves to our utmoſt, in Caſe our Danger be as great.

But becauſe the Danger was neareſt *Holland*, our Author thinks we ought to have acted only as *Auxiliaries*. This is ſo extraordinary a Reaſon, that if it be good, it muſt deſtroy all Alliances. If *England* ought not to have entered into the *Grand Alliance*, becauſe *Holland* was more concerned, no more ſhould any other Power in *Europe*, ſince neither the Danger nor the Abilities of any two *States* can be exactly equal; and therefore there can be no Allowance where all Parties ſhall be *Principals*. Though in the laſt War this Writer allows the *Empire*, *England* and *Holland*, were all *Principals*, and he does not pretend to find any Fault with it. I muſt obſerve, that a Year ago the Cant of the Party was not ſettled, nor were they agreed what Senſe certain Words were to be uſed in; for in the *Letter to the Examiner*, *Principals* is oppoſed to *Confederates*, and means the Engaging farther than any of the other *Confederates*, in the Expence and Burthen of the War; but no Fault is there found with our entring into the *Grand Alliance*; on the Contrary it is commended: But here, in this Writer, *Principals* is taken

in a new Senſe, and oppoſed to *Auxiliaries*: By which the Author means, that we ought not to have gone into the *Grand Alliance* at all, but contented ourſelves to aſſiſt *Holland* with Ten Thouſand Men only, according to an old Treaty; this, he ſays, *would have been prudent and generous*, and *that the States demanded no more*. True, they did not demand more, becauſe we were by no Treaty then in being, obliged to do more for them; but where is the Generoſity of furniſhing this ſmall *Quota* according to the Treaties we were bound by? Or, where would have been the Prudence in giving an Aſſiſtance that muſt needs come to nothing? But our Author, who with his Friends is greatly skilled in Foreign Affairs, *makes no Doubt* but *Holland*, with that Aſſiſtance alone, *would have been able to defend their Frontiers*; and if they could not, he makes no Doubt in the ſecond Place, *but the* Spaniards *would not have ſuffered the* French *to poſſeſs themſelves of* Flanders. Now I, in my Turn, *make no Doubt*, but this Author is convinced as much as I am, that all this is egregious Nonſenſe: Firſt, to fancy that the *Spaniards* would hinder the *French* from poſſeſſing themſelves of *Flanders*, when, by the Treachery of the Elector of *Bavaria*, they were at that Time, in one Night, put into the actual Poſſeſſion of all the ſtrong Places

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in it. When this Author writes again, I deſire the Favour of him to let us know, which Way they could have been diſpoſſeſſed? And his other Fancy is ſtill more abſurd, that *Holland*, who could not, in Conjunction with *England* and *Spain*, keep their *Frontiers* laſt War, ſhould now be able to defend themſelves when their Frontier is loſt, againſt the united Force of *France* and *Spain*, with no other Aſſiſtance from *England* but that poor one of Ten Thouſand Men. And as if theſe two ridiculous Aſſertions wanted no other Proof, but were as plain as firſt Principles, by Help of this ſhort Charm; *I make no Doubt*, he gravely infers from them, *That there was no Sort of Neceſſity for us to proceed farther, although we had been in a better Condition; but our Politicians had other Views, a Grand Alliance was therefore to be made between the* Emperor, England, *and the* States-General. Well is it for us our Politicians then were not of the Size of thoſe who now preſcribe to us; ſince it has been ſhewn to the greateſt Degree of Evidence, that the War was neceſſary, and that nothing could have been ſo fatal to us, as to ſit ſtill and look on, while *France* was over-running the reſt of the World. Nothing was ſo much for the Service of *France* as this nonſenſical Doctrine of *Auxiliaries*, ſince upon the ſame Foot they

would have acted as *Auxiliaries* to the Duke of *Anjou*; by which Means *Holland* and the *Emperor* would ſoon have been out of Breath, and muſt, by their own Submiſſion to *France*, have ſhewn us the Way to ſubmit too: For had not we come into the War, neither of thoſe Powers could have he'd out another Campaign; and what would have been the Conſequence, ſhould we ſuffer them to be over-run? Or ſhould we then think fit to help them? If the laſt was for our Intereſt, ſure it was much more to our Purpoſe to help them in Time, when our Aſſiſtance could be of ſome Uſe, and not when they had exhauſted themſelves beyond Recovering, by exerting their Strength all at once, and that without Succeſs, as it muſt have been againſt a Power that was ſo much an Over-match: For this Author has before told us, That the Balance was altered ſince the laſt War no leſs than *one hundred thouſand Men on the Side of* France, and the Balance he owns was much too ſtrong on that Side before. And yet the ſame Author, who ſays this, would make us believe *Holland* and the *Emperor* might have been a Match for *France* by themſelves. Men muſt be ſtrangely in Love with Contradictions, that can take up with ſuch Stuff as this. The Plain of the Caſe is this: The Power of *France* was ſo *exorbitant*, that if *England* won't

won't engage in the War, the Liberty of *Europe* muſt be loſt, let the other two Powers do what they will. If they hazard a War, they are ſo over-match'd, that it can end in nothing but the Ruin of them: If for Fear of an ill War, they leave *France* in the quiet Poſſeſſion of their Uſurpations, they muſt reſolve to ſubmit to ſuch Conditions as ſhall be impoſed on them. Nothing could hinder this but a vigorous Union of all the Allies; and if it were done at all, it muſt be done at firſt, without giving the Enemy Time to take the proper Methods to ſecure the Poſſeſſion of what they had uſurped. This was the only Part theſe Powers could take to reſcue the expiring Liberty of *Europe*, and *England* wiſely came into it, as the only poſſible Way to ſecure their *Religion*, *Trade*, *Government*, and what is the only laſting Security of all the reſt, the *Proteſtant Succeſſion*. And this was ſo far from being a haſty Step in *England*, that it had like to have been delayed too long; for though the King of *Spain* died the 1ſt of *November* N. S. 1700. the Parl-t in Being was diſſolved, by whoſe Advice I deſire this Writer to inform us, by which Means the King was diſabled from giving any Aſſurances of Aſſiſtance to the Elector of *Bavaria*, and that determined the latter to throw himſelf upon *France*, and betray to them the whole

Spaniſh

Spaniſh Netherlands. The new Parl—t did not meet till *February*, about ten Days after the *Netherlands* were given up, it was almoſt the End of the Seſſion before they adviſed the King to make Alliances; and the End of that Year another Parl—t was called, who approved the Advice of the former, and War was not actually proclaimed till *May* 4, 1702. about two Months after the King's Death. What now is there in this that can be ſaid to be haſty or precipitate? When did any State deliberate ſo long in a Caſe of ſo much Danger? What Odds was it but the *Emperor* had been beat in *Italy*, and *Holland* had been made a Province to *France?* It was what all Men will allow *France* might have done, and it was Infatuation they did not: But if they had done what they had in their Power to do, what had become of our wiſe and mature Deliberations? What then can be more falſe or impudent than to ſay as this Author does, *That without offering at any other Remedy, without taking Time to conſider the Conſequences, or to reflect on our own Condition, we haſtily engaged in a War that has coſt us* 60 *Millions.*

But to proceed, As this Author declares our Entrance into the War to be *againſt all Manner of Prudence or common Reaſon*; ſo he undertakes to prove, that *England* is not obliged to purſue the Ends of it; or rather, that the

Reſtitution

Reſtitution of Spain is not one of thoſe Ends. *The Queen's Declaration of War*, he tells us, *does not take Notice of the Duke of* Anjou's *Succeſſion to that Monarchy, as a Subject of Quarrel.* This he ſays, *p.* 22. *&* *p.* 16. he gives us a Part of this Declaration. Now the grand Deſign of this Book being to perſuade the Nation to an ill Peace againſt the Conſent of their Allies, and the Senſe of Juſtice and Honour, which have always governed our Parl—ts in Matters which the *Dignity* of the *Crown* and the *Reputation* of their *Country* are concerned in, being a great Obſtruction to ſuch pernicious Meaſures, to remove the Scruples that will ariſe in honeſt Minds, this Author labours this ſecond Point extremely, and is at Abundance of Pains to explain away the Senſe and Meaning of the Treaties we are under. An ill Peace is what the whole Scheme of the Author aims at, this is the great Point which all his others center in, which he hopes thus to bring about. 1. To go into the Grand Alliance was wrong in itſelf. 2. The Terms of it do not oblige us to inſiſt upon the *Reſtitution of the Spaniſh Monarchy*. 3. The Allies are a Pack of Rogues, and if this was ſtipulated in the Articles of the *Grand Alliance*, they not having performed their Parts, we are not obliged to ſtand to it. Is not this a noble Scheme? Who now can ſcruple conſenting

ſenting to a ſeparate Peace without *Spain* and the *Indies?* What Difficulty can any one make againſt giving up ſuch Allies? How can we think ourſelves bound by what is not expreſly mentioned in the Articles of our Treaties with them? And, in a doubtful Caſe, how can we be ſo nice in departing from an Alliance, which we ought not at firſt to have entred into? This is the Scheme contrived to break the *Grand Alliance*, and I will undertake, by the ſame Arguments, to undermine the Revolution; which Purpoſe this Scheme will, with little Alteration, as well ſerve, as that it is now uſed for: And I doubt not but in a little Time it will; our Author having given us a plain Intimation he has it in his Thoughts, as ſoon as he has enabled his Friends to carry the firſt great Point of an *ill Peace.* For what elſe can be the Meaning of that ſcandalous Intimation he gives of this, *p.* 39. That the *Legiſlature* may have Occaſion *to change the Succeſſion, if the Neceſſities of the Nation may require it.* Till this Author tells us what thoſe *Neceſſities* can be, and proves the *Legiſlature* have ſuch a Power, I humbly beg Leave to tell him, there can be no ſuch Neceſſities, except what his Friends ſhall create us by an *ill Peace*; nor have the *Legiſlature*, I conceive, Power to change the *Succeſſion in the Houſe of* Hanover, without ſuch Neceſſities,

Neceſſities, it being made by the *Union* a fundamental Article, which our *Repreſentatives* are choſen to preſerve, but have no Power to deſtroy; but I ſhall have more Occaſion to ſpeak of this, when I come to conſider the *Barrier Treaty*, by which the *Succeſſion* is ſecured, and which, for this Reaſon chiefly, I preſume our Author is ſo angry at, and makes ſo many Objections againſt, every one of which, I promiſe to ſhew, is malicious, and ridiculouſly falſe.

But to return; Of the three Parts of which this noble Scheme conſiſts, I think I have pretty well confounded the firſt, and ſhewn it was not wrong for *England* to go into the *Grand Alliance*; but that on the Contrary, it was highly reaſonable and abſolutely neceſſary. I come now to ſhew there is as little Senſe or Reaſon in what he advances in Proof of his ſecond Point; but beg Leave firſt to obſerve, That if all his three Points were fully proved, they do not prove what they are brought for. For if our Treaties do not oblige us to inſiſt on the Reſtitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, and our Allies do not deſerve it of us? Shall we therefore be falſe to ourſelves, becauſe we need not be true to them? Shall we make a Peace without *Spain* and the *Indies*, in the Reſtitution of which we have ourſelves the greateſt Intereſt, becauſe the Houſe of *Auſtria* have

have not done ſo much as we expected, tho' perhaps they did all they could? Shall we not inſiſt upon a good *Barrier* for the *Dutch*, or rather ſhall we oblige them to quit that which they have Poſſeſſion of, becauſe ſome Men are not pleaſed with them, and therefore take a great deal of Pains to make us out of Humour with the beſt Ally we ever had or can have, and who, inſtead of being falſe to us, have this War outdone themſelves, and ſhewn the moſt generous Concern for the Intereſt of *England*: But ſuppoſing all that this Writer ſays of them were true, ſhall we expoſe ourſelves to Danger for the Pleaſure of expoſing them? Shall not we inſiſt on a good Barrier, becauſe we are told they do not deſerve of us all we have done towards it? Shall we lay ourſelves open to all the Conſequences of an inſecure Peace, and, in Complaiſance to the *old inveterate perpetual ſworn* Enemy of our *Religion* and *Country*, ſacrifice ourſelves as well as our Allies, by receding from the eſſential Points of a good and laſting Peace? If this won't follow from our Author's Propoſitions, as it is certain it will not, all he endeavours to prove, in Truth proves nothing as to the main Point, which is all is aimed at. For though our Honour might be diſengaged, our Intereſt is not, the Safety of *England* and *Holland* eſpecially are inſeparably inter-

interwoven, and neither can ſtand long without the other.

Having ſhewn the Reader in few Words, how wide a Difference there is between this Author's Concluſion and his Premiſes, and that though the laſt were proved, the other would remain to be proved as much as ever: I come now to ſhew, that the ſecond is abſolutely falſe, and that *England* is obliged by her Treaties to inſiſt on the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh Monarchy*, particularly of *Spain* and the *Indies*. To prove this, we need only look into the Words of the Treaties themſelves. This is ſo evident in the Treaties with *Savoy* and *Portugal*, that there is not ſo much as a Pretence for denying it. And I would be glad to know why the Articles of theſe Treaties are not as obligatory as thoſe of the *Grand Alliance*. I am ſure there is one Reaſon why they ſhould be more, and that is, that when the *Grand Alliance* was made, the Allies were in the utmoſt Conſternation. The ſudden Invaſion and Seiſure of the whole *Spaniſh* Monarchy made the Danger that threatned them appear ſo terrible, that any Terms, while they were in that Fright, which a moſt unjuſt Uſurpation had put them into, ſeemed tolerable. And therefore their true Senſe cannot be ſo well judged by what they did then, as when they were come a little to themſelves,

ſelves, and a good Campaign in *Flanders* had made them think they were in a better Condition to make a Stand, than they could hope to be, when the *French* were under the Walls of *Nimeguen*. This gives a greater Validity to the ſubſequent Treaties, than to that *of the Grand Alliance*, and the true Senſe of the Allies can be much better ſeen by them. Beſides that general Articles are to be explained by particular ones, and not particular ones by ſuch as are conceived in general Terms. And therefore the beſt Way to know what is meant by *an equitable and reaſonable Satisfaction to the Emperor for his Pretenſion to the Spaniſh Monarchy*, is to ſee how the Allies have expreſſed themſelves in their other Treaties; which Treaties can, on no Pretence, be called the Contrivance of a Faction, having been made in the ſecond Year of the War, when all Places of Truſt were in the Hands of Men moſt zealouſly affected to the Church, and the Parliament perfectly of a Piece with them. So that there can be no Room for weakening the Force and Authority of Treaties made before this pretended Faction was formed, or ſo much as thought of, nobody pretended to complain of wrong Meaſures, every body was pleaſed with the Reſtoration of Credit, the Succeſſes of the War, and the wiſe and frugal Management of the Treaſury. It may therefore

fore juſtly be preſumed, that no Treaties were better conſidered, or more prudently entred into by her Majeſty, than thoſe with *Savoy* and *Portugal*, in which the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy to King *Charles* is expreſly ſtipulated. But what puts this Matter paſt all Diſpute, and undeniably proves that the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, eſpecially of *Spain* and the *Indies*, is no *new Incident*, ſtarted ſince the Grand Alliance, as this Author pretends, is the firſt Separate Article of the Grand Alliance in 1689, wherein *England* and *Holland* engage, *That in Caſe the King of* Spain *ſhould die without Iſſue, they will, with all their Forces, aſſiſt his Sacred Imperial Majeſty, or his Heirs, in taking the Succeſſion of the* Spaniſh *Monarchy lawfully belonging to that Houſe.* Is this now a *new Incident*, when it appears it is what the Allies obliged themſelves to a Dozen Years before? Is this the Work of a late Faction, which is plainly as old as the *Revolution?* And ſince the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy is ſo expreſly articled for in our Treaties both before and ſince the Second Grand Alliance, ſhall we pretend it was not ever intended by the Allies, nor within the Meaning of the Grand Alliance, but the Contrivance of a Faction here to perpetuate the War, becauſe it is not in ſo many Words expreſſed, but only that *an equitable and reaſon-*

able Satisfaction ſhall be procured the Emperor for his Pretenſion to the *Spaniſh* Succeſſion? Is it not apparent, that this was always the Deſign of the Allies, though it was not, at the Time of the Treaty, thought proper to be ſo expreſs'd? And do not this Writer know what the Reaſons were for their expreſſing themſelves as they did? Had not *England* and *Holland* been frighted into an Acknowledgment of the Duke of *Anjou*, though in a very private, obſcure, unauthoritative Way? And did not the Apprehenſion they were then under make them think it impoſſible to recover the whole Monarchy, though they thought it juſt and neceſſary for their own Defence? But when People think themſelves upon the Brink of Ruin, they are glad to compound on any Terms; and would *France* have taken them at that Advantage, and hearkened to an Accommodation, they would, to prevent a War which ſeemed ſo hazardous, have given up many Points which they had Right to inſiſt on, and ought to do, as ſoon as they felt their Ground, and were in a Condition to ſupport their juſt Pretences by their Sword: It was the particular Circumſtances of that frightful Juncture, and nothing elſe, that made the Allies expreſs themſelves in ſuch general Words, which they reſerved to themſelves the Power of explaining; and have both by previous

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and ſubſequent Treaties, ſufficiently ſhewn their true Meaning and Intention. If God ſhould bleſs their Arms, it is evident they thought the Reſtitution of the whole Monarchy ought to be inſiſted on as the Emperor's Right, and neceſſary for their own Defence.

It appears then, that this Reſolution againſt any Peace without *Spain*, which, he ſays, *is a new Incident* GRAFTED *upon the original Quarrel by the Intrigues of a Faction*, is an expreſs Article of the firſt Grand Alliance; and that I take to be the proper Place to look for the Grounds of our *original Quarrel*. This *new Incident is alſo grafted* in the twenty-firſt Article of the Alliance between the Emperor, *England*, *Portugal*, and *Holland*; and in the ſixth Article of her Majeſty's League with the Duke of *Savoy*. *This new Incident* has likewiſe been five Times *grafted* in her Majeſty's Speeches from the Throne, or Anſwers to the Addreſſes of Parliament. It has been four Times *grafted* in the Addreſſes of the Houſe of Commons; and five Times in thoſe of the Houſe of Lords; and by both our Parties ſucceſſively. This *new Incident was grafted* in the Preliminary Articles concluded by the Miniſters of the Allies with thoſe of the *French* King in the Year 1709; and it was *grafted* in the Reſolution of *the States* in the Year 1710, in which the other Allies con-

curred. So that if this *new Incident*, which her Majeſty herſelf ſays, was the *chief Inducement of the War*, or of this Author's *original Quarrel*, has ſince been *grafted* upon it by the Intrigues of a Faction, as he ingenuouſly obſerves, her Majeſty, her Parliaments, and her Allies, are the *Faction* that have done it. And is not this now a very modeſt and judicious Reaſoner, fit to be employed in Writing for ſuch a Peace? Not to mention that quaint Expreſſion of *grafting an Incident upon a Quarrel*, becauſe we muſt always expect to meet with thoſe Tinſel Figures, when ſuch Men or their Maſters will be ſcribling about Politicks: But ſhall the Reſolutions of both Houſes, confirmed by the Queen, be called by ſuch Writers, *the Intrigues of a Faction?* What will become of our Conſtitution, if the moſt ſacred Sanctions of it are to be treated in ſo inſolent a Manner? Nay, what will become of the Nation itſelf? Who will treat with us, or truſt us? And what a Figure ſhall we make in *Europe*, if, as often as Alterations are made at Court, thoſe that come into Power ſhall pervert all that has been done by their Predeceſſors, and cancel the Reſolutions of her Majeſty and our Parliaments, which have been made by both Parties alternately,

nately, and in which they themſelves have concurred?

To explain away the Meaning of all Treaties by the Help of a few general Words in one, which at the ſame Time it is ſo eaſy to account for, is juſt as reaſonable as the Pretence of the *Jacobites* and their Friends to deſtroy the Validity of the *Revolution* by virtue of a ſingle Clauſe of *Non-Reſiſtance*, in the famous Act of 12 *Ch.* II. in Contempt of, and in Contradiction to all the Laws made before and ſince in the Defence of the Rights of the People; as if it were fitter for the whole Body of our Laws to be explained away by vertue of a few Words in a ſingle Act made at an extraordinary Juncture, than that ſingle Clauſe ſhould be interpreted in a Senſe agreeable to the Spirit of our Laws, and the very Fundamental of our Conſtitution. The *Revolution* will run in my Thoughts while I am upon this Argument, for I cannot but fear, that the ſame Faction, that are in ſo much Haſte to over-turn the *Grand Alliance*, mean no leſs to deſtroy the *Revolution*, and whether they do directly mean it or not, there is ſo cloſe a Connexion between the two, that the Confounding of one will in all human Probability draw after it the Subverſion of the other. But had we no other Treaties to explain the ge-

neral Words of the Treaty of the Grand Alliance by, the Meaning of the Allies is ſufficiently plain from the Articles of this very Treaty; for if they propoſed nothing elſe to themſelves but the Procuring for the Emperor *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Sicily*, *the Lands upon the Coaſts of* Tuſcany, *and the Iſlands in the* Mediterranean *that belong to the Crown of* Spain, which is expreſly covenanted for in the fifth Article, they would always have expreſſed themſelves in that Manner, and not made Uſe of thoſe general Words of *an equitable and reaſonable Satisfaction*, under which *England* and *Holland* meant *Spain* and the *Indies*, which the Emperor knew was their Concern as much, or rather more, than his; and therefore if they were, for certain Reaſons, content that *Spain* and the *Indies* ſhould not be mentioned by Name, the Emperor was ſatisfied as long as thoſe Parts were named, in which his own Safety was moſt immediately involved. That the Allies intended to explain theſe Words, ſo as to take in the Reſtitution of the whole Monarchy, if they were in Condition to inſiſt on it, is plain from hence, and has ever ſince been ſo underſtood; and no longer ago than laſt Year, the Author of the *Letter to the Examiner* ſo little dreamt of the Notions that have been ſtarted ſince, that he freely

freely owns, That *to reſtore the* Spaniſh *Monarchy to the Houſe of* Auſtria, was one of the *wiſe Motives of this War*. And the ſame Thing is confeſſed by the Lords, in their *Repreſentation* in *February* laſt; and from thence we may be ſure it was then the Senſe of the M——y. And to take away all Poſſibility of a Pretence, that this was not a wilful and deſigned Corruption, a *Satisfaction* for the Emperor, and a *Security* for *England* and the *States*, is the Language that runs through the whole Treaty; and in the Article but juſt before this, we have theſe Words, *For obtaining the Satisfaction aforeſaid for his Imperial Majeſty, and the aforeſaid Security for his* Britannick *Majeſty and the States*. Can we ſuppoſe this Writer did not read the whole Treaty, or not ſo much as caſt his Eye upon the Article immediately preceding this, which it was ſo much for his Purpoſe to pervert? No ſure, this *Corruption*, in ſo important an Article, muſt be allowed to be a Maſter-piece of Cunning, not the Work of a vulgar Hand, or of a *ſwift* Pen; and the Author with Reaſon thought himſelf ſafe from a Diſcovery, by the very Greatneſs of the Crime, which is ſuch, that a Man muſt be loſt to all Honeſty, before he can be ſuſpected to be guilty of it.

But it is Time to have done with this Argument; I ſhall now turn myſelf to my Author, and let the World ſee he is as good at corrupting Witneſſes, and thoſe not private ones, but the moſt publick and ſolemn Acts, as he is at impoſing weak and falſe Reaſonings, of which we have three ſcandalous Inſtances in a very ſmall Compaſs: One in the Piece he gives us of the *Queen's Declaration of War*, and two others in the Tranſlation of of one ſingle *Article* of the Grand Alliance. P. 16. he tells us, the *Queen's Declaration* is grounded on the Grand Alliance, and then gives this Extract of it, that it recites the *French* King's *keeping in Poſſeſſion a great Part of the* Spaniſh *Dominions*, *ſeizing* Milan, *and the* Spaniſh *Low-Countries*, &c. Now in the *Declaration* between *Spaniſh Dominions* and *ſeizing* Milan, are theſe very remarkable Words, *exerciſes an abſolute Authority over all that Monarchy, having ſeized* Milan, *&c.* Were theſe Words, does any body think, left out by Chance, or for nothing? No, by no means; it was for our Author's Purpoſe to affirm, as he does, *p.* 22. that the *Q——n's Declaration takes no Notice of the Duke of* Anjou's *Succeſſion to that Monarchy, as a Subject of Quarrel.* But do not the Words I have quoted, in Effect, ſay the Thing, though they forbear the

the Name? They certainly do, and that no Doubt was the true Reaſon they were left out. But our Author is not content to ſuppreſs a very material Part of one Evidence, but does, in the moſt ſhameful Manner, falſify another in two Places of the eighth Article of the Grand Alliance, *p.* 68. firſt in theſe Words: *Nor is Peace to be made without having firſt obtained a juſt and reaſonable Satisfaction for his* Cæſarean *Majeſty, and for his Royal Majeſty of* Great-Britain, *and a particular Security to the Lords the States-General, of their Dominions, Provinces, Titles,* &c. Now the true Tranſlation of the Original Words is this: *No Peace ſhall be made, unleſs an equitable and ſeaſonable Satisfaction for his Imperial Majeſty, and the particular Security of the Kingdoms, Provinces, Dominions,* &c. *for his Majeſty of* Great-Britain *and the States-General, be firſt obtained:* Whence now ariſes this great Difference between the two Tranſlations; was it becauſe our Author did not underſtand the Original? Why then did he not give us this Article as it is tranſlated in the *general Collection of Treaties*, which was much eaſier to do, than to be at the Pains to tranſlate ſo long an Article himſelf, had it not been to ſerve a Purpoſe. He would have us believe *we had no Quarrel with* France, but

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his owning the *Pretender*, p. 16, 22. and other Places, which he thinks was a trifling Quarrel, and might eaſily have been made up. *For the* French *Court declared, they did not acknowledge the Pretender, but only gave him the Title of King, which was allowed by* Auguſtus *to the King of* Sweden; how much Falſehood in ſo few Words! Firſt, what King *Auguſtus* was allowed was by Treaty: Secondly, He was not allowed to ſtyle himſelf *King of* Poland, but *King* only; and therefore this is not applicable to the Caſe of the *Pretender*, who was ſtyled not ſimply King *James*, as the other was King *Auguſtus*, but his *Britannick* Majeſty, and the King of *Great-Britain*; for the Truth of which I refer to all the *Paris Gazettes*, and other publick Papers. It is therefore falſe to ſay he had the Title of King, but was not acknowledged; but the Author's Scheme required he ſhould ſay this, and to ſupport it, he tranſlates the eighth Article in ſuch a Manner, as to make us think, nothing elſe was meant but that Satisfaction ſhould be made the King for this *Indignity* and *great Affront* put on him. But if we let this Article ſpeak its true Senſe, it covenants for the Security of his *Majeſty's Kingdom, Dominions, Navigation and Commerce*, as well as for thoſe of the *States-General*,

neral, the Contrary to which this Author would feign have thought, both to reflect upon the King, and leſſen as much as may be the particular Intereſt *England* has in the Grand Alliance.

So much for this Paſſage; the other is ſtill more ſcandalous. A little lower in this Article, it is covenanted, *Particularly that the* French *may never be in Poſſeſſion of the* Spaniſh Weſt-Indies, *and that they may not have the Liberty of Navigation for Conveniency of Trade, under any Pretence whatſoever, neither directly nor indirectly; except it is agreed, that the Subjects of* Great-Britain *and* Holland *may have full Power to uſe and enjoy all the ſame Privileges as they did uſe and enjoy at the Time of the King of* Spain's *Death.* Would not any Man think by theſe Words, that the *French*, by this Article, are no otherwiſe excluded from trading to the *Spaniſh Weſt Indies*, but on Suppoſition that *England* and *Holland* are denied the Uſe and Enjoyment of the ſame Privileges they had formerly? And that if they are allowed to uſe and enjoy thoſe Privileges, that then the Excluſion of *France* from that Trade is at an End? This and nothing elſe can be the Meaning of theſe Words, and it moſt admirably ſuited our Author's Deſign, which is to perſuade us to ſuffer

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the *French* to have a free Trade to the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, if they will allow us the ſame we had before, in direct Contradiction to the Intereſt of *England*, and the plain Senſe of this Article, which ought to be, and in the *Collection of Treaties* is tranſlated thus —— *And particularly that the* French *ſhall never get into the Poſſeſſion* (or make themſelves Maſters) *of the* Spaniſh Indies, *neither ſhall they be permitted to ſail thither* (or ſend any Ships thither) *on the Account of Traffick* (or to exerciſe Trade there) *directly or indirectly, on any Pretence whatſoever*, there ends that Clauſe——Then follows, *and laſtly*, (the ſaid Peace ſhall not be concluded) *unleſs full Liberty be granted to the Subjects of the King of* Great-Britain *and* States-General, *to exerciſe and enjoy all the ſame Privileges*, &c. as they did uſe and enjoy at the King of *Spain*'s Death. Thus we ſee it is an expreſs and full Excluſion of the *French* from the *Spaniſh* Trade in the *Indies*, upon any Pretence whatſoever. And a Peace made on other Terms will be made in Violation of a very material Article, which this Writer has the Impudence to falſify to that Degree, as to make it ſpeak contrary to its true Meaning to cover Deſigns they dare not own.

But this Article, he ſays, was quoted *to put the Matter out of Diſpute*: And ſo indeed it does: For if there were no other Article in all our Alliances, we are bound not to give *Spain* and the *Indies* to the Houſe of *Bourbon* by this very Article, which he has produced to juſtify it. The Article ſays, No Peace is to be made *without a Security that* France *and* Spain *ſhall never be united*: But if the Houſe of *Bourbon* has both, what poſſible *Security* can be given that they ſhall never be united? Is it impoſſible for the *Dauphin* or the Duke of *Anjou* to die without Children? And what then can hinder thoſe Kingdoms from being united under one Prince, as they already are under one Management? Shall we depend upon a new Renunciation made by any of the Deſcendants in a right Line from *Lewis* XIV? I ſhould be glad to ſee any of the Friends of *France* propoſe to us for Security a *French* Renunciation. This is, I believe, one of thoſe few Things which they will not have the Confidence to do.

But the Article ſays farther, as I have already ſhewn, That no Peace ſhall be made till we *have Security that the* French *ſhall never be in Poſſeſſion of the* Spaniſh Weſt-Indies: And I would fain know how we ſhall be ſecured of this, if *Spain* be given to the Houſe

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of *Bourbon.* Are not the *French,* at this Time, in Poſſeſſion of the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies?* Have they not Settlements there in *Lima* and other Places? Or have they promiſed our Negotiators of Peace, that for their Sakes they will quit thoſe Settlements? If they have not done this, and will not be as good as their Word, then I ſay, we cannot make Peace with them upon the Terms propoſed, if there were no Article againſt it but this, which is here judiciouſly referred to: We neither have, nor ever can have, a *ſufficient Proviſion that* France *and* Spain *ſhall never be united.* And we are ſo far from being aſſured, that *the* French *ſhall never be in Poſſeſſion of the* Spaniſh Weſt-Indies, that we know they are poſſeſſed of good Part of them already, and have *more* granted to them by a Treaty with the Duke of *Anjou* and his Grandfather; ſo that I might venture to put the whole Iſſue of the Diſpute between this worthy Author and his Opponents, upon the Conſtruction of this ſingle Article, which he has obliged the World with a Tranſlation of: Such an admirable Reaſoner he is upon Matters of Fact! Nay, allowing all he contends for, that the *Allies demand no more for the Emperor and* Great-Britain *than a juſt and reaſonable Satisfaction,* I would even, in this Caſe, ask the Reader whether it is any more

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than a juſt and reaſonable Satisfaction for the Emperor, that he ſhould have thoſe Dominions, which the King of *France* has ſolemnly renounced for himſelf and his Deſcendants, and which the Houſe of *Auſtria* has an undoubted Right to? Is it any more than a reaſonable Satisfaction for *Great-Britain*, that *France*, which has ſo lately broken two Treaties with us, that of *Ryſwick*, and that of the *Partition*, ſhould never be truſted again without effectual Security, nor left in a Condition to bring hither the Pretender? And can there be a ſufficient Security to the States-General, or to any other State in Chriſtendom, for their Dominions, when the exorbitant Power of *France* ſhall be ſtrengthened by the Riches of the *Indies*? What! after this, will the *French* give, that whenever they pleaſe they cannot take away, and what will they leave that they can. How often muſt one repeat that the King of *France* governs his Grandſon, which if he lives but three Years more, will be enough to do our Buſineſs? And that in the mean Time he has Treaties for Ports, for Forts, for Settlements, and for Trade, which are already executed. What therefore do theſe Peace-makers mean, by telling us of a *reaſonable Satisfaction*, or a *ſufficient Security*, without *Spain* and the *Indies*?

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Theſe Arguments are ſo noiſy, and yet ſo empty; ſo weak, and yet ſo ſufficient; ſo florid, and yet ſo ſenſeleſs, that God forbid the chief Director of the Work ſhould be truſted alone with any cunning *Frenchman*, though his Intentions were never ſo zealous for the Intereſt and Safety of his own Country.

Thus has this uſeful Author explained an Article in one Treaty; and I doubt not but we ſhall find him acting with the ſame Sincerity in the Account he gives of other Treaties, when we come to look into them: But that I have not now Time for.

Having ſufficiently diſcovered the wicked Deſign of this vile Book, and pointed at general Solutions of almoſt all the Fallacies it is filled with; and given ſuch ample Proof of the Writer's Integrity and Honeſty, which has ſwelled theſe Papers much beyond my Expectation, I ſhall reſerve my particular Anſwers to the ſeveral Facts alledged for a ſecond Part, which ſhall be publiſhed in very few Days; and in it ſhall be fully conſidered all that the *Partizans* of *France* have ſaid, or can ſay againſt the *Allies* and the late M———y. In the mean Time I deſire all honeſt and impartial Men to ſuſpend their Judgments, and not haſtily believe upon this infamous Author's

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bare Word, that we are under any real Neceſſity of concluding, againſt the Conſent of our Allies, and in Breach of ſo many Treaties, a moſt juſt, neceſſary and ſucceſsful War, by a ſcandalous and inſecure Peace.

THE ALLIES AND The Late Miniſtry Defended againſt FRANCE, And the Preſent Friends of *France*.

PART II.

Containing a Vindication of the Barrier Treaty, and of our Alliances with *Portugal*: With a particular Defence of our Faithful and Good Allies the *Dutch*, from the Charges imputed to them in the Management of their Part of the War.

———*fœdere* rupto
Hæc *Batavûm* Regio atque omnis plaga Gentis *Iberæ*
Cedat Amicitiæ *Gallorum*, & *Pacis iniquæ*
Dicamus leges, & *alumnum* in regna Vocemus?
Audiat hæc Genitor, qui *fœdera* fulmine ſancit!

I SHEW'D, in the foregoing Part of this Anſwer, That the Author of the *Conduct of the Allies* having laid down this general Propoſition for the Foundation of his whole Pamphlet, *That no Nation was ever*

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ſo ſcandalouſly abuſed by domeſtick Enemies, nor ſo vilely treated by Foreign Friends, as our's has been, had endeavoured to make good his Propoſition, by proving theſe three Points. Firſt, *That we had engaged in this War againſt all Manner of Prudence or common Reaſon.* Secondly, *That we had purſued the War in a wrong Method, and had made no Efforts where we could moſt have weakened the Enemy*: And, laſtly, *That we had ſuffered our Allies to break all their Treaties and Agreements.*

The Firſt of thoſe Points, *That it was wrong for us to begin the War in the Manner we did*, he took very great Pains to demonſtrate, as I have already ſhewn: And he pretended farther to prove, *That we were not obliged, by the Terms of the Alliance, to inſiſt upon the Reſtitution of* Spain.

I hope I have already confuted what he has offered upon thoſe two Heads; and have ſhewn at large, to the Satisfaction of all who are truly in the Intereſt of their Queen and Country, and not in that of *France* and the *Pretender*, That *as it was juſt and neceſſary for us to enter into the Grand Alliance*; ſo *by the Terms of that Alliance*, which this Writer has moſt ſcandalouſly falſified, conſidered with other Parts of that Treaty, and explained by thoſe made between us and the Allies both

before and after it, *we are obliged to inſiſt on the Reſtitution of the* Spaniſh *Monarchy, particularly of* Spain *and the* Indies: And that if we were not by our Treaties ſo ſtrictly obliged to adhere to theſe Demands, the Protection of our Trade, and the Security of the Succeſſion in the Houſe of *Hanover*, make it abſolutely neceſſary we ſhould inſiſt upon them.

I proceed now to conſider the other two Points he mentions, *That we have purſued the War in a wrong Method*, and *have ſuffered our Allies to break their Treaties*. And ſince he himſelf has inverted the Order he laid down, and endeavours to expoſe the Faults of our Allies, before he repreſents the ill Management of the War, I muſt be content to follow him; and to ſhew, in the firſt Place, That the Conduct of the Allies has not been ſuch as to forfeit the Right they have to our Performance of the Engagements we have made with them: After which I ſhall endeavour to juſtify alſo the Conduct of the Late Miniſters, and to prove that the War has not been wrong purſued.

This Author indeed very frankly accuſes the Allies of having broken every Article of their Treaties; and it is eaſy to gueſs why he does

does ſo. Such an Accuſation was no more than neceſſary to defend the Treatment they have received from other People, in direct Violation of the Articles of a certain Alliance. But before this honeſt Gentleman enters upon his Proof of this Point, he ſays *he will take Leave to offer a few Remarks on certain Articles in Three of our Treaties:* One of them is the Barrier Treaty with the *States*, made in *October* 1709. The other are our two Alliances, Offenſive and Defenſive, with *Portugal*.

It might reaſonably be thought, that the Treaties remarked on are ſome of thoſe Treaties, that are pretended to be broke; and yet upon Examination we ſhall find Two of the Three Treaties mentioned can no Way come into his Queſtion. The *Barrier Treaty*, for Example, concerns not the Operations of the preſent War: This therefore of all Treaties, has nothing to do in this Place. But though it does not affect the Propoſition he is to prove, it ſerves his Purpoſe extremely, of railing at the *Dutch*, and ridiculing the late M——rs, and repreſenting the Endeavours of the laſt to eſtabliſh a firm Union between the two Nations, for their mutual Security, which is the juſteſt and wiſeſt Part any M———y can act, as a *Conſpiracy* between them and the

States to ruin *England*; though nothing be more evident, than that in our Preſervation, next ourſelves, they are moſt concerned. As the bringing in this Treaty here is very abſurd, and the Deſign of his doing ſo, horribly wicked and unjuſt, ſo the Remarks he makes on it are extremely fooliſh and malicious; the Remarks of a Man, who is entirely in the Intereſt of *France* and the Pretender; or elſe he could never vent himſelf with ſo much Rage againſt a Treaty made to ſecure, in the moſt effectual Manner, the Q——'s Title, and the *Proteſtant* Succeſſion, by obliging the *States* to inſiſt on the *French* King's removing the *Pretender* out of his Dominions, and to ſupport the juſt Right of the Houſe of *Hanover* againſt all who ſhall oppoſe the Succeſſion veſted in them. And ſo reaſonable and neceſſary a Treaty ſhould, methinks, with *Engliſhmen*, need no Defence. But ſince this Author has ſo groſly miſrepreſented it, and, in what he ſays, ſpeaks not only his private Senſe, but that of his *Faction*, I ſhall conſider all his Objections to it; and that not ſo much for the Sake of the Noble Perſon more immediately concerned in making it, who is in a Situation to defend himſelf: But as the Treaty is of the greateſt Conſequence in itſelf; and as it highly concerns the Publick, that well-

intentioned People ſhould be undeceived, and not eaſily ſuffer a Treaty to be reproached, on which their Security ſo much depends.

To come then to his Objections againſt the Subſtance of this Treaty. He tells us, *p.* 38. 'That neither her Majeſty, nor her Kingdoms 'have any Intereſt or Concern in it, farther 'than what is mentioned in the Second and 'Twentieth Articles. By the former, the '*States* are to aſſiſt the Queen in defending 'the Act of Succeſſion; and by the other, 'not to treat of a Peace till the King of '*France* acknowledges the Queen, and the 'Succeſſion of *Hanover*, and promiſes to re-'move the *Pretender* out of his Dominions.' *That is, in this Treaty neither the Queen nor her Kingdoms have any Intereſt and Concern, but what is the greateſt Intereſt and Concern they can I think have in any Treaty:* And no Man who has truly at Heart the Q——'s Title and the *Proteſtant* Succeſſion, and knows the Miſchiefs of Popery and Arbitrary Power, and *the reſtleſs Endeavours of* France *to bring them on us*, can, without Surprize and Concern, ſee this Writer treat with ſo much Contempt, the Care that has been taken to *ſecure theſe Points*, eſpecially when in the new Preliminaries the *French* King makes his Acknow-

ledgment of the Q——n, in ſuch Words as give juſt Occaſion for Diſtruſt. And what makes it ſtill more neceſſary to guard theſe Points all we can, is, that as juſtly as the Q— poſſeſſes the Hearts of her Subjects, yet it plainly appeared by the *French* King's ſending the Pretender with ſo ſmall a Force on the laſt Invaſion, that he thought there was then at leaſt a great Party among ourſelves, always ready to aſſiſt the *French* in any Attempts they ſhall make againſt the preſent Settlement. What then can this Writer mean by ridiculing a Treaty made for its Defence, as if a Matter of ſo much Importance could be too well ſecured? Whatever may be the Opinion of this Author, or his Friends, I muſt beg Leave to tell him, the Nation have expreſſed themſelves of another Mind. In 1708, both Houſes of Parliament addreſſed the Q——n, 'That for preſerving the Repoſe and Quiet 'of *Europe*, and preventing the ambitious 'Deſigns of *France* for the Future, ſhe would 'be pleaſed to take Care at the Concluſion of 'the War, to continue and eſtabliſh a good 'and firm Friendſhip among all the Allies; 'and that the *French* King might be obliged 'to own her Majeſty's Title, and the *Pro-* '*teſtant* Succeſſion, as it is eſtabliſhed by the 'Laws of *Great-Britain*; and that her Al-

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'lies be engaged to become Guarantees of 'of the ſame.' And in Anſwer to this Addreſs, the Q—— was pleaſed to declare, 'She 'was of their Opinion in theſe Points; and 'aſſured them no Care ſhould be wanting on 'her Part to attain them.' So that what is done by the Barrier Treaty, was done in purſuance of an Addreſs of Parliament, and in Execution of the Q——'s own Senſe expreſſed in her Anſwer to them. And will any Body now pretend, that Points recommended by Parl——t, and approved by the Crown, ought not to be purſued? Or make it a Crime in a M——r, that he has taken the moſt effectual Care of them, and has been the Inſtrument of enabling her M——y to make good her Promiſe to her People?

But though he allows that the Q—— and Kingdom have ſome little *Intereſt in two Articles of this Treaty*, yet he is very ſure, they have not the leaſt *Concern* in any of the reſt. But what does he mean by making this Aſſertion? Have her Majeſty and her Kingdoms no Intereſt or Concern to prevent the *Low-Countries* from falling into the Hands of *France*? Why then did the Parliaments ſo long ago as in King *Charles* II's Time make frequent Addreſſes, and uſe all their Endeavours to engage that Prince to join in the Defence of

thoſe Countries? Sure this, as well as all we have been doing theſe twenty Years, ſufficiently ſhew the conſtant Senſe of the Nation on this Head: And how far this Conſideration weighed with us and our Allies, towards engaging the whole Confederacy in the preſent War, manifeſtly appears through the whole Tenour of the Grand Alliance; particularly in the eighth and ninth Articles. Of what Conſequence alſo the Allies thought it, to have the *Spaniſh Netherlands* effectually ſecured from the Power of *France*, is very manifeſt from the twenty-ſecond Article of the Preliminaries, which, with the above-mentioned Articles of the Grand Alliance, are the very Foundation of this Barrier Treaty. And therefore it is not to be imagined, that any true *Engliſhman*, who reflects upon the vaſt Expence of Blood and Treaſure that has been ſpent during the Laſt and the Preſent War, in the Recovery of the *Low-Countries*, can ever think that *Britain* has no *Intereſt* or *Concern* in their Preſervation, or that too great Care can be taken to prevent the like Charge on this Nation for the Future.

But this Author wiſely obſerves, 'That it 'is certainly for the Safety and Intereſt of the 'States-General, that the Proteſtant Succeſ-'ſion ſhould be preſerved in *England*;' and therefore

therefore he thinks this Treaty was quite unneceſſary, and ought not to have been made. But ſure this is a ſtrange Concluſion: That which is the Reaſon why all other Treaties are made, is an Argument, in this Writer's Opinion, that this ſhould not be made. What has occaſioned all the Treaties that ever have been made, but the common Intereſt of the Parties contracting? And yet, in Caſe there is a common Intereſt, this Author thinks no Treaties need be made; nay, it is a Fault with him to make them. But he is farther offended 'at the Price *the Aſſiſtance of the* '*Dutch* is purchaſed at; and deſires the World 'to judge, whether their Aſſiſtance, to pre-'ſerve a Right ſo well eſtabliſhed as the 'Queen's, be an Equivalent to thoſe many 'unreaſonable, exorbitant Articles in the reſt 'of the Treaty.' We will now therefore ſee whether any Thing in them be ſo unreaſonable or *exorbitant*; which laſt Word has been ſo long fixed on *France*, by the Sanction of many Parl—ts, that nobody, but one who is in a *French* Faction, would have taken it from thoſe it belongs to, to apply it to our Allies, at leaſt while the War laſts, though there were ſome Colour of Reaſon for it; which I ſhall ſhew there is not. The *Dutch* had a Right to their *Barrier*, previous to this Treaty:

Treaty: In the fifth Article of the Grand Alliance it is expreſly ſtipulated, 'That the 'Allies ſhall uſe their utmoſt Endeavours to 'recover the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, to the End 'they may ſerve as a Fence, Rampart, and 'Barrier to keep *France* at a Diſtance from 'the *United Provinces*, as formerly; the *Spa-* 'niſh *Netherlands* having been the Security 'of the *States-General*, till the late Seizure 'of them by the *French* King ——'. And in the ninth Article it is ſaid, 'That the Allies 'at a Treaty of Peace, ſhall agree on what are 'the proper Ways to ſecure the *States-General* 'by the aforeſaid Barrier—'. Purſuant to theſe Articles of the Grand Alliance, as the Towns in *Flanders* have been taken, the *Dutch* have conſtantly put Garriſons into them, with the Conſent of all the Allies; and for the ſame Reaſon, in the twenty-ſecond and twenty-third Articles of the Preliminary Treaty, it is agreed, That as well the Towns which did not belong to the Crown of *Spain* at the Death of King *Charles* the Second, as thoſe that did, which *France* by thoſe Articles was to deliver up, ſhould be yielded and made over to the *States*, to ſerve for their Barrier, and to be garriſoned by their Troops: Which Articles, all the World knows, were agreed to, and ſigned by the Miniſters of the late *Emperor* and King *Charles*, as well as by thoſe of *Eng-*

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land and the *States*. So that in Truth, by the Barrier Treaty her Majeſty agrees to nothing more, than to ſupport the *States* in ſuch a ſufficient Barrier as had been yielded to them before by all the Allies, under ſuch Regulations as are neceſſary to preſerve it, and are no Way inconſiſtent with the Honour and Intereſt of *Great-Britain*. For the Whole of this Treaty in few Words is this: Her Majeſty and her Kingdoms are highly concerned that the *French* ſhould not be Maſters of the *Low-Countries*: The *States-General* are likewiſe concerned, That her Majeſty's Title and the Proteſtant Succeſſion ſhould be ſecured: It is the mutual Intereſt of both Nations, that theſe two Points ſhould be preſerved in the beſt Manner, againſt the Danger both are in from the Power of *France*; which, by what has ſince happened, inſtead of being leſſened, is like to be more *exorbitant* than ever: And therefore nothing can be more neceſſary, than for the *Dutch* and us to enter into the ſtricteſt Alliance for the Preſervation of both; which is the only Way not only to provide for our mutual Safety, but to preſerve the Repoſe and Quiet of *Europe*, and prevent a new War; as is ſet forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

But he ſays, *Page* 39, 'The twentieth Ar-

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'ticle *is a natural Conſequence* that muſt at-
'tend any Treaty of Peace we can make with
'*France*; being only the Acknowledging of
'her Majeſty as Queen of her own Domi-
'nions, and the Right of Succeſſion by our
'own Laws, which no Foreign Power hath
'any Pretence to diſpute.' Would one think it poſſible a Man ſhould affirm, that the twentieth Article is only an Acknowledgment of her Majeſty and of the Right of Succeſſion, when he had himſelf told us, but the Page before, that this Article requires alſo, That no Peace ſhall be made with *France, without a Promiſe to remove the Pretender out of his Dominions*? And is this Promiſe nothing? Give us the old Preliminaries with it, and I ſhall think it a very great Thing; but in Company with the new ones, I confeſs I think it as little as he is pleaſed to make of it; not that ſuch a Promiſe after all is ſo much as mentioned in them. But farther; this Article does not barely inſiſt on an Acknowledgment of her Majeſty as Queen of her own Dominions, or on the Right of Succeſſion by our own Laws; which general Expreſſions it is very eaſy to elude; but on her Majeſty's *Title* to the Crown of *Great-Britain*, and on the Right of Succeſſion in the Houſe of *Hanover* to the ſaid Crown, as eſtabliſhed by the

preſent

preſent Acts of Settlement: And this by the twentieth Article is fully to be acknowledged by *France* as a Preliminary, previous to any Treaty of Peace that ſhall be made. It is not left to be a *Conſequence* of one, which he pretends it *naturally* muſt be; remembring very well himſelf, but preſuming, I ſuppoſe, that the reſt of the World have forgot, that this *natural Conſequence of any Treaty of Peace with France*, was not a Conſequence of the *Reſwyck* Treaty; and that every one of the Points, inſiſted on in this Article, were then omitted; and that neither the King's Title to the Crown, nor the Right of the next Succeſſor her preſent Majeſty, were acknowledged, nor was any Promiſe made to remove the *Pretender*. What Credit does an Author deſerve, who, in the Account he gives of a very clear and plain Article, omits the moſt material Clauſe, and miſrepreſents the reſt; and affirms the Whole to be a natural Conſequence of a Treaty with *France*, when the Treaty of *Reſwyck* is a Demonſtration it is not? Since which Treaty, it is notorious that the *French* King has denied the Queen's Title, owned the *Pretender*, and aſſiſted him to invade her Kingdoms.

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To come now to his Objections againſt thoſe *unreaſonable and exorbitant Articles, which are granted the* States *in the reſt of the Treaty.* The firſt is, That *by the Grand Alliance the* Spaniſh Low-Countries *were to be recovered and delivered to the King of* Spain; *but by this Treaty that Prince is to poſſeſs nothing in* Flanders *during the War.* Here our Author miſrepreſents again, and affirms what is falſe; for it is no where ſaid in the Grand Alliance, that the *Low-Countries* ſhould be delivered to the King of *Spain*, much leſs that they ſhould be during the War. And in Fact, it is well known, that for Years before this Treaty was made, the Government of thoſe Provinces, ever ſince the Reduction of them, has been adminiſtred by the *Queen* and the *States*, with the Conſent of the Emperor and King of *Spain*. So that thoſe Provinces neither have nor would have been reſtored to King *Charles* during the War, though this Treaty had never been made; but to ſhew what Care is by this Treaty taken of King *Charles*'s Intereſt, the Sovereignty of thoſe Provinces, both as to the Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Rights, is expreſly reſerved to him, as well in thoſe Towns where the *Dutch* are to have Garriſons, as in thoſe where they are to have none. The military Command only being

ing given to the *States* in the Towns to be garriſon'd by their Troops. But 'after a 'Peace, our Author ſays, the *States are to* 'have the military Command of about twen-'ty Towns with their Dependancies, and '400,000 Crowns a Year from the King of '*Spain* to maintain their Garriſons; by 'which Means they will have the Com-'mand of all *Flanders* from *Newport* to *Na-'mur*, and be entirely Maſters of the *Pais 'de Waas*, the richeſt Part of thoſe Pro-'vinces.'

In Anſwer to this Objection, I muſt tell this Writer, that he ought to have diſtinguiſhed between thoſe Towns in this Barrier, which were in the Poſſeſſion of the Crown of *Spain* at the Death of King *Charles*, and thoſe that were not. Of which laſt only, and their Dependancies, the *States* are to have the Revenues, with the additional Sum of 400,000 Crowns a Year, for maintaining the whole Barrier. And whoever conſiders the Number of Troops that will be requiſite for maintaining the whole Barrier; the vaſt Expence of repairing and keeping up the Fortifications, and of ſupplying thoſe Places with all War-like Neceſſaries; as alſo the Extent of the Country, of which only they are to have the Revenues; and will look back

and ſee how little the whole *Low Countries*, when they were much richer and larger than they are now, even upon the Foot they were left at the *Pyrenean* Treaty, have been able to contribute for the Defence of their Frontier, muſt be convinced, that what is allotted by this Treaty can by no Means ſuffice; and the *Dutch* muſt over and above be at a very great Expence, in which nothing but the abſolute Neceſſity of Self-Preſervation cou'd have engaged them.

But to bring the Danger of this Treaty home to us, this honeſt Man, *Page* 40. obſerves '*further, that they have Liberty to* 'garriſon any Place they ſhall think fit in 'the *Spaniſh Low Countries*, whenever there 'is an Appearance of War; and conſequent-'ly to put Garriſons into *Oſtend*, or where 'elſe they pleaſe, upon a Rupture with *Eng-'land*.' The Repreſentation of the Treaty in this Article is as unfair as the reſt, and his Inference from it is ridiculous. For firſt, the Caſe he puts, of a Rupture with *England*, is an abſolute Diſſolution of this Treaty, the Deſign of which, as is expreſs'd in the Preamble, is the mutual Security of the contracting Parties; and therefore nothing can be conſtrued to come within it, that ſuppoſes a Rupture between them; and the declared

Intention

Intention of the Barrier, is to defend the *States* from *France*, *and others*, *who ſhall attack or endeavour to ſurprize them*. And in the ſeventh Article, where this Liberty is given to the *States*, it is only in Caſe of an *apparent Attack or War*. Now from theſe Words, it is plain, Firſt, That the *States* have no Right to this Liberty, where they are Aggreſſors, but when they are attacked. Secondly, This is chiefly with a View to *France*, againſt whoſe ſudden Inſults, Experience ſhews, the *States* cannot be too much on their Defence. And if *others* are joined to *France*, it is for a very evident Reaſon, becauſe by the Intrigues of *France*, ſome of their Neighbours upon the Continent may be drawn in to arm againſt them, as has happened in former Wars, and may therefore do again. But as for *England*, a Rupture between us and the *States* is, as I have obſerved, out of the Queſtion; it is what I hope will never happen, unleſs the wicked Deſigns, of which this Author gives us ſcurvy Intimations, ſhould prevail. And ſhould there be a Rupture, I ſcarce believe we ſhould go to *Flanders* to attack them; that is a viſionary Scheme of making War, which never did, nor can take Place, unleſs under the malignant Influence of ſome very wretched *Politi-*

cians. And if we were to be ſo mad, this Article could not hurt us, ſince the Treaty would then be at an End: And if we do not break with *Spain* at the ſame Time, it will be impoſſible for the *Dutch* to put Troops into *Oſtend*; ſince this is one of the Places, which by the Treaty are entirely left in the Hands of the King of *Spain*, to be garriſon'd by him.

The next Objection againſt this Treaty is, 'That the *Dutch* will in effect be entire Ma-'ſters of all the *Low Countries*; may impoſe 'Duties, Reſtrictions in Commerce, and Pro-'hibitions at their Pleaſure; and in that 'fertile Country may ſet up all Sorts of Ma-'nufactures, particularly the Woollen, by in-'viting the diſobliged Manufacturers in *Ire-'land*, and the *French* Refugees, who are 'ſcattered all over *Germany*.' Now all this Objection is ſo falſe and groundleſs, that it is below an Anſwer, were it not in Appearance very popular; contrived to incenſe the People of *England* againſt a Treaty made with no other View than to add a farther Security of that invaluable Bleſſing the *Proteſtant* Succeſſion, and to prevent, as much as may be, their being again engaged in a new War upon ſo expenſive and burthenſome a Foot, as we have been in this and the laſt.

By

By what has been already ſaid, it appears, that the Civil Power, with all Rights and Privileges belonging to it, is expreſly and particularly reſerved by this Treaty to King *Charles*, and conſequently the *Dutch* cannot impoſe Duties, Reſtrictions, and Prohibitions, or Regulations in Trade, even in thoſe very Places that are to be garriſon'd by the *States*, as this Author would inſinuate; and ſuppoſing the Fact to be as he repreſents it, yet the dreadful Conſequence he draws from it, would never follow, of the *Dutch* eſtabliſhing Manufactures in that Country: This is manifeſt from the effectual Care that *Amſterdam*, *Harlem*, *Leyden*, and the other trading Towns in *Holland* take to prevent even thoſe Places that have belonged to the *Generality* ever ſince the Treaty of *Munſter*, from ſharing with them in the Manufactures. And ſhould the diſobliged Manufacturers in *Ireland* go and ſettle in the Towns of *Flanders*, they would find themſelves as ill treated in that Reſpect, as they can be in their own Country; and all the other imaginary Conſequences, which this Writer draws from theſe new Manufactures, being without Foundation, muſt fall with them.

The laſt Objection againſt the Contents of this Treaty is, 'That all the Ports in *Flanders*

' are to be ſubject to the like Duties the *Dutch* ' ſhall lay upon the *Scheld*, which is to be ' cloſed on the Side of the *States*. Thus all ' other Nations are, in Effect, ſhut out from ' trading with *Flanders*.' Yet in the very ſame Article it is ſaid, ' That the *States* ſhall ' be favour'd in all the *Spaniſh* Dominions, as ' much as *Great-Britain*, or as the People ' moſt favour'd.' Who now would not from this Repreſentation think, that ſome new, and till now unheard-of Advantages were by this Article given to the *Dutch*, and ſtrange Hardſhips put upon the poor *Engliſh*? Which yet is not only groundleſs, but moſt impudently falſe: For it is nothing but ſtipulating, that Matters relating to Commerce ſhould be put upon the ſame Foot they were before the War. It is needleſs to repeat, that the *Dutch* have no Right, by this Treaty, to lay on any Duties or Impoſitions, that being a Part of the Civil Power reſerved by the Treaty to King *Charles*; and conſequently no Right to ſhut out any Nation from trading in *Flanders*. The Article he finds Fault with is made in Purſuance of the eighth and ninth Articles of the Grand Alliance, and on Purpoſe to prevent all Jealouſies and Diſputes between the *Dutch* and us, in Relation to Trade. And the ſeveral Clauſes of it are formed on the

fourteenth,

fourteenth, and three following Articles of the Treaty of *Munſter*, in which the Commerce to the *Low Countries*, and the reſt of the *Spaniſh* Dominions, is ſettled: And according to which it continued to be regulated till the Death of King *Charles*. And to the Foot it was then upon, the aforeſaid Articles of the Grand Alliance refer. So that all the terrible Innovations, here inſinuated, are as old as the Treaty of *Munſter*, and of no leſs than ſixty Years ſtanding. Now for avoiding all Differences between the two Nations on this Head, and in Purſuance of the Grand Alliance, the Q——n and the *States* do by this Article not only engage to preſerve the Commerce upon the ſame Foot; but likewiſe promiſe, that the Subjects of each ſhall be treated alike, and as favourably as thoſe of any other Nation, in all Parts of the *Spaniſh* Dominions: And if Mr. *Sanhope*, as is ſuggeſted in this Book, has concluded an advantageous Treaty of Commerce with *Spain*, we are in a fair Way of enjoying the Benefit of it jointly with our Allies, purſuant to this and former Treaties, and to the Excluſion of the *French*, unleſs this Author's Friends ſucceed in their deſtructive Deſign of perſuading us to give up *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies* to the Houſe of *Bourbon*. By ſuch a Treaty, indeed, we ſhall be *in a*

worſe Condition, as to our Trade, and every Thing elſe, *than before the War began*. But to ſay that we are ſo by this Barrier Treaty with the *Dutch*, is, as I have ſhewn, utterly falſe. *We have conquer'd Flanders* for ourſelves, as well as *for them*; and by this Treaty our own Trade is re-eſtabliſhed, as well as theirs; They have no one Advantage more than they had before the War, nor we any one leſs. And conſequently the Guarantee of the Q——n for this Treaty is not unreaſonable: All the Intereſts ſecured by it are mutual, and it is fit the Obligations ſhould be ſo too.

What now can be the Meaning of ſuch violent Anger againſt ſo important a Treaty? What the Deſign of ſo many malicious Objections, when there is no Ground for any one of them? There can be but two Reaſons for this very perverſe Malice. It muſt either be with a View to the *Pretender*, or an ill Peace; one or both are at the Bottom of this black Deſign. He does indeed give us, as I have obſerved in the firſt Part, broad Intimations of the Firſt; as in other Parts of his Book, ſo particularly in what he ſays of this Treaty, *P.* 39, which he rails at for having '*put it out of* '*the Power of our own Legiſlature to change* '*our Succeſſion without the Conſent of the* '*Guarantee.*'

'*Guarantee*.' But if this be the Conſequence of it, I thank the Author for the Diſcovery; it is the beſt News I have heard a great while, and makes me value the Treaty much more than I did before. Yet why this Intimation, that there can be any Occaſion for ſuch a Change? Why ſo many Intimations that we may have a War with the *Dutch*? And how come theſe Toughts into his Head, before we are at an End of our War with *France*?

But if this Writer be not an Enemy to the *Succeſſion*, which it is not very eaſy to believe, and conſequently that be not the Reaſon of his being ſo angry with the Barrier Treaty, it is certain the other is; I mean, that it obſtructs the Deſign of an *ill Peace*. This is ſurely one Reaſon, though perhaps not the only one, that he finds ſo much Fault with this Treaty: For by ſuch a Peace the *Dutch* Barrier may be ſacrificed to ſome private Articles with the King of *France*, and *Spain* and the *Indies* be given up to his Grandſon. But this is abſolutely inconſiſtent with this Treaty, and therefore, Right or Wrong, the Treaty muſt be damned. It is not very decent in the Opinion of the moſt proſtitute Creatures of a Party, to violate a Treaty, without firſt finding ſome Fault with it; and that is the Reaſon

ſon ſo much Artifice is uſed to cry down the Barrier Treaty, and to make us believe that our Succeſſion does not want to be ſecured. But one would have thought that this Author, when he had injuriouſly inveigh'd againſt all her Majeſty's Allies, and ſcandalouſly abandoned their Intereſt; when he had endeavour'd to perſuade us to give up *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies* to the Houſe of *Bourbon*, and had impudently recommended to us ſuch Terms of Peace as no Prince, no M——ry, no Par——t, nor any one Ally has hitherto thought tolerable, nor the Enemy himſelf has preſumed to offer ſince the *Ramellies* Propoſals were rejected; one would have thought, I ſay, that after all this he had made his Court ſufficiently to *France*, and might have ſpared a Treaty ſo indiſpenſibly neceſſary for preſerving the Religion and Liberty of his own Country. And it would have been hard to have found out the Reaſon that induced him to expoſe himſelf ſo far in making ſuch a falſe and ſcandalous Repreſentation of the Articles of this Treaty, if he had not obliged the World with the ſurprizing new Maxim already mentioned, *That it is neither Right in Point of Policy or good Senſe, that a Foreign Power ſhould be call'd in to confirm our Succeſſion*, &c. But when he had raſhly

diſcovered

diſcovered this Secret of his Heart, it was eaſy to account for all that he has written in this Pamphlet, or that he ever ſhall write whilſt he lives. And as it was not poſſible for him to put a more odious Caſe, than the bare Suppoſition of any Change in our Succeſſion; ſo I am in no great Fear of that Change ever happening, unleſs his Faction ſhould clap up ſuch a Peace as would leave *France* in a Condition to enſlave this Kingdom. In the mean Time, till ſuch a Peace as that is made, and till the *French* are in a Condition to force us, which, whenever they are able, they will loſe no Time in doing; I would humbly give this Author a little Advice, That he would pleaſe not to nibble any more at the Proteſtant Succeſſion, becauſe he may be informed, *That by endeavouring, by any Overt-Act whatſoever, to hinder any Perſon who is intituled to that Succeſſion*, he will find himſelf guilty of High Treaſon. And now I will leave him to enjoy the Comfort and Honour of his Reflections upon this Treaty, and go on to conſider what he ſays to thoſe with *Portugal*.

One at leaſt of thoſe Alliances had as little Relation to the Point this Author was to prove, as the Barrier Treaty; but ſince they both

both ſtand equally in the Way of an ill Peace, there was the ſame Neceſſity that both ſhould be condemned. Yet if this Writer had told us, what Circumſtances Affairs were in at the Time of making them, we ſhould rather wonder the *Portugueſe* could be prevailed on, upon any Terms, to quit the Alliance they were in with *France*, than that we gave them thoſe we did. For, as this Author has more than once told us, this War was begun by the Charge that was made in the Balance of Power, upon the Seizure of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, under ſuch mighty Diſadvantages, as gave very little Hopes, that the Allies could be long able to maintain themſelves againſt ſo exorbitant a Power, as *France* was then poſſeſſed of. And had the Enemy been able to put as ſpeedy and good an End to the War, as they were in a fair Way to do a very few Months after theſe Alliances with *Portugal* were made, that King would ſoon have found Reaſon enough to repent his Breach with *France*, who would, no doubt, have made him feel in the ſevereſt Manner, the Effect of her Reſentments. So that I really wonder, how the Fears of ſo great Danger could be overcome by any Offers we could make, much leſs by thoſe we did; which in Truth were the leaſt that could be made. To which, if

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we add the Influence the *French* have in that Court, all who are competent Judges in theſe Matters, muſt confeſs, that theſe Alliances were the Effect of great perſonal Courage and Reſolution in the then King of *Portugal*, and of great Prudence and Dexterity in thoſe that treated with him.

That the Terms granted on the Part of the Allies, are the leaſt that could be, we ſhall be convinced, by a ſhort and plain Account of them. Both the offenſive and defenſive Alliance were made at the ſame Time, and ſigned the ſame Day, *May* 16, 1703. The firſt conſiſts of twenty-nine Articles, the other of twenty. In the firſt it is agreed, That for the Land-Service, and the Invaſion of *Spain* on that Side, the King of *Portugal* ſhall maintain, at his own Expence, 15,000 Men, and raiſe 13,000 more to be paid by the Allies. And to this Body of *Portugueſe* Troops, the Allies are to join 12,000 Men of their own, or other Nations. This is the Subſtance of the ſixteen firſt Articles; the two next, which are thoſe that this Writer finds ſo many Faults with, relate to the Sea-Service. In the firſt of them, the *Maritime* Powers oblige themſelves to keep on the Coaſt of *Portugal, a competent Number of Men of War to defend their Ports, and protect their Trade*,

Trade, (which this Author is very witty upon, and calls, *the Honour of being Convoys and Guards in ordinary to the* Portugueſe *Ships and Coaſts.*) Then follows, That upon certain Advice or Intelligence, (*comperto vel etiam intellecto*) that the Enemy intend to invade them with a Force ſuperior to what the Allies ſhall have on their Coaſt, at the Time of ſuch Intelligence, that then the Allies ſhall increaſe their Number of Ships, ſo as to be able to prevent ſuch Invaſion: And to guard againſt any ſudden Inſults, ſuch Ships ſhall continue in thoſe Seas or Ports, as his *Portugueſe* Majeſty ſhall judge neceſſary. In the next Article, they oblige themſelves, for the Defence of the *Portugueſe* Dominions *beyond the Seas*, that if War be made upon any of them, or the King has certain Advice it is deſigned (*cognoverit*) to furniſh the Ships neceſſary to prevent or oppoſe the Enemies Deſigns: And if any ſtrong Place be taken from them, to continue their Aſſiſtance till it is retaken. What now is there in theſe Articles unreaſonable for the *Portugueſe* to aſk, or for the Maritime Powers to grant? I would fain know, if this Author himſelf had been to tranſact this Affair, how he could have had the Face to aſk the King of *Portugal* to break with *France*, and expoſe himſelf to the Invaſions

ſions of ſo great a Power both by Sea and Land, which he was himſelf in no Condition to make Head againſt, without offering, among other Things, to protect him from the naval Strength of *France*, by keeping a Squadron on his Coaſts? And to increaſe that Squadron upon Notice of a deſigned Invaſion. And who is the proper Perſon for this Notice to come from, but the King himſelf? Sure Princes ought to be allowed to have the quickeſt and beſt Intelligence of the Enemies Deſigns againſt them, or elſe they are very ill ſerved. Can this, without the greateſt Diſingenuity, be called, *taking the King of* Portugal's *Word, whenever he has a* Fancy *he ſhall be invaded? Or when he is in a* Humour *to apprehend an Invaſion?* Where did he learn, that *Fancy* or *Humour* are the *Engliſh* of *comperto intellecto* and *cognoverit*, the Words uſed in the Original? Are not theſe Words ſtrong enough to guard againſt *Fancies* or *Suſpicions* only? Do not they ſuppoſe certain Knowledge or Advice? And cannot the King of *Portugal*, if he has ſuch certain Advice, convince our Admirals, that it is not a Humour or a Whim, but ſure Intelligence and well grounded, that he goes upon? Beſides, is not this a pretty Character of a Prince in Alliance with us, to ſuppoſe he cannot judge

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of the Intelligence he has; or that *Humour* and *Fancy* govern him, inſtead of *Reaſon* and *Knowledge*, in Matters of this Conſequence? But whether they do or not, our Admirals muſt be as great Fools as the Prince himſelf is ſuppoſed to be, or elſe they will be able to diſtinguiſh between Things ſo very different as a groundleſs Fancy and certain Advice: And if they are ſatisfied there is nothing in what is apprehended, they won't run *upon his Errands*, notwithſtanding any Thing in theſe Articles. But if this Author ſtill thinks the Words uſed in the Treaty are not ſtrong enough to prevent the Caprices and Humours of the King of *Portugal*, I deſire he would tell us what are, and how he would have expreſs'd himſelf on this Occaſion? There is, indeed, the Word *ſuſpicio* in the ſecond Article of the defenſive Alliance, but the Occaſion it is uſed upon, won't ſerve this Author's Purpoſe: It is this; If the Kings of *France* or *Spain* have a Deſign to make War on *Portugal*, or if there be ſuch a *Suſpicion*: *Si velint, aut eos velle ſuſpicio ſit, bellum inferre*, then the Maritime Powers ſhall, What? — ſend Fleets and Armies? No, but interpoſe their good Offices to preſerve Peace and prevent a War. This is all they are obliged to do upon a bare Suſpicion. When

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the Allies are to do more, it is upon certain Advice, expreſs'd in the Words above-mentioned.

But another Thing that offends our Author in theſe two Articles, is ſomething that in Truth is not in them, but in the two next; and that is, that *theſe Fleets muſt be ſubject not only to the King, but his Viceroys, Admirals, and Governors; which he believes is an Indignity that was never offer'd before, except to a conquer'd Nation.* Does he himſelf believe this? Or would he only have others believe this to be a *great Indignity*, when indeed it is none at all, but abſolutely neceſſary, to make our Ships of Uſe to the Prince whoſe Dominions they are to protect? The Subſtance of the firſt of theſe Articles is this, That *all Auxiliary Ships* (not Fleets, as this Author calls them) *ſhall be ſubject to the King's Orders; and in Parts beyond Sea, to the Orders of his Viceroys, and Governors.* That is, to the Perſons that have the ſupreme Command, in the Parts where theſe Ships are to be employed. And if it be reaſonable they ſhould be ſubject to the King's Orders when they can be had, it is for the ſame Reaſon fit, that where they cannot, theſe Ships ſhould be ſubject to thoſe who govern in his Stead, and have his Authority. Such an Ar-

ticle is abſolutely neceſſary to prevent Diſorders and Diſputes, which might otherwiſe ariſe, and render the Service of our Ships uſeleſs; the Conſequence of which would be, that we ſhould be at all the Expence of aſſiſting our Ally, and yet he would not be the better for it. But what is neceſſary to make an Alliance uſeful, can with no Fairneſs be ſaid to be an Indignity: Nor is this Author ſo little acquainted with Treaties, as not to know, that in Alliances between crowned Heads, the Succours, ſent by either Side to the other, have always been eſteemed *Auxiliaries*; which is the Name given to our Ships both in the eighteenth and nineteenth Articles; and have been under the Direction of the Prince, to whoſe Aſſiſtance they were ſent, and have, on that Account, given Rank without any Difficulty to the others, as Principals in the War. And yet it is for this, which is the conſtant Practice in the like Caſes, that ſo much Clamour is made againſt what is contained in the nineteenth Article, That when theſe *Auxiliary Ships* are joined with the *Portugueſe* Fleet on any Occaſion, they ſhall receive the *Signal* from their Admiral; that Councils of War ſhall be held on Board him, and Orders to execute what has in thoſe Councils been reſolved on, ſhall be ſent to

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the other Commanders from him: This is all the Subjection that is required to the *Portugueſe* Admirals. And I would be glad this Author would give us a more reaſonable Scheme, in the like Caſe, that ſhall promote the intended Service better, or have in it leſs Indignity, or more Order. Till then, I muſt take the Liberty to ſay, That all he has urged againſt theſe four Articles is falſe, malicious, and abſurd. Whatever is agreed in them, on the Part of the Maritime Powers, is neceſſary to anſwer the Ends of the Alliance; the leaſt that *Portugal* could ask, and no Way inconſiſtent with the Honour of *Great Britain*. And if we look into Facts, to ſee what ill Uſe the King of *Portugal* has made of the Power given him by theſe Articles, or what Hardſhip has been put upon our Fleets, we ſhall find the Whole amounts to this: That two Men of War went once to *Brazil*, and three or four more have, at other Times, waited the Return of the *Brazil* Fleets, and put themſelves under the Command of the *Portugueſe* Admiral or Commodore. And I ſuppoſe this Author does not want to be told, that our Intereſt in thoſe Fleets would make it very reaſonable for us to do ſo much for their Safety, though we were not obliged to it by their Treaty; the Whole of which, as to

theſe Articles, comes to this: The King of *Portugal* cannot be brought off of his Alliance with *France*, without a Promiſe from the Maritime Powers to protect his Dominions upon the Continent and in the *Indies*. This Protection cannot be given but by our Fleets; our Number of Ships muſt be proportioned to the Occaſion there is for them; which Occaſion, the Prince or his Viceroys, whoſe Aſſiſtance they are deſigned for, are the beſt Judges of; and therefore they muſt, to be uſeful to him, be under his or their Orders; and when any of them are in Conjunction with his Fleet, they muſt, as the Nature of *Auxiliaries* requires they ſhould, be under his Admiral, ſo as to receive the Signal from him, *&c.* And to make the Protection promiſed effectual, the Number of theſe *Auxiliary* Ships muſt be increaſed upon any Invaſion from the Enemy, with a Force ſuperior to our ordinary Strength; and this Increaſe muſt be made, not when the Invaſion is actually putting in Execution; that, it is plain, will be too late; it muſt be while the Enemy are making Preparations for it, and before they are finiſhed. When there is not only a Suſpicion, or uncertain Rumours of ſuch Preparations, but certain Advices, and ſuch Intelligence as may be depended on, it is then

ſure high Time to take Care of the Intereſts of the Prince whom we oblige ourſelves to protect, and provide for his Safety, or the Safety of his Dominions, by Preparations ſuitable to the Occaſion, and by ſuch an Increaſe of Strength, as the certain Deſigns of the Enemy make neceſſary. And as the King is to be preſumed to have the earlieſt Notice of the Enemies Deſigns, and the beſt Advices in what relates to his own Dominions, thoſe that come from him ought to be in the firſt Place attended to; and if there be not good Reaſon to doubt of their Certainty, ought to be complied with. Let this Writer ſhew, that any Part of the Argument here ſumm'd up, is unreaſonable or unneceſſary; or that any Thing more is contained in the above-named Articles, than is in this Argument: If he can prove neither of theſe Propoſitions, it will follow, with the utmoſt Evidence, that there is nothing granted in theſe Articles, but what is fit and neceſſary; and conſequently, that his Cenſures, and Attempts to turn them into Ridicule, are themſelves very unjuſt and ridiculous.

In the defenſive Alliance, which is perpetual, the fourth, fifth, ſixth and ſeventh Articles, relating to our Ships, are almoſt in the ſame Words, and therefore the ſame Anſwers

will ſerve to the Objections made to them. But I muſt obſerve the Unfairneſs of this Author here again, in not taking any Notice of the eighth Article, That if the Ships of the three Nations are to act in Conjunction, in any Expedition which is the common Concern of all of them, (and not particular to the King of *Portugal*) that then the Commander that has moſt Ships under him, ſhall give the Signal, and act in all Reſpects as Admiral to the Whole. And in virtue of this Article, it is well known, that in 1705, Sir *John Leake* had under his Command a *Portugueſe* Flag with ſeven or eight of their biggeſt Ships, when he beat *Pointi*'s Squadron in the Bay of *Gibraltar*.

While our Author is finding Fault with this defenſive Alliance, out of his great Love of Method, and to ſay a very ridiculous Thing, he goes out of his Way to tell us, *That in the offenſive Alliance we took no Care of having the Aſſiſtance of* Portugal, *whenever we ſhould be invaded. But in this it ſeems we were wiſer; for that King is obliged to make War on* France *or* Spain, *whenever We or* Holland *are invaded by either.* Would not any one think, by theſe Words, that a great Overſight had been committed in the offenſive Alliance, but that afterwards, by ſome Accident or other, we were

were made ſenſible of our Miſtake, and corrected it in a ſecond Treaty? And yet this Inſinuation is ſo falſe, that both Treaties were made together, and ſigned the ſame Day, as I have already obſerved; and therefore there was no Need of making Proviſion in the offenſive Treaty, in Caſe either of the Maritime Powers were invaded; that Caſe was proper for the defenſive Alliance, and to that it is reſerved. And by this Treaty, as we are to ſend to the King of *Portugal*'s Aſſiſtance 12,000 Men, if he be invaded, and to protect his Dominions with our Ships, as in the offenſive Alliance: So, if either of the Maritime Powers are invaded, he is by the twelfth Article to make War on *France* or *Spain* with his whole Strength, *cum Univerſis Viribus ſuis*: And therefore it is falſe to ſay, That by the thirteenth Article we are told what this Aſſiſtance is, which the *Portugueſe* are to give us, that they are to furniſh Ten Men of War: As if making all the Diverſion they can by Land were not as truly giving Aſſiſtance, as *furniſhing theſe Men of War*; eſpecially when this Author tells us, they are to ſerve only upon their own Coaſt. Though that again is another Falſity, as it intimates that they are by the Treaty to ſerve no where elſe: For by the laſt Clauſe in the thirteenth

Article, it is ſtipulated, That if War be made by *France* alone, then theſe ten *Portugueſe* Ships ſhall, to aſſiſt the Maritime Powers, act in Conjunction with their Fleets. But this Clauſe it was for the Purpoſe of this very ſincere Writer to omit; as alſo the Reaſons given in the Article, why, in the other Caſes of the War being made by *France* and *Spain* together, or by *Spain* alone, the *Portugueſe* Ships ſhall ſerve only on their own Coaſts, *quod in eâ verſantes ad diſtrahendas Hoſtium vires plurimum proficient*; they would, by that Means, be able to do the common Enemy moſt Miſchief: Which is a good Reaſon. And notwithſtanding our Author's *no Doubt they will there be of mighty Uſe to their Allies, and Terror to the Enemy*, all whom Experience has taught to reflect with any Judgment upon theſe Matters, will allow, that any Aſſiſtance *Portugal* could give the Maritime Powers, might be employ'd much more to their Service, by keeping near Home, and making what Diverſion they can, than by coming to join either the *Dutch* or us. And as the ſame Strength would then be prepared with much leſs Expence, they would be able to employ more Strength in a Diverſion a great deal, than they could ſend to us; and

would

would be in a Condition to continue it longer.

But there is one Thing this Author makes a great Jeſt of, and that is, that by this Treaty, if We or *Holland* are invaded; yet if we expect any Aſſiſtance from the King of *Portugal*, *we are to ſupply him with Ships and Forces in the ſame Manner, as if he were invaded himſelf.* And *this*, in his Opinion, *muſt needs be a very prudent and ſafe Courſe for a Maritime Power to take, upon a ſudden Invaſion; by which, inſtead of making Uſe of our Fleets and Armies for our own Defence, we muſt ſend them Abroad for the Defence of* Portugal. What now can be more frivolous than this Objection? Can we expect, when there is ſuch a Diſproportion in the Parties, the Aſſiſtance ſhould be equal on both Sides? If a Diverſion on the Side of *Portugal* ſhall be thought at any Time of Service to us, ſhould we not make ſuch an Addition to their Strength, as may enable them to do it effectually; which from their own ſingle Force is not to be expected? And if upon an Invaſion, we think it more to our Purpoſe, to keep our Men and Ships at Home, is it not in our own Power, notwithſtanding any Thing in theſe Articles? Does our Author think, that when we are invaded, the King will, from

theſe

theſe Articles inſiſt upon our defending ourſelves in the worſt Manner, by ſending our Troops to him, when it is more for the Service of his Allies to keep them at Home? Such Caſes ſpeak themſelves, and need no other Anſwer. But if our Author would have *Portugal* make ſome extraordinary Efforts of themſelves, ſo would I too; but both he and I know they cannot. And that is the true Reaſon the *Dutch* have not continued to perform their Part in the Firſt of theſe Alliances. For the Second, as I have before obſerved, do not properly take Place yet; nor can well till this War is at an End. And if we have kept cloſer to our Articles, I ſhall ſhew it was becauſe we thought it worth our While.

So particular an Examination into theſe Alliances will, I doubt not, convince every impartial Reader, that the Weakneſs and Folly they are accuſed of, is not in them, but in the Objections made to them. Which, as they are groundleſs and unjuſt, ſeparately conſidered, and by themſelves; ſo they are ſumm'd up by this Author, in this very falſe Concluſion, that *the Spirit and Tenor of theſe Treaties quite through, run only upon this ſingle Point, what We and* Holland *are to do for* Portugal, *without any Mention of an Equivalent; except thoſe Ten Ships, which, at the Time when we have greateſt Need of their Aſſiſtance,*

ſiſtance, are obliged to attend upon their own Coaſts. I have ſhewn, that to *fit out Ten Ships* is not the only Aſſiſtance; but that they are alſo to make the greateſt Diverſion they can by Land. Nor are theſe Ships confined to their own Coaſt, except when the War is made by *Spain*. And if they are then obliged to keep in their own Seas, it is the beſt Service they can do. And if what they are to do by Land and Sea for us, be not equal with what we are to do for them, it is no Objection, if they do in Proportion to their Strength. That by this Treaty they are engaged to; and if they do not perform their Part, we are not, that I know of, obliged to perform ours, if we do not think it for our Intereſt. From theſe mutual Engagements, it is plain, the whole Tenor of theſe Treaties do not *run upon one Point only*. And I muſt add, what this Author has a Mind ſhould be concealed, that by the nineteenth Article of the defenſive Alliance, a very conſiderable Advantage is granted us, and the *Dutch*, by a free Entrance into their Ports in Time of Peace, for Twelve Men of War; which is twice the Number that was allowed before.

From this Account, it is plain theſe Alliances want no other Vindication, than to be repreſented truly as they are. And one need only read the Articles themſelves, to be ſatiſfied

fied there is nothing in them that an *Engliſh* M——y ought to be aſhamed of. But that is not enough: To do Juſtice to thoſe Alliances, and to the Wiſdom of thoſe who adviſed the Making them, we muſt look back to the Circumſtances Affairs were then in, and the great Difficulties that were to be overcome; which I have already hinted at; together with the Advantages theſe Treaties gave us a fair Proſpect of, with reſpect to the War, and the real Benefit we reap from them in our Trade. They who remember, how impatient the Nation were for theſe Alliances, before they were made: What Hopes we had of reducing *Spain* to the Obedience of King *Charles*, by a vigorous Impreſſion from that Side, on which *Spain* lies in a Manner quite open to *Madrid*, and the inevitable Ruin not only of our *Spaniſh*, but the *Mediterranean* Trade alſo, that muſt have followed, if the Port of *Lisbon* had continued ſhut to us, muſt confeſs, that inſtead of Blame, great Thanks and Praiſes are due to the M——y that adviſed theſe Alliances; from which we had Reaſon to promiſe ourſelves ſuch great Advantages in the Proſecution of the War, and without which the moſt uſeful Branches of our Trade could not ſubſiſt. And had our Expectations, from theſe Treaties, anſwered in

in both Points of *War* and *Trade*, which nobody could foreſee they could not, all the World muſt own, they had been worth a great deal more than what, by the Articles in Favour of the *Portugueſe*, we have given for them. And after the Experience of eight Years, allowing the *Portugueſe* have not performed ſome Articles in relation to the War, I believe, if it were to continue, even the new M——y would not adviſe the Breaking of them. For are not the Advantages of our Trade with *Portugal* vaſtly an Over-balance for any Inconveniences we ſuffer, not from the Articles of theſe Alliances, but from the ill Execution of ſome of them? Much leſs are the diſtant Promiſes made to the *Portugueſe* in theſe Treaties, in any Degree equal to the Benefit we have actually received from them. Is not the Treaty made with that Prince, at the End of the Year 1703, for the Admiſſion of *Engliſh Cloth*, which ſtood then prohibited in *Portugal*, a far greater real Advantage to us, than any they can hope for from us? All the Manufactures of *Portugal* were immediately ruined by it; and both that Kingdom and their Dominions in *America* have ever ſince been forced to depend on us for their *Woollen Goods*. But that is not all; we have in Effect carried on the

Spaniſh

Spaniſh Trade through them, and almoſt engroſſed the whole Return of Bullion from *Brazil*. Our Troops in *Spain* and *Portugal* have been chiefly paid by the Advantage of the Balance of that Trade on our Side, without ſending any Species from *England*: And that Balance has been ſo great, that I will appeal to all the Money that has been coined in her Majeſty's *Mint*, and even to the *Cuſtom-houſe* Books, whether in Times of Peace the whole *Spaniſh* Trade has been equal to it. Will any one now condemn Treaties ſo very advantageous, and ſay they ſhould not have been made, or ſhould be broke; becauſe the *Portugueſe* have not anſwered our Expectation in ſome other Points; becauſe their Finances are not, perhaps, well managed; becauſe ſome of their M———rs are not heartily in our Intereſt; becauſe they have not punctually performed the military Part in their Treaties with us, nor managed their Share of the War ſo well as they ſhould and might have done? Should we, for theſe Reaſons, quarrel with thoſe it is ſo much our Intereſt to be Friends with? Shall we not, for our own Sakes, hinder them from being ſwallowed up by the Common Enemy? Had the *Dutch* as much Intereſt as we in the Preſervation of them, I am apt to think, they would readily have done much

much more towards it, in Proportion to their Strength, than ever we have yet performed. But if theſe Alliances were ſo deſirable for *England*, and, at the Time when they were made, ſeemed ſo very uſeful for the War, and have ever ſince really been of the greateſt Advantage to our Trade: What can be the Meaning that this Author ſhould ſo groſly miſrepreſent them? Or how could he expect ſuch a Miſrepreſentation ſhould paſs without a Diſcovery? The Anſwer to both theſe Queſtions is very eaſy. The Reaſon why this Author finds ſo much Fault with theſe Alliances, is the ſame for which he is ſo angry with the Barrier-Treaty; both ſtand in the Way of an ill Peace, and therefore muſt be broke into, to come at it; and to juſtify the Violation of them, both muſt, at any Rate, be condemned as weak and fooliſh Bargains. The Barrier-Treaty ſecures to the *Dutch* ſome Towns, that by ſuch a Peace are to be given back to *France*; and the Alliances with *Portugal* are inconſiſtent with leaving the Duke of *Anjou* in Poſſeſſion of *Spain* and the *Indies*: And this is the true Quarrel this Author and his Friends have againſt them: For in the twenty-firſt Article of the Offenſive Alliance, it is agreed, *That no Peace ſhall at any Time be made, while his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's*

Second

Second Grandſon by the Dauphin, *or any other Prince of* French *Extraction, ſhall continue in* Spain. If our Author could have reconciled his intended Peace with this Article, we ſhould have heard of no Complaints againſt the Four preceding ones. They are blamed, but it is this provokes him; and it is purely for this Reaſon he is ſo much offended with the firſt Article of this Treaty, That the Emperor and the Maritime Powers ſhall jointly with the King of *Portugal* endeavour, that King *Charles* (then Arch-duke) ſhall be put into Poſſeſſion of all *Spain*, as the King his Predeceſſor poſſeſs'd it. In which Article this wondrous Man finds a World of Nonſenſe and Contradiction; becauſe by the Grand Alliance the Maritime Powers might conquer what they could for themſelves in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*: And by a Secret Article in this very Treaty, ſome Places, both in *Spain* and the *Indies*, are to be given to the King of *Portugal*. But does this Author really take his Readers to be ſuch Fools, as to think there is any Contradiction in this, becauſe he is pleaſed to call it ſo? As to the firſt Objection, this Treaty was grounded on the Grand Alliance, into which, as the Preamble ſets forth, the King of *Portugal* was invited by the reſt; and that King conſidering the Danger all *Europe* was in, by the

the plain Indications the *French* King had given, that he intended to make *Spain* a Province to *France*, and that by his Treaties with *France* he had only acknowledged the Duke of *Anjou* as in Poſſeſſion of *Spain*, but not as having a juſt Title to it; upon theſe and other Conſiderations he thought fit to enter into this Treaty, *to provide in the moſt effectual Manner for the Safety and Liberty of* Spain, *and the Right of Succeſſion to thoſe Kingdoms.* Is this Treaty then an Entrance into the Grand Alliance, at the Invitation of thoſe who had made that Alliance, and ſhall it nevertheleſs be pretended, that any Articles or Clauſes in that Alliance are voided by this Treaty, made in Purſuance of it, unleſs they are expreſly revoked and declared void? Is not this Article to be underſtood with ſuch Exceptions as are already made previouſly to it by the Parties concerned? Was ever this Objection before ſtarted? Do the Maritime Powers allow their Hands to be, by this Article, tied up from doing, if they think fit, what they are allowed by the ſixth Article of the Grand Alliance? Or has King *Charles*, or his Father, or his Brother, ever pretended, that the Right we had by that Article to what we ſhould conquer in the *Weſt-Indies*, is taken away,

or given up by this? What then does this Author mean by these chimerical Contradictions, where no body else has ever dreamt of any? There is no Manner of Inconsistency between the two Treaties, but one is grounded on the other, and made to pursue the Ends of it: And his other Objection, if possible, is more ridiculous, *That we broke this very Article in Favour of* Portugal, *by subsequent Stipulations.* Is an Article of the same Treaty, a *subsequent Stipulation* to that Treaty? Or is a Treaty contradictory to itself, because the Parties contracting for the Recovery of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy agree by a Secret Article, to give a small Part of it to the Person they contract with for his Assistance? Suppose three Persons agree with a Fourth for the Recovery of a great Debt, and, to engage him in it, promise him, if the Debt be recovered, that he shall have such a Share for his Pains: Would any Man in his Senses say, that one Part of this Supposition is a Contradiction to the other? Or that the Agreement to recover the whole Debt is broke, because by the same Agreement a certain Share of it is to be given as a Reward to the Person agreed with to assist in the Recovery? But this is just as good Sense as what is urged in

this Objection; which is truly new, and will, I dare ſay, be denied by nobody to be the Author's own. The Form of the Secret Article runs thus: It is provided, *That after the Right to* Spain *and the* Weſt-Indies *ſhall be lawfully transferred to the Archduke, that he ſhall yield and give to the King of* Portugal *ſuch and ſuch Places in both for ever.* What a mean Opinion has this Author of his Readers, when he triumphs with ſo much Inſolence in his own Nonſenſe! *They who were guilty of ſo much Folly and Contradiction*, ſays he, *know beſt whether it proceeded from Corruption or Stupidity.* In Anſwer to which, I muſt be ſo juſt to this Author, as to clear him of the Imputation of Stupidity: And, if what he ſays proceeds wholly from Corruption, it ought to be conſidered, that the Means uſed, and the Tools employed, ſhould always be proper for the Cauſe to be maintained.

Which leads me to the other Queſtion that may very well be asked, How this Author could venture upon ſo groſs a Miſrepreſentation of theſe Alliances, or expect they ſhould paſs without a Diſcovery? Which needs no other Anſwer, than that his Cauſe made it neceſſary; and he that could venture

to corrupt publick Acts in Print, and in every body's Hands, would not, upon Occaſion, ſcruple to miſrepreſent Papers that are not in Print, and hardly any where in Writing; it is very poſſible this Author and his Friends might think there was not in *England* a Copy of theſe Alliances but what was in their own Hands, and then that would prevent a Diſcovery of their foul Miſrepreſentations, or at leaſt, a ſolid Confutation of them; and if this could not be wholly prevented, if it could but be delay'd a While, and his thick-laid Lies could but for a few Days paſs for Truths, and influence where they ſhould, their Point was anſwered; and Men who have no Reputation to loſe, when the Cauſe is ſerved, would after that be very indifferent, whether the Diſcovery were made or not; any body might have their Leave to diſprove their Lies, when they have no farther Uſe for them.

But before I leave this Subject, I muſt obſerve, that theſe Alliances with *Portugal*, as well as the Barrier-Treaty, being only in MSS. an Enquiry into the Author of this ſcandalous Libel, would be brought into a very narrow Compaſs. It is highly probable that there is not above one Copy of either in Hands that would

would make ſuch a Uſe of them; and the Reader will, I doubt not, think it much for the Honour of thoſe, in whoſe Hands her Majeſty's Treaties are, to corrupt them themſelves, or to employ others in ſuch wicked and prophane Work; I ſay prophane, for Treaties have been always reckoned ſacred Things; and the Reaſons of State make it highly fit they ſhould be ſo reputed; ſince Alliances are the Bonds of Union and Friendſhip between Princes, without which they cannot ſupport themſelves. And if they are ſuffered to be trampled on, and treated with Indignity, it reflects highly on the Honour of the Princes that make them, and greatly weakens their Authority at Home, and unavoidably creates Diffidence and Jealouſy in the Minds of their Allies. And for theſe Reaſons I defy this Author, as well as he is verſed in the Hiſtory of *England*, to give one Inſtance, when our Treaties with Foreign Princes, while the Prince that made them was on the Throne, and the Treaties in Force, were ever expoſed to the Contempt of their Subjects, in ſo publick and impudent a Manner, and declared to be *weak and fooliſh Bargains*. This is a glorious Inſtance of the tender Regard ſome Men have for the Honour of the

Crown. For ſure we are, this notable Performance does not come from Men of any other Character.

But to proceed: After theſe choice Remarks of our Author upon Treaties, which I have ſhewn have no other Fault but that they are an Obſtruction to the Peace he and his Friends are ſo fond of; and two of them at leaſt are no Way concerned in the Argument in Hand; he comes at laſt to the Propoſition he was to prove, *p.* 42. but has ſtrangely changed the Words of it: For inſtead of proving, That *we ſuffered each of our Allies to break every Article in their Treaties*, which he undertook to prove, *p.* 21. and pretends he has proved, *p.* 58; here *p.* 42. he propoſes only to *conſider in what Manner our Allies have obſerved thoſe Treaties they made with us, and the ſeveral Stipulations and Agreements purſuant to them.* And inſtead of ſhewing *that each of our Allies have broken each Article of their Treaties*, he attacks in what follows, only the *Emperor*, the *States*, and the King of *Portugal*; and in all he ſays againſt the two Firſt, he does not produce one Treaty, or any one Article they have broke; but we are to take him upon his Word, which will

will have little Weight with impartial Men, in Articles they do not ſee, after two ſuch very groſs Corruptions in the eighth Article of the Grand Alliance, the only one he has given us at Length. He that cannot be ſincere, where it is ſo eaſy to diſcover him, muſt not be truſted eaſily, where it is not. And we ſhall find our Author throughout true to his Character, in going over the Charges he brings againſt each of the Allies, who have the Misfortune to be under his Diſpleaſure.

To begin with the *Dutch*: The firſt Charge againſt them is, That whereas by *a Convention ſubſequent to the Grand Alliance, 'twas agreed, that* Holland *ſhould bring* 60,000 *Men into the Field in* Flanders, *and* England 40,000. *There was an Augmentation made by the* Dutch *and Us of* 20,000 *Men for the Year* 1703, *upon a* Par, *directly contrary to the former Stipulation.* Now that there was ſuch an Augmentation made upon a *Par* is true; but that this was contrary to the former Stipulation is falſe; if the Author means, that by the former Stipulation the *Dutch* were obliged, in all future Augmentations, to obſerve the ſame Proportion they did at firſt. That Stipulation affected only the Number of Men to be then

raiſed, but was not a binding Rule any farther. In all future Additions to the Army in *Flanders*, the *States* were at Liberty to inſiſt upon a new Proportion between them and us, if they found the former lay too hard upon them. Here therefore is no Treaty of Convention broke at all, but a new one made; and all new Contracts, the Parties contracting may and ought to make upon the beſt Terms for themſelves they can. The *Dutch* had made a great Effort at firſt ſetting out, and raiſed above 60,000 Men, beſides 45,000 they had in Pay before the War began. This was ſo heavy a Charge, that they ſoon found they could not bear the Expence of taking more Troops into their Service jointly with *England* upon the firſt Foot: But to puſh the War with Vigour, they were willing to make an Augmentation of 10,000 Men upon a *Par*. The *Engliſh* Parl——t at that Time being not very well pleaſed with the Prohibition of Commerce between us and *France*, while the *Dutch* enjoyed it, would not agree to this Augmentation; not becauſe it was upon a *Par*, ſo far as I remember, but unleſs the *Dutch* would prohibit Trade with *France*, as we had done. And this Difficulty had like to have hindered the Augmentation; it being

ing evident, that a People, who ſubſiſt wholly by Trade, could not long bear ſuch a Prohibition. However, the *States*, out of their Zeal to the Common Cauſe, agreed to ſubmit to this Hardſhip for one Year; but finding by Experience that it was impracticable, and that their People neither would nor could bear it, the Parl—t was prevailed with to continue the Augmentation without inſiſting on the Tack to it. This is the true State of the firſt Augmentation that was made.

He ſays farther, That *the next and ſome enſuing Campaigns, farther additional Forces were allowed, and in every new Supply the* Dutch *gradually leſſened their Proportions.* But whoever will give himſelf the Trouble to look into the Liſt of the Forces in the *Dutch* Pay, hereunto annexed, will find that the *States* made ſeveral Additions to the Troops in their Service, in which we bore no Share: And if he will pleaſe to compare that Liſt, which is authentick, with the Account given by this Author, he will find that nothing can be more falſe, than to ſay, *That in every new Supply the* Dutch *gradually leſſened their Proportions.* As the firſt Augmentation was made upon a *Par*, ſo at leaſt were all that

have

have been made since for that Service. There were, indeed, in the Year 1706, 3000 *Palatines* taken into the Service of the *States* and us; of which we pay two Thirds. But these Troops, though put on the *Flanders* Establishment, never served there, but in *Spain*; the Service there at that Time requiring it. Besides, in Lieu of these, it appears by the Lists of the Forces in the *Dutch* Pay, that they increased their Horse against the next Year with eight Men in a Troop, amounting in the Whole to near 1200 Men. I desire therefore this Author, when he writes next, to tell us, what these Proportions were, by which the *Dutch gradually lessened* their Share, after the first Augmentation at a *Par*.

As to the Parliamentary Addresses to the Q——n, that the *States might be desired to observe their Proportions*, I must tell this Writer, that whatever was done of this Kind, was upon general Rumours only, and not upon any Facts that appeared before the House. Nor is any Thing more groundless than the pretended Effect, he says, these Addresses had upon the *States, that they eluded them by making their Troops nominal Corps; as they did, by keeping up the Numbers of Regiments,*

ments, but ſinking a Fifth Part of the Men and Money. This Author, after all the Pains taken by ſo many Emiſſaries, has very ill Intelligence, or elſe he had known, that there is not in all this one Syllable of Truth. The *Dutch* Corps are ſo far from being *nominal*, that they are the compleateſt in the whole Service. No Troops are ſo ſtrictly muſtered, at leaſt once in the Campaign; and every Captain is obliged, upon Pain of being broke, to have his Complement to a Man. And this is a Strictneſs obſerved in no other Troops, that I know of.

The next Complaint is againſt the Manner in which the *Dutch* Troops are employed; a Complaint as unjuſt and grounleſs as the former. He ſays, *The more Towns we conquer, the worſe Condition we are in, becauſe they make no Scruple of employing the Troops of their Quota towards garriſoning every Town as faſt as it is taken, directly contrary to the Agreement by which Garriſons are excluded.*

I wiſh this Author would have given us the Words of this Agreement, and then I believe we ſhould find the *Garriſons excluded*, mean the Garriſons of the Towns that at that Time belonged to them, and not the Towns that

ſhould

ſhould be taken in the Proſecution of the War; though had it been ſo expreſs'd, it ought not in Equity to have been extended ſo far as this Author would have it; nothing leſs being in their Thoughts, at the Time of that Agreement, than that ſuch a Number of ſtrong Towns could be forced from ſo powerful an Enemy, or that he ſhould ſuffer it, before he could be brought to ſubmit to a good Peace. Theſe were Caſes not foreſeen: But this is a Defence the *Dutch* do not want; by the Wiſdom and Conduct of my Lord *M*——, the Troops, left in Garriſon in *Flanders*, during the Campaigns, are very inconſiderable. This Author's Generals, I know, could think this Work enough for a whole Army. But his Grace knows how to employ his Troops to better Purpoſes. What remain in Garriſon are a Trifle compared to the whole Army; and generally ſuch Regiments, as in the Campaign before have ſuffered ſo much, as not to be in a Condition to take the Field. I could, indeed, tell this Writer of ſome *Engliſh* Regiments that have ſtaid in Garriſon, becauſe they were too weak to take the Field, though the Service has not been the Occaſion of their Weakneſs; but this I am ſure he had rather not hear of.

As

As for the Towns that lie neareſt to the Armies, they indeed have in them larger Garriſons; but yet, that if any Misfortune ſhould happen, thoſe who think now ſo many Troops are placed in them, would complain loudly that there were not more. But as to theſe Troops, it muſt be obſerved, that they are as uſeful to the Operations of the Campaign, as thoſe that actually are in the Field; and often are upon much harder Duty, in ſecuring Convoys of Proviſions, Ammunition, and Artillery, and in other ſecret and extraordinary Services. Beſides, that upon any Proſpect of a general Action, Care is always taken, that the greateſt Part of them ſhould join the Army. And if this Author can bear the Name of *Bouchain*, I would put him in Mind, that it was a Body of Troops, privately drawn from the neighbouring Garriſons, that enabled the Army this Summer to paſs the *Senſet*, and form that Siege, the Succeſs of which has given ſo much Offence. It is true, indeed, the *Dutch*, or rather my Lord *M—*, does put conſtantly Garriſons *into every Town, as faſt as it is taken*. For Example, laſt Year he put four Garriſons in Towns, where the Allies have had none for theſe thirty or forty Years before. And I would be glad

glad to know, what Method this Author would take; (not that I think him or his Friends very like to take Towns.) Would he, when he has taken them, leave them without Garrisons for the Enemy to retake? Or can he tell where to find Troops to put into them, *as fast as they are taken*, if he will not spare any from his Army? But to pass this Nonsense; our Author concludes this Complaint against the *Dutch*, with an Assertion the most ridiculously false and extravagant of any in the whole Book. There is not in the World, I believe, such another Book, nor in the Book such another Proposition. *This at Length*, says he, *arrived by several Steps to such a Height, that there are at present in the Field not so many Forces under the Duke of* M——'s *Command in* Flanders, *as* Britain *alone maintains for that Service, nor have been for some Years past.* This is such a foolish, ill-contrived Invention, that one wants a Name for it. If it had not been intended for some very short-lived Purpose, it is scarce credible any Writer should so far forget himself, as not to have more Regard to Probability. To shew him the monstrous Folly and Absurdity of this Assertion, I must make a little Use of Numbers; and, to be as clear as possible, I will

will make a Calculation upon thoſe he may be ſuppoſed to be beſt acquainted with. In the Eſtimate of the 40,000 Men furniſhed by *England*, for the Service in *Flanders*, 16 Battalions of Foot are computed to be 14,937 Men; and five Regiments of Horſe, and two of Dragoons, making in all 17 Squadrons, are reckoned to be 3522; and the Total of the Forces in her Majeſty's Pay for *Flanders* is 64,724; and deducting the 2000 *Palatines*, which, as I obſerved, are in *Spain*, there remains only 62,724. Now let us ſee, how many Squadrons and Battalions this Number will make, at the Rate the *Engliſh* Squadrons and Battalions are reckoned in the aforeſaid Eſtimate. Now if 16 Battalions make 14,937 Men, then 52 Battalions make 48,545; and if 17 Squadrons of Horſe and Dragoons are 3522 Men, then 68 Squadrons are 14,088. Add now together 48,545, and 14,088, and the Total will be 62,633; almoſt equal to all the *Flanders* Forces in her Majeſty's Pay.

Theſe are all the Troops under the Duke of *M*——, that are paid by us, beſides two Battalions of the Foot-Guards, which make about 1200 effective Men. Let us now compare an Army, conſiſting of 52 Battalions,

and

and 68 Squadrons, with the Whole that is commanded by the D. of *M*——, which, if this Writer ſays true, muſt be leſs by one Squadron, or one Battalion at leaſt; but if we look for the D. of *M*—'s Army in any *Line of Battle*, many of which are printed every Year in the common News-Papers, we ſhall find a great deal above twice that Number of Battalions, and more than thrice that Number of Squadrons. Now unleſs it can be proved, that 52 Battalions are more than about an hundred and twenty or thirty, of which thoſe 52 are a Part; and that 240 Squadrons are leſs than 68 of the ſame Squadrons, this Author muſt acknowledge, that the Total of the Queen's Forces, which he has affirmed to be bigger than the D. of *M*—'s Army, is really not half ſo big; the *Imperial* Forces not included; though this Author do not except them, and in common Eſteem they are conſidered as one Army. But perhaps thoſe Troops had left *Flanders*, when this Paſſage was writ, which it ſeems to have been during the Campaign; though he *had Reaſons*, he ſays, *for not publiſhing ſooner*. For had a Man writ at a Seaſon, when the Armies were out of the Field, he could not have expreſs'd himſelf ſo abſurdly, as to ſay, *there are not*

at

at preſent ſo many Forces in the Field. And what confirms me in this Conjecture is, that the next Paragraph, concerning the D. of *M*——'s Project for Winter-Quarters, appears plainly to be ſtuck in, ſince the Book was writ, having no Connexion with what goes before, or follows after. And from hence I make this Reflection, That this Book has been upon the Anvil as long as the Cauſe it is to ſerve has been negociating; and that the blackeſt Arts were uſing to ruin the D. of *M*——, at the ſame Time that we were told, ſome Men profeſs'd the greateſt Friendſhip for him.

But to come to this Complaint againſt the *Dutch*, for not coming entirely into the Project for Winter-Quarters: I obſerve, to the Honour of the *States*, that this Author charges them with no one Fact in all the Operations of this War for nine Years: That what he does charge them with, is no Breach of any Treaty, unleſs this Author can prove, that the *Dutch* are bound to come into all the Projects the General ſhall propoſe: That if they did not come into this, it was not for the Reaſon aſſigned by him, when he ſays, *the Queſtion was reduced to this ſhort Iſſue, Whether the* Dutch *ſhould loſe this paultry Benefit ariſing*

by Contributions, or the Common Cauſe an Advantage of ſuch mighty Importance? In which I am confident he ſpeaks againſt his own Knowledge, ſince it is plain, by his Manner of expreſſing himſelf, that he has ſeen the Papers relating to this Affair; and that he cannot have done, without learning from them, that the *States* made ſeveral Objections to this Project: That to crowd ſuch a Number of Troops into that Frontier, would, in many Reſpects, be very inconvenient to the Troops, and render them leſs fit for Service the next Campaign: That it would leave the *Netherlands* and their own Provinces too much expoſed; and that the extraordinary Expence for *Bedding*, *Stabling*, *Firing*, and *other incident Charges*, was too great for them to bear, conſidering the prodigious Charges they were already at. But however, provided the Troops of the ſeveral Nations in that Service would furniſh their Part towards theſe Garriſons, and the Queen would come into a Proportion of of the other Articles beſides Forage, they would agree to it. This *England* did conſent to, but not till it was too late to make the neceſſary Preparations for the Reception and Subſiſtance of ſo many Troops; and ſo this Project, in Part, was forced to be laid aſide,

though

though the beſt Care had been taken that the Execution of it might not be loſt for Want of Time; and to that End my Lord *S——rs* came over hither with it in the Beginning of *July*.

As to the Inſinuation about the *paultry Benefit* of Contributions, this Author knows it is wholly groundleſs; that the *States* have ſufficiently cleared themſelves in that Point, and ſhewn, that the Treaty for Contributions was made before this Deſign was formed: And that this Treaty did interfere but little with the Project, *to hinder the Enemies erecting Magazines*, ſince that Treaty only ſtipulates, that *the Product of thoſe Countries under Contribution ſhall paſs free and unmoleſted*: But the Product of thoſe Countries was entirely eaten up by our Armies, and therefore the *French* Magazines muſt be made of what is not the Product of thoſe Countries, and conſequently are not affected by the Treaty. This is the true State of this Matter, and this Writer's *paultry Benefit* had no Part in it; though a Benefit which at other Times he won't allow to be a paultry one, but would make us think it amounts to an immenſe Sum; and his Friends have been often endeavouring to perſuade the World, that the D. of *M.* had

a good Share of it; at the ſame Time that they knew, it is by Treaty allotted to the *States*, in Conſideration of the Contributions they pay themſelves, and of that vaſt Expence they are at in Sieges; which, by the Succeſs of the War, and the Loſs of Engineers, exceeds greatly what had been expected, or it could be imagined they could bear. And after all, if it were true that the *States* did not exert themſelves as they might have done on this Occaſion, who can blame them? With what Heart could they go into an expenſive Project for the War, when they knew private Negociations of Peace had been carrying on for ſeveral Months? Or how could they expect that a Project of ſuch Importance, wholly formed by the Duke of *M.* and highly for his Honour, would be ſupported where he had no longer any Credit.

But I muſt obſerve farther in Relation to this Project: Firſt, that it did not miſcarry under the Old M——y; which yet was neceſſary to prove our Author's Point, that *we ſuffered our Allies to do ſo and ſo:* And that the Project at laſt, though not in the full Extent of it, has been ſo far complied with, as to enable us to hinder the Enemy from making

king a new Line, and cutting off *Bouchain*, as they deſigned in their late Attempt; which, if it would not lead me too far from my Subject, I could give broad Suſpicions, that it was made in Concert, to forward the ſame good End this Book was writ for. And it is not a little remarkable, that the News of it arrived the Day the P——t met after two Prorogations; and had the Letters come in that Morning as regularly as they ſhould have done, it might have had a fatal Influence on the Reſolutions that then were to be taken. But this Attempt, God be thanked, has miſcarried, and in the Circumſtances we are now in, I am perſuaded our Troops will be able to defeat any future Attempt that ſhall be made of the ſame Kind: And to take the Field ſo much ſooner than the Enemy, that we may juſtly hope to have *Cambray* or *Arras* very early in the next Year. After which, there will neither be a Town or River of Conſequence between us and *Paris*. It was therefore high Time for the *French* to propoſe a Congreſs, and to make ſure, e're it was too late, of *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies*.

The next Article of this Libel againſt the *Dutch* is, that *inſtead of making up in their Fleet what they fell ſhort in their Army, they*

never once furniſhed their Quota *either of Ships or Men.* To this I anſwer, That they did not fall ſhort of their *Quota* for the Army, but indeed exceeded it, as will appear by what has been already ſaid, compared with the Liſt of their Forces annexed; by which we ſhall ſee they have in their Pay about 143,385 Land-Men. And therefore there is no Obligation to make any Addition to their Fleet on that Account. But we are aſſured *they never once furniſhed their* Quota *by Sea*; *or if ſome few of their Ships now and then appeared, it was no more than appearing, for they immediately ſeparated to look to their Merchants, and protect their Trade*: Which is a Thing they are, it ſeems, very careful in; and it is much for their Honour, and will enable them, who are ſo ſmall a State, to hold out ſo expenſive a War much longer than they could have done otherwiſe. If therefore this Author is of a contrary Opinion, and thinks their Care of their Trade a Reproach to them; I heartily wiſh it could be retorted upon us, who, it is certain, have not been ſo careful; as the *Lords* more than once have ſhewn in their *Repreſentations* and *Addreſſes* to the Queen on this Subject. And it is not above a Twelvemonth ſince our *Virginia* Fleet was unaccountably

unaccountably loſt upon our Coaſt, for want of a little *Dutch* Care. But to judge of this Matter more impartially, I deſire this Author would tell us, what it was we propoſed to do with our Fleets, when we ſettled our Proportions at the Beginning of the War? Was it not chiefly, that we might be able to be a Match for the Enemy by Sea, as well as Land? And have we not been ſo? Has the Royal Fleet of *France* been able to ſhew itſelf theſe ſeven Years? Has not the Defeat near *Malaga* put it out of their Power ever ſince to appear in Line of Battle, either in the *Channel* or the *Mediterranean?* And have not the *Dutch* and we, ſince that, done their Men of War at *Toulon* more Damage, than will be repaired in many Years? Why then ſo much Complaint of their not furniſhing their full *Quota* for the Sea-Service? Is it becauſe it has hindered ſome Expeditions to the *Indies?* But if the *Dutch* had never ſo many Ships, I believe they would find ſome other Uſe for them. They are too frugal and cautious a People to be fond of Expeditions, which coſt ſo dear, and the Succeſs of which is ſo uncertain, and depends on ſo many Accidents; and which, when they ſucceed beſt, ſeldom fail to ruin both the Ships and Troops employed on thoſe Ser-

vices; and they will be confirmed in this Opinion, by our late Expedition to *Quebec*. But I ſhall have Occaſion to ſay more of this in another Place.

But as if we might ſuffer greatly by the Failure of the *Dutch* in this Part, *We may very well remember*, ſays our Author, when thoſe *Guarantees of our Succeſſion, after having not one Ship for many Months together in the* Mediterranean, *ſent that Part of their* Quota *thither; and furniſhed nothing to us, at the ſame Time that they alarm'd us with the Rumour of an Invaſion.* This Paſſage being an Inſult on the *Dutch*, as *Guarantees*, by the Barrier-Treaty, of our Succeſſion, ſhould relate to ſomething that happened ſince; and therefore can look no farther back than laſt Year. And if that be the Author's Meaning, there are few Paſſages in his Book more malicious. It having been, upon Conſideration of the Poſture Affairs were in in *Spain*, thought proper, that the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* Squadrons ſhould continue all Winter in the *Mediterranean*, contrary to the uſual Practice, the *States* ſent two Expreſſes over Land to *Genoa*, and, I think, one by Sea, with Inſtructions to their Admiral not to return. But theſe Expreſſes unfortunately miſ-

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ſing him, he did return: Upon which they immediately ordered another Squadron to be fitted out. Now I deſire this Author to tell me, if the *States* did not do all that could be done in thoſe Circumſtances. But our Author ſays, *they furniſhed nothing to us, at the ſame Time that they alarm'd us with the Rumour of an Invaſion.* I remember indeed, we were alarm'd with ſuch a Rumour, and that it gave great Offence; and that ſeveral Perſons were not a little brow-beaten, for uſing their beſt Endeavours to give us the earlieſt Intelligence they could. And becauſe an Invaſion was not actually attempted, and proved to be a Rumour only, it was preſently ſaid to be a Plot of the *Dutch*, and the late M——y: And I wiſh we do not ſuffer another Time, for diſcouraging the Intelligence we had then. We might, in my humble Opinion, from the intended Invaſion in 1708, which was made then a Rumour, learn, that Advices in Matters of that Nature cannot come too ſoon, nor the Perſons employed be too diligent in giving Notice of the firſt Suſpicions of ſuch Deſigns. But the *Dutch at that Time ſent their Ships to the* Mediterranean, *and furniſhed nothing to us.* Here again I would ask this Author a Queſtion or two: Firſt, Whether what

what the *Dutch* did was not to promote the Service, and replace the Ships that were come away contrary to their Intentions? Secondly, Whether the *Engliſh* M——y deſired, that they would forbear a While to ſend thoſe Ships away? And laſtly, How he knows the *Dutch* would not have ſent ſome Ships to our Aſſiſtance, had the Invaſion proved more than a Rumour; which ſince it did not, there was no Occaſion for their Help. But our Author has worſe to ſay of the *Dutch* ſtill. Sir *J. Wiſhart*, it ſeems, met laſt Year *with ſuch a Reception, as ill became a Republick that lies under ſo many great Obligations to us. In ſhort, ſuch an one as thoſe only deſerve, who are content to take.* Our Author's Reſentments now run high; he ſeems to think we ſhould demand Satisfaction; and it might, in Imitation of former Examples, were our Author Chief Miniſter, be made in due Time Part of a Declaration for another *Dutch* War; which in ſeveral Places he ſeems to long for. But to the Point; if he had told us the Particulars of this Reception, he ſhould have a more diſtinct Anſwer to it. At preſent, I muſt obſerve, that this is the firſt Complaint of this Kind in Ten Years. And then if Sir *James* did not ſucceed in his Buſineſs, it was

becauſe

becauſe the *Dutch* were neither able to do what was deſired, neither did he come Time enough for it; the State of the War, both by Sea and Land for that Year, being fixed before his Arrival. Which made it impoſſible for the Admiralty of *Holland* to comply with any new Propoſal. As for the *States*, they have always behaved themſelves with the utmoſt Reſpect to the Q——n, and a juſt Regard to the Intereſt of her People; and have, we all know, lately given the moſt ſenſible Proof of their profound Deference to her Majeſty, in conſenting to a *Congreſs* againſt their own, and the Judgments of their Allies; as is ſet forth in their Reſolution upon that Subject. But ſince the Expence of ſo extenſive and long a War is ſo great, that they are not able fully to anſwer all the Parts of it, a Deficiency muſt fall ſomewhere; and therefore they have very prudently let it fall on their Fleet, where it would be leaſt felt. This is the true Anſwer to all this Author has ſaid, or can ſay againſt them, in relation to the Sea. They maintain above 140,000 Men at Land: And the State of the War for one Year, comes to near Four Millions and a Half,

For

For Example. The general Eſtimate of their Expence, for the War the laſt Year, was as follows:

	Gild.	*St.*
The Ordinary and Extraordinary Eſtimate of the War for 1710, amount to —	27,424991	6
The Troops which are not in either of thoſe Eſtimates, — —	2,421503	17
The Extraordinary Expences of the Campaign, excluſive of Artillery and Ammunition for Sieges; of which an exact Eſtimate cannot be made before-hand, but which muſt amount to a very conſiderable Sum, ——	4,000000	00
Money for Recruits of Men and Horſes, *&c.* ——	1,310000	00
Magazines of Forage, - -	1,610000	00
For the Sea-Service, above what ariſes from the Duties of Importation and Exportation, ——	8,612980	00
Subſidies to ſeveral Allies, —	2,786833	06
In all —	48,167208	09
Which Sum at 11 Gilders to the Pound *Sterling*, is —	4,378837 *l.*	

And

And that we may make the truer Judgment of the Expence the *States* are at from this Eſtimate, I muſt deſire the Reader to take along with him theſe three Remarks.

1. That the Revenue ariſing from the Places the *Dutch* are poſſeſs'd of in *Brabant* and *Flanders*, and of all the Places in the *Generality*, ſuch as *Breda* and others, that are not properly a Part of the Seven Provinces, all this Revenue is appropriated to the Payment of Charges not within this Eſtimate.

2. That each of the Seven Provinces apart is at the Charge of all the Parts of its own Civil Government.

3. That there is not one of the Provinces that has not been obliged to borrow, from Time to Time, very great Sums to furniſh their Contingent for the War; and conſequently there is none of them that does not pay annually a great deal for Intereſt; none of which Money is reckoned in this Eſtimate.

I ſhall, without ſaying more of this Eſtimate leave it to the Conſideration of this worthy Author; let him compare the Revenue

venue of the two Nations with the annual Expence of each, and then affirm, if he can, that the Weight of the War does not in Proportion lie heavier upon the *Dutch* than us; which till then, I ſhall take the Liberty to ſay it does: Which is at once a full Anſwer to all that has been or can be ſaid againſt them. And if they were capable of deſerting their Allies, and going into the Intereſt of *France*, after ſo much Succeſs againſt them, this Author has furniſhed them with better Arguments, than any he has brought againſt them. For if they have done all they can, and more than they can, which is true of them: And if what this Writer every where affirms of our Condition, is true of us, it is Time there ſhould be an End of all Complaints on each Side; and that they ſhould be glad of any Peace the *French* will vouchſafe to give them.

Nor is the Expence of their Sieges, and ſeveral other conſiderable Articles, reckoned into this Account: And therefore conſidering how very ſmall a Territory the Seven Provinces together make, that they ſubſiſt almoſt entirely by Trade, and that is moſtly confined to one, which is not ſo big as ſome Counties in *England*; it is truly wonderful to

ſee

ſee the mighty Efforts they have made: They have outdone the Expectation even of the Enemy; and I dare ſay the Faction in *England* are the only People in the World that think they have not done enough. To envy ſo brave a People any little Branch of Expence they have ſaved, in order to be able to ſupport the more neceſſary Parts of the War with Vigour, is as barbarous, as to quarrel with them becauſe they have not done more than they are able, is abſurd and unreaſonable.

And the ſame Anſwer I muſt take Leave to make to the next Complaint made againſt them, *That they are always ſlow in paying their Subſidies.* People can pay no farther than they have Money to pay with: They take the moſt extraordinary Ways to raiſe Money; Ways, that we in *England* ſhould be very loth to come to; and they are in Debt a great deal more than we, and have a leſs Revenue by much to anſwer it. It is therefore not very ſtrange, if their Payments of Subſidies be not ſo quick as they ſhould be. It is indeed very much for the Honour of the late M——y, that our Payments have hitherto been ſo regular; but I cannot ſee by what neceſſary Conſequence the Slowneſs of the *Dutch*

throws

throws the Blame and Preſſure on the Queen. If we are able to make quick Payments, we ſhould, whether the *Dutch* do or not; and whenever we cannot, I dare ſay we ſhall not; which is their Caſe.

Our Author having thus far attacked the *Dutch*, takes the late Emperor to Task next; but what he has to ſay upon this and other Heads, and any other ſcatter'd Objections of his againſt his mortal Enemies the *Dutch*, I muſt leave to be conſider'd in a *Third Part*, this being already too big; which I perſuade myſelf every fair and candid Reader will forgive, when he conſiders that this Able Writer can crowd more falſe Things into one Page, than can ſometimes be ſet right in Ten. I have nothing to add, but to deſire the Reader, in Juſtice to our *Allies*, to make due Allowances for the many unavoidable Imperfections in this Defence of them, which they are much abler to do themſelves; and I am perſuaded, if we had a good Miniſter from *Holland*, or Count *Gallas* were ſtill here, neither the *States*, nor the Houſe of *Auſtria*, would want to be defended by an *Engliſh* Pen.

A LIST

A LIST of the Troops the State of the United Provinces kept in their Service at the Peace of Ryſwyk, *and of the Augmentations made ſince that Time to the Year* 1711.

Horſe 4128.
Drag. 992.
Foot 40,889.
46,009.

THE State of the United Provinces kept in their Service, at the Peace of *Ryſwyk*, 46,009 Men, both Horſe and Foot, which, at the Return of the Guards from *England*, ſuffer'd ſome ſmall Alteration, both in the Proportion between the Horſe and Foot, and in the Num-

Horſe 4501.	ber; but without any	
Drag. 1592.	Diminution of the	
Foot 38,899.	Expence; ſo that at	
44,992.	the Death of King	
	Charles II. of *Spain*,	
	the State paid —	44,992.
Horſe 1440.	At the Beginning	
Drag. 772.	of the Year 1701. the	
Foot 15,282.	State augmented their	
17,494.	Troops by way of Re-	
	cruits, with —	17,494.
Horſe 4188.	And raiſed at the	
Foot 10,842.	ſame Time, 72 Com-	
15,030.	panies of Horſe, and	
	163 of Foot, making	
	together —	15,030.
Drag. 304.	And by two Capi-	
Foot 792.	tulations, of the 12th	
1096.	of *April*, and 27th of	
	May, 2 Squadrons of	
	Dragoons, and 1 Regi-	
	ment of Foot, ma-	
	king together —	1096.

Drag.	528.	Not contented with	
Foot	1680.	that, the State took	
		into their Service, by	
	2208.	two Contracts, of the	
		10th of *March* and	
		18th of *April*, 2 Re-	
		giments of Foot, and	
		1 of Dragoons of *An-*	
		ſpag, making	2208.
		Item, By a Contract	
		of the 27th of *March*,	
		2 Regiments of Foot	
		of *Mecklenberg*, ma-	
		king	1680.
Horſe	1872.	Again, By a Con-	
Drag.	552.	tract of the 23d of	
Foot	4452.	*April*, 4 Regiments	
		of Horſe, 1 of Dra-	
	6876.	goons, and 6 of Foot	
		of *Hanover* and *Zell*,	
		making	6876.
		By two Contracts of	
		the 24th of the ſame	
		Month, 2000 Foot of	
		Heſſe-Caſſel	2000.

Horſe	1488.	By a Contract of	
Foot	3168.	the 27th of *May*, 4	
	4656.	Regiments of Horſe,	
		and as many of Foot,	
		of the Elector *Palatine*, making —	4656.
Horſe	3000.	Thereafter the State	
Drag.	1000.	negociated together	
Foot	8000.	with *Great-Britain*,	
	12,000.	by the Treaty of the	
		15th of *June*, 12,000	
		Danes, the Half of	
		which makes —	6000.
Heſſians	492.	The ſame Year the	
Switz.	1246.	State augmented again	
	1738.	their Troops with 6	
		Companies of Foot of	
		Heſſe-Caſſel, and 7	
		Companies of *Switzers*, making —	1738.
Horſe	400.	And by a Contract	
Foot	1600.	of the 17th of *October*, with 1 Regiment	
	2000.	of Horſe, and 2 of	

Foot

Foot of *Munſter*, making ——— 2000.

N.B. The ſaid 2000 Men arrived but at the End of *Auguſt*, the following Year.

Horſe 874.
Foot 4255.
———
5129.

Great-Britain and the State have by Contract of the 30th of *December* 1701, taken into their Service 2 Regiments of Horſe and 5 of Foot of the King of *Pruſſia*'s, making 5129 Men, the States Moiety comes to — ——— 2564.

Horſe 360.
Drag. 1280.
Foot 4360.
———
6000

Moreover by a Contract of the 7th of *February* 1702, 1 Regiment of Horſe, 2 of Dragoons, and 5 of Foot, of *Heſſe-Caſſel*, making 6000 Men, to which the Landgrave engaged to join 3000

for a Subsidy; the Half of the 6000 makes — 3000.

Horse 520. Drag. 2589. Foot 16,902. — 20,011. — The two Powers made in the Spring of the following Year 1703, an Augmenta- of 20,000 Men, the Liſt of which is to be found in the Contract of the 30th of *Auguſt*. The States Moiety makes — 10,000.

Drag. 600. Foot 3400. — 4000. — In the Year 1704, the State took into their Service, by a Contract of the 31ſt of *March*, 1 Regiment of Dragoons, and 3 of Foot, of *Wirtemberg*, making — — 4000.

Horse 720. Foot 480. — 1200. — Beſides, in the Year 1706, they took together with *Great-Britain*, by a Contract of

the

the 25th of *May*, 2 Regiments of Horſe, and a Battalion of *Heſſians*, with which their Body of 9000 Men was augmented. The States Share is — 600.

Horſe 464.
Foot 2536.
3000.

And by the Contract of the 26th of the ſame Month, together with *Great-Britain*, 3000 *Palatines*. The States third Part is — 1000.

In the Beginning of the Year 1707, the State augmented the National Horſe with 8 Men in each Company, amounting to — 1160.

Horſe 443.
Drag. 896.
Foot 3300.
4639.

Great-Britain and the State took into their Service, by a Contract of the 30th of *April* of the ſame

Year, 4639 *Saxons*, the Share of the States comes to —— 2319.

Again, by the Contract of the 27th of *August* of the ſame Year, 1 Regiment of Dragoons of 800 Men. The States Half is — 400.

The State took beſides into their Service, by a Contract of the 21ſt of *February* 1709, 2 Regiments of Foot of *Wolfembuttel*, making —— 1400.

Horſe 264.
Drag. 528.
Foot 3300.
——
4092.
——

And by a Contract of the 22d of *March* in the ſame Year, together with *Great-Britain*, 4092 *Saxons*. The States Share amounts to — 2946.

——

More

Moreover, by that of the ſame Month, 1 Regiment of Foot of *Holſtein Gottorp*, of 797.

And by that of the 18th of *April*, one of *Munſter* of —— 800.

The State did at the ſame Time augment the *Swiſs* and *Griſon* Regiments, with 22 Men in each Company, making —— 1144.

—— Laſtly, the State agreed the 29th of *June* 1711, for a *Swiſs* Regiment of 1200 Men, the Raiſing of which is in a good Forwardneſs. —— —— 1200.

It is obſervable, that all the Troops mentioned in this Liſt, re- 138,200

ceive

ceive the ordinary Pay of the State, and many of them still more, one *Hessian* Regiment of Horse excepted; whereas *Great-Britain* has allowed theirs, besides such 1 Regiment of the *Landgrave*'s, a Body of 10,000 *Hanoverians*, and another of 6000 *Prussians*, a much lower Pay; so that they only supply their Wants by the Means of the Winter-Quarters they have yearly in the flat Country.

It is to be observed again, that besides all the forementioned Troops, the State pays since the Year 1706, together with her *Britannick* Majesty, the Bread, Forage, and Agio of the Money, at 25 *per* 100 for a Body of 10,370 *Prussians*;

and

and that this Payment does, in relation to the State, come ſo much the nearer to the ordinary Pay, becauſe a great Part of that Body has every Year its Winter Quarters in the flat Country of the State, which prevents getting the Taxes, which otherways might be laid upon it; ſo that it ſeems there are good Grounds for inſerting in the Liſt of the Troops the State pays, one Half of that Body, which is — 5185.

Total — 143,385.

THE ALLIES AND The Late Miniſtry Defended againſt FRANCE, And the Preſent Friends of *France*.

PART III.

In which are conſider'd all the Objections made againſt the *Emperor*, *Portugal*, and the reſt of the Allies: With a farther Vindication of the *Dutch*; and ſome Reflections on the *Spaniſh* War; on the Nature of Alliances in general; and on the apparent ill Deſigns of that Author.

Oblitus decoriſque ſui, ſociûmque ſalutis.
Hæc Promiſſa Fides? Sic nos in Sceptra reponis? } Virg.

THE Author of *the Conduct of the Allies*, &c. whom we may conſider as the *Engliſh Menager*, having chaſtiſed the *States* to the entire Satisfaction of the *French* one; and without the leaſt Spark of Modeſty, Candor,

dor, Ingenuity, or Truth; Virtues, which in Politicks *France* and her Faction are perfect Strangers to; He falls foul next upon the *Emperor*, who muſt expect but little Quarter at ſuch unmerciful Hands, after the moſt injurious Treatment of thoſe Allies, upon whom next ourſelves, the Burden of the War has chiefly lain; whom Nearneſs and Religion, the ſame Intereſts, and common Danger, ſhould join together in the ſtricteſt Union. After this nothing can ſurprize that it ſhall pleaſe this Author to ſay againſt the *Emperor*. By which Word he means the Imperial Court, under the two laſt Emperors, as well as while there was none at all. And the preſent Emperor having remonſtrated againſt the Peace, which he and his Friends are ſo very eager for; this may prepare us to expect a heavier Charge, if poſſible, againſt the *Imperial* Court, than what he has brought againſt the *States*: And how well he has anſwered what might be expected from him, I come now to examine.

But before I enter into the Particulars, I cannot help taking Notice of one Paſſage, *Page* 46. relating to the preſent Emperor, when he was no more than King of *Spain*. He ſays King *Charles* was paid in *July* 1711.

all

all his Subsidies to January, *and yet hath complained for want of Money.* This being said by way of Encomium on the present M——y, as well as to insult King *Charles*; I must tell him, that the late M——y always took care that his Subsidies should be paid him by the first of *May*: But in Behalf of King *Charles* I would ask this Author, what Sum of Money was at that Time paid him: Whether it were a Year's Subsidy clear, or only paying him what on the Balance of old Accounts would be left: For that might be a very small Sum in Reality, while in Figures it is the whole Year's Subsidy. Another Question I would ask is, Whether when our Troops in *Catalonia* should have taken the Field this Year, there was not eight or nine Months Subsistance due to them; and whether for want of timely Remittances we have not lost a great Prospect of pushing the War in those Parts with good Success, considering the ill Condition the Enemy were in, if Want of Money had not made it impossible for our Troops to take the Field?

As one Thing leads to another, our Author cannot omit another Passage concerning *Subsidies*, to shew how much Foreigners reckon themselves Masters of our Money, whenever they

they think fit to call for it. *Prince* Eugene *happening to paſs by* Berlin, *and an Arrear being due from the Emperor to the* Pruſſian *Troops in* Italy, *his Highneſs frankly promiſed them, that in Conſideration of this Deficiency,* Britain *and the* States *ſhould* increaſe their *Subſidies to* 70,000 Crowns more between them. *The* Dutch *refuſed conſenting to it. But the* Pruſſian *Miniſter here prevailed on us to agree to our Proportion, before we could hear what Reſolution would be taken in* Holland. Now for a full Anſwer to this Paſſage, I might have referred my Author and his Friends to the Prince himſelf, when he was here; for they certainly ſaw him, and he was beſt able to tell them, whether *Berlin* fell by Chance in his Way, in his Road from *Vienna* to the *Hague*; or whether he went ſo far out of his Way, to ſolicit ſomething for the Service of the *Emperor*, and the Common Cauſe. He likewiſe can beſt inform them, whether he was ſo impertinent as to engage *Britain* and the *States* in Payments, without any Powers ſo to do. Till I have better Authority for it, than this Author's Word, I ſhall believe there is nothing more in it, than that upon the King of *Pruſſia*'s ſtarting new Difficulties about thoſe Troops, to get

more

more Money for them, the Prince of *Savoy*, to ſatisfy the King, and remove theſe Difficulties, undertook to uſe his Endeavours with us and the *States*, to make the Augmentation he inſiſted on; by which Means the Continuance of thoſe Troops in *Italy* was obtained; and yet neither we nor the *States* were engaged to make the Augmentation of the Subſidy, if we did not think fit; and the *States*, it ſeems, did not. Why then, let me ask this Author, did we? For this Queſtion he can anſwer beſt, this Tranſaction is no older than laſt Year. The late Treaſurer was removed the Beginning of *Auguſt*; there was no Convention then made for the Payment of this Money: It did not come before the Parl----t till *December*; nor then neither, properly ſpeaking; it not appearing to the Houſe as an Augmentation, when the firſt Eſtimate for Subſidies was given in; but reckon'd in lieu of an Abatement to the Duke of *Savoy*; which Abatement, however, afterwards upon ſecond Thoughts was not abated. So that for the Diſcharge of this Author's 35,000 Crowns, the Eſtimate ſtands now charged with an Augmentation of above 46,000. Now to let this Management paſs, in which it muſt be confeſſed they have out-

done

done the Old M----y, I would only ask this Author, Whether there was not Time enough between *July* and *December* to have known what *Reſolution the* Dutch *had taken in this Matter*: And therefore the not knowing it cannot be a Reaſon why we did it, if it was wrong, nor indeed, in that Caſe, ought we to have agreed to this Payment, though the *Dutch* had. But if we are to judge by the Eſtimate, it was not very unreaſonable, it being there ſaid to be in Conſideration of the extraordinary Charge the King had been at to recruit his Troops.

Our Author having given this Laſh in paſſing, to King *Charles*, Prince *Eugene*, and the King of *Pruſſia*, goes on to the Particulars of the Charge againſt the *Emperors*. The firſt is, that inſtead of ninety thouſand Men, which they ought to furniſh, neither of the two laſt Emperors ever had Twenty on their own Account, except once in *Italy*. Which is an Aſſertion juſt as true, as what he ſays of there not having been for ſeveral Campaigns ſo many Men under the D. of *M.* in *Flanders*, as the Queen alone maintains for that Service. The Emperor did certainly raiſe, at the Beginning of the War, his *Quota* of Troops; and I dare ſay the Corps that make the Number

ſtipulated, ſtill ſubſiſt, though the diſtant and hard Services they have been employed in, the low Condition the Imperial Finances are reduced to by continual Wars, and the great Degree to which the Hereditary Countries are exhauſted of Men, have made it impoſſible for the late Emperors to recruit them well. Once indeed, this Author allows the Imperial Court did exert themſelves. Why do not he tell us they did it without Allies? And that if they had not done it, the Liberty of *Europe* had been loſt beyond a Poſſibility of recovering? Let him conſider what a prodigious Expence that firſt Campaign put the Court of *Vienna* to; and what a noble Body of Troops were deſtroyed to make Head againſt *France*, when all was in Danger of being ſwallow'd up, and muſt have been ſo, without that wonderful Effort. And if the Emperor has ſince done leſs, thoſe who know the State of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, how long their Power has declined, the many Wars they have been engaged in at the ſame Time, and how little Reſpite they have had; how imperfect their Oeconomy and Government is; how very little Opportunity they have to recover themſelves, when their Strength is once exhauſted, through the great Expence they

they are at of keeping up a conſiderable Number of Troops in Time of Peace; and the ſmall Reſource they have by Trade: Whoever conſiders theſe Things, or looks no farther back than to the feeble Efforts of the whole Empire the laſt War, muſt own, they have done more than could be expected. For the late Emperors did make very conſiderable Efforts in *Italy* for ſix Campaigns at leaſt; that is, till the *French* were driven out of it; as this Writer himſelf confeſſes. For he ſays, *When they had ſucceeded in their Attempts on the Side of* Italy, *they ſoon found out the moſt effectual Expedient to excuſe themſelves.* This is fairly confeſſing, that till they had ſucceeded in *Italy*, they did not excuſe themſelves. But that they certainly had not done, till the Battle of *Turin*; their Affairs in *Italy* having never ſince the Beginning of the War been in more Danger than they were at that Time. Nor does this Author want to be told, that they had not even then ſucceeded in *Italy* to their Content; they were not eaſy as long as *Naples* was in *French* Hands, which he himſelf makes a Crime in them: This therefore made them exert themſelves at leaſt one Campaign more. Here then are eight Campaigns, before the *Impe-*

rial Court were at Leiſure to look out for this Expedient to excuſe themſelves. And for all the following Campaigns, it is known they have had a conſiderable Body of Troops in *Flanders*, which, in Conjunction with thoſe under the D. of *M.* had, by a vigorous War, ſet us above the Neceſſities of an ill Peace: If this Author and his Friends had not joined with *France*, to confound the moſt hopeful Proſpect of Affairs that *Europe* has ſeen this fifty Years, or is like to ſee in Fifty more, if the Deſigns in View ſucceed. And beſides theſe Troops, it is certain the *Emperor* has, for ſeveral Years paſt, ſent more than his *Quota* to the *Rhine*, that other Princes might be thereby induced to follow his Example. Nor has there been any Complaint of their being backward in their Preparations on the Side of *Savoy*: If nothing has been done there for theſe four Years paſt, it is not for want of the Emperor's Troops being ready to do their Part, but from the Diſputes between him and the Duke of *Savoy*; which, how far it would have been reaſonable for either Side to have yielded to the other in, it is not my Buſineſs to determine. All I contend for at preſent is, that it has not been for Want of Tooops on the Emperor's Part,

that

that nothing has been done ſo long on that Side. But if the Emperor has been ready to do his Part in *Savoy*, has furniſh'd more than his *Quota* to the *Rhine*, and has, to promote the Common Cauſe, ſent a good Body of Troops to *Flanders*, which he was no Way obliged to, becauſe that is the only Part the War could be puſh'd in with Succeſs; which yet without theſe Troops it could not have been; (as has been ſhewn to Demonſtration in the *Management of the War*;) If, I ſay, the Imperial Court has done this, what can be more falſe than to ſay, that neither of the two laſt Emperors ever had twenty thouſand Men on their own Account in the Common Cauſe? And how injurious is it to impute their not doing more to an Expedient they found out, *to excuſe themſelves?* And that too at a Time when all the World is ſufficiently convinced of their Inability. And the great Intereſt they pay here in *England* for Moneys borrow'd on the beſt Funds they have, will ſuffer no body to be ignorant of the Straights they are reduced to; and this Writer, I doubt not, has many other Proofs of this, that do not come under common Obſervation, nor is it fit they ſhould. But there is a Sting in this *Expedient* for the D.

of *M.* and that muſt not be loſt, eſpecially at this Juncture, that he is ſo perverſe, that no Terms can bring him into our Author's noble Scheme. *They computed eaſily, that it would coſt them leſs to make large Preſents to one ſingle Perſon, than to pay an Army.* In Anſwer to which, I do confeſs, that the Emperor *Leopold* indeed did, in Acknowledgment of his having ſaved the Empire by his unparallel'd Wiſdom and Conduct, make him a Prince of it; and that he might have the Honour of a Vote in the Dyet, did erect *Mindleheim* into a Principality. Which, after ſeveral Times declining it, he did accept, with the Q---'s Leave and Approbation. And I have heard beſides, of four or five Pictures given him; which, having been the Elector of *Bavaria*'s, were a very natural and decent Preſent to him, who had freed the Empire of an Enemy, and obliged him to ſeek for Refuge in *France*, who but a little before had conceived great Hopes of driving the Emperor from *Vienna*, and aſſuming to himſelf the *Imperial* Dignity. Beſides theſe Preſents, I have never heard of any; but have juſt Grounds to believe, that he never received ſo much as one; and that there is not a more falſe and malicious Inſinuation than this in the whole Libel;

Libel; which is enough to ſay of it. And had this Writer any Senſe of Honour or Conſcience, he would not, to murder the Reputation of a Man, who has done ſo much Honour to his Country, and to whoſe Services, under God, *Europe* owes its Liberty, put ſuch Conſtructions on Things, as, he knows, have no Truth in them; he would not impute the Effects of the *Emperor*'s Inability to the Perſon that ſaved his Empire; he would not look for an *Expedient* in Preſents, that were not made; nor interpret, in ſo villanous a Manner, Acknowledgments which all the World thought ſo well deſerved, and will think ſo, in Spite of this Author and his Friends.

After this general Complaint againſt the two laſt Emperors, for not furniſhing their *Quota*'s, and leaving it to us to fight their Battles, this Author deſcends to Particulars; and gives us three Inſtances to prove *how little they regarded their Allies, whenever they thought the Empire itſelf was ſecure.* But I would be glad to know when this was, that the Empire was thought to be ſo ſecure. It is the firſt Time I have heard it was ſo; and with this Author's Leave muſt tell him, I do not take it to be ſecure yet; nor can it be, if his Schemes take place. Is an Empire ſe-

cure, that lies open to the Enemy, and, by the Negligence of the many Princes it is divided between, is in a very defenceleſs State? Is the Empire ſecure, that cannot bring an Army into the Field till the Middle of Summer, and till then may be invaded by the Enemy with a very ſmall Body of Troops, and ravaged without any Oppoſition, as it was in 1707, and would have been ſince, had not the Duke of *M.* every Year drawn the Enemy's Attention another Way, and obliged them to look to themſelves, inſtead of invading others? Where then is this Security of the Empire? To ſay nothing of the conſtant Apprehenſions of an Inſurrection in *Bavaria*, which might kindle a new Fire in the Heart of it, in Concert with the Enemy. If therefore the Emperor would not venture to diſregard his Allies till the Empire was ſecure, we can have no Reaſon to complain upon that Score yet. But farther; if the Emperor has, by ſeveral Inſtances, ſhewn how little he regards his Allies, then this Diſregard is not peculiar to us: His other Allies have Reaſon to complain of it as well as ourſelves; and they have ſometimes done it in a decent Way, not in ſcandalous Libels and Invectives, but in proper Remonſtrances both to the Impe-

rial

rial Court, and to the Dyet of the Empire; to preſs them to exert themſelves after the Example of the Maritime Powers; who, as the *Dutch* M----rs have often told them in the Name of the *Queen* and the *States*, have made extraordinary Efforts, beyond what they were obliged to by their Treaties, and even beyond their Strength, to *reduce the exorbitant Power of France*, and preſerve the *Liberty of* Europe, and *the Rights of the Houſe of* Auſtria. This Author cannot but have ſeen ſeveral of theſe Memorials; and therefore cannot but know, that if the Emperor and Empire have not done more, it was not for Want of being call'd upon and importuned in the moſt preſſing Manner poſſible. But this Author's Quarrel is not with the Empire, who have been really in Fault, but with the Emperor: The Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy being his, not their Concern, it is little or nothing that this Peace-maker has to ſay to them.

But to come to his Inſtances: The firſt is, his not putting an End to the War in *Hungary*; *which he might have done ſeveral Times upon Terms not at all unbefitting either his Dignity or Intereſt.* Now if the Court of *Vienna* were

were to blame in this, did the late M——y *tamely ſuffer it?* Does not he know very well, how the M——rs of *England* and *Holland* labour'd this Point? What Pains the Earl of *Sunderland* and Mr. *Stepney* particularly took in it? The latter reſiding conſtantly at *Vienna*, and the former going thither expreſly for that very Service. Did ever any Men preſs an Accommodation more forcibly than the late M———rs did this? When I ſee another M——ry follow an Affair ſo long together with ſo much Spirit, Argument, and good Senſe, as can be produced on this Subject, for the Honour of the late M—ry, and thoſe employ'd by them, I ſhall then with Patience let this Author and his Friends accuſe them of *tamely ſuffering* the Emperor to *ſacrifice the whole Alliance to his private Paſſion.* But as to the Merits of the Cauſe: Did not the late Emperors make ſeveral Attempts for an Accommodation, and offer Terms, and admit the Interpoſitions of our M——rs? And as it was very much for the Intereſt of the *Common Cauſe*, that an End ſhould be put to that War, Did not *England* and *Holland* preſs it with the greateſt Earneſtneſs? But when that was done, are not all Governments themſelves the beſt Judges in theſe Affairs? And therefore,

therefore, if they cannot be ended as it is wiſh'd, they are only to be pitied for ſo great a Misfortune: And their Purſuit of an Affair that ſo nearly concerns them, cannot with any Juſtice be interpreted to be a Diſregard to the Common Cauſe, or a Neglect of their Allies; as in this Caſe we are ſure it was. For during great Part of the Time of thoſe unhappy Troubles, the Emperor's Affairs, both in *Italy* and the *Empire*, were in the utmoſt Danger, eſpecially in 1707, when the Empire was invaded by Mareſchal *Villars*, and the King of *Sweden*, with a victorious Army, gave as juſt Apprehenſions as if he had been at the Gates of *Vienna*: To ſay nothing of the Danger King *Charles*'s Affairs were in at the ſame Time. Yet all this could not prevail with the Imperial Court to give the Malecontents the Terms they inſiſted on. From whence I make theſe three Inferences. Firſt, That this Refuſal very probably was not the Effect of private *Paſſion*, but of Reaſon and Reflection; elſe it muſt have given Way to the Weight of ſo many and ſo near Dangers that then threaten'd them. Secondly, Whatever were the true Cauſe of this Refuſal, if ſuch Dangers had no more Influence on the Emperor than the Solicitations of his Allies,

his

his continuing that War is no Proof at all of his Diſregard to his Allies. If they had as much Weight with him, as ſuch great and imminent Dangers had, they might have a great deal, though not enough. But, thirdly, If the Imperial Court were as much in Fault in this Affair, as this Author would have them thought to be, no Blame can on that Account be thrown on the late M---y, who did all that Men could, to perſuade them to put an End to it.

The next Inſtance of the *Emperor's Indifference, or rather Diſlike of the Common Cauſe, is the Buſineſs of* Toulon; the Miſcarriage of which he imputes wholly to the Emperor. Upon this Head, every Propoſition advanced is falſe in Whole or in Part. Firſt, he tells us the Deſign was diſcover'd here by a *Creature of a certain Great Man*, laying Wagers about the Taking of it. This is a very odd Preamble to a Proof that *Toulon* was loſt by the Emperor's Fault, to tell us, that probably it was not; the Deſign was diſcover'd here. But theſe Inconſiſtencies are nothing with this Writer, if he can but bring in one or two certain *Great Men*, whoſe Reputation ſtands cruelly in his Way, and will do ſo, let him employ never ſo many Pens to blacken them.

Now

Now in Anſwer to this, I affirm, that this Deſign was not diſcover'd by the Creature of this *Great Man*, but by the Clerk of another Great Man, who was then Sec—— of S----. But to go on; our Author argues, that the Emperor had no Mind *Toulon* ſhould be taken, becauſe he detach'd 12,000 Men to *ſeize Naples*, as he ingeniouſly expreſſes it. That the Emperor did at that Time make an Expedition to *Naples*, is true; but was it becauſe he had no Mind *Toulon* ſhould be taken? No; it was becauſe thoſe, who would make a ſcandalous Peace now, were attempting the ſame Thing then; and he was afraid the Intereſt of his Family in *Italy* would have been ſacrificed to other Views. This was the true Reaſon of that Expedition; and this Writer knows it was; which makes his Virulence and Malice the more impardonable. As Things were managed, it is plain there was a Want of Troops. But when the Emperor was preſs'd to put off that Expedition, he did not want an Anſwer. He told them, That without thoſe 12,000 Men, they had as many as they had before deſired; and indeed as many as would be able to find Subſiſtance; and that more would be but a Burthen to them; that while they were employ'd in the Reduc-

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tion of *Toulon*, the other Troops ſhould by great Marches haſten to *Naples*; and then return to join them for any farther Services. But *'tis manifeſt*, ſays our Author, that *the Emperor had no Mind we ſhould take* Toulon, *becauſe the Attempt might have ſucceeded, if Prince* Eugene *had not thought fit to oppoſe it.* This is falſe again. The Duke of *Savoy* had the chief Command in that Expedition, and not Prince *Eugene*. What was the true Reaſon they delay'd ſo long the Beginning of that March, I cannot pretend to ſay; but when they had paſs'd the *Var*, I deſire this Author would tell us, who it was that propoſed the Holding a Council of War on Board the Fleet; and did hold one, to conſider, whether they ſhould proceed directly to *Toulon*, or beſiege *Antibes*. A Man muſt be a very ill Judge in Affairs, that could not from that Step ſee, what was likely to come of the Expedition. Again, to clear up this Affair, I would fain know, who govern'd the Motions of the Army, till they came before the Place; for it is incredible, how ſo ſmall an Army could be ſo many Days making ſo ſhort a March. And if they had advanced with half the Speed that they retired, it is certain they might have inveſted the Place before the Works the Ene-

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my were making would have been finiſh'd, and before any conſiderable Number of the Enemy's Troops were arrived. But the Slowneſs of our Motions made our Arrival too late in both thoſe Reſpects. And the Enemy's Troops were in Poſſeſſion of the high Ground about the Place, before we came in Sight of it. And therefore if the Duke of *Savoy* did not ſeem willing to attack the Enemy, that is not very hard to account for; nor might it be any Fault in Prince *Eugene*, that he did not think it reaſonable. But beſides, there was a particular Reaſon at that Time to think, the Prince might have ſtrict Orders from *Vienna*, to be very cautious how he expoſed that Body of Troops. And that was, the Nighbourhood of the King of *Sweden*, who was pleaſed to pick many Quarrels with the Emperor, and no body could tell where his Demands would ſtop, or what would ſatisfy him: This gave very great Umbrage to the *Imperial* Court; and had they loſt that Body of Troops before *Toulon*, they had Reaſon to fear, they ſhould ſoon feel the Want of them. This was certainly a good Reaſon for not venturing a Battle to Diſadvantage, where the leaſt Misfortune would have been the Ruin of them all. But had that Expe-

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dition either been begun ten Days ſooner, or the March from the *Var* had been made in leſs Time, the Deſign would have ſucceeded without the Hazard of a Battle. There is more might be ſaid upon this Subject; but I am not in ſo much Haſte to diſcover ſome Truths, as our Author is to tell the moſt pernicious Lies.

Upon this Inſtance then, I muſt obſerve, 1. That the Expedition to *Naples* was not the Effect of any Diſregard to the Allies, but of *Self-Preſervation*. 2. That Prince *Eugene*'s declining a Battle was not the Cauſe of our ill Succeſs againſt *Toulon*. 3. That it is no Way chargeable on the late M——ry; who form'd the Deſign with the greateſt Secrecy, and made the moſt effectual Preparations for it, and did all they could to put off the Expedition to *Naples*, and remove every Difficulty that might hinder the Succeſs of it. And, laſtly, That it was not diſcover'd firſt by any Creature of the late M——ry, nor had *France* any Suſpicion of it, till the Expedition was actually begun; as any one may ſee, that will look back into the Hiſtory of that Affair.

The third and laſt Inſtance, and *that a much greater than either of the foregoing, how little*

little the Emperor regards us, may be brought from the Proceedings of that Court not many Months ago. The Subſtance of this heavy Complaint is, *That the* Imperial *Court being deſired by the Queen to ſend* 8000 *Men to reinforce the Duke of* Savoy *before the End of the Campaign, that he might be able to take Winter Quarters on this Side the Mountains: This Deſire not being complied with, the Hopes from that Project are loſt, and the War is left in the Method, which is like to continue it longeſt.* And this is ſaid to be treating the Q. in a *moſt contemptuous Manner.* Now for a little Truth, at the Sight of which this great Contempt will vaniſh into nothing, and this mighty Project with it.

Firſt, This Refuſal in the *Imperial* Court, to ſend 8000 Men to the D. of *Savoy*, did not proceed from the leaſt Diſreſpect to the Q.; on the contrary, at that Juncture they were moſt deſirous to oblige her Majeſty, that they might engage her in the Intereſt of King *Charles*, in order to ſecure more effectually his Election to the Empire; a Point of infinite Concern to that Court; and therefore there was nothing in their Power they would not willingly have done; and if in theſe Circumſtances they did not do what the Q. de-

ſired, it was becauſe they could not. This Author himſelf owns, that *they alledged the Impoſſibility of complying with the Q.'s Demands upon any Conſideration whatſoever. Nay, they did not ſo much as give the Queen's M—r an Opportunity to tempt them with any particular Sums.* If this Author had not a very particular Talent at Reaſoning, he could never, to ſhew this to be an Inſtance of *Contempt* to the Q. ſay the Things that prove quite the contrary. Is the Pleading an *abſolute Impoſſibility*, a *contemptuous* Treatment? Or is it a Sign of its being only a pretended Impoſſibility, that *they did not give an Opportunity to tempt them with any particular Sums?* If this be Contempt, what would it have been, if they had given ſuch an Opportunity, and after ſome Offers the Affair had broke off? Would not the Liſtening to theſe Offers have been a good Argument to prove, that they could do the Thing deſired, if they would, but refuſed to comply in a Point of ſo much Conſequence, for a paultry Sum, becauſe we would not come up to their full Price? Had they acted thus, there would have been ſome Colour for Reproaching them in this Manner, though it would have been but a Colour only. For if the ſending ſuch a Body of Troops would have

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required ſuch a Sum of Money, beyond what the *Imperial* Court (which is often the Caſe of that Court) could at that Time furniſh, and the Q. on her Part did not think fit to be at that Expence; it is certain, the Treaty for theſe Troops muſt break off without Effect; and there would be no Room to pretend, this was an Affront to the Q. or uſing her ill. But it did not come to this; no ſuch Handle for Complaint was given: The Impoſſibility of complying was ſo evident, that without entering into any Parly, they declared they could not do it *upon any Conſideration whatſoever*. And it is not hard to ſee many great Difficulties that would naturally hinder the *Imperial* Court from complying with this Demand at that Juncture; though this Author pretends they offered nothing to excuſe themſelves, but *ſome general ſpeculative Reaſons, and trifling Pretences*. Had they been ſo *trifling*, I am apt to think this Author would have told us what they were, or if a little Miſrepreſentation could have made them look ſo; and from his Silence therefore I ſhall take Leave to conclude they were not *trifling*. What Reaſons the *Imperial* Court did give, I cannot tell; but ſome few they might have given, are theſe: Firſt, they

could not ſpare ſuch a Body of Men from *Hungary* at that Time, for two very weighty Reaſons; one with Reſpect to the *Malecontents*, and the other to the Motions of the *Turks*. Our Author indeed takes no Notice of this laſt; but, for the other, is pleaſed to tell us, *they could not plead their old Excuſe; the War with the* Malecontents being at an End. And was this War ſo effectually ended, that they might draw their Troops from *Hungary* without Danger? Does not this Author know that Prince *Ragotski*, who was the Head of the *Malecontents*, and all the other Chiefs, except Count *Caroli*, refuſed to ſubmit to the Terms offered them: And that the Submiſſion of the reſt was very little to be depended on; it having been made upon Terms offer'd in the *Emperor*'s Name, and perſonally to him, who was really dead, at the Time the Submiſſion was made, as ſoon after appear'd; which unhappy Circumſtance had like to have undone all; the Act of Submiſſion, and all that depended upon it, being *ipſo facto* void. What Security now was there, that upon this Turn of Affairs the *Malecontents* would not reaſſemble under their old Leaders, and take freſh Heart, in Hopes of obtaining better Terms from the Neceſſities

ſities this unexpected Accident put the *Imperial* Court under? What could be of greater Concern to that Court, than the Loſs of *Hungary*? And when could they have juſter Cauſe to apprehend the Loſing it? Did not the Garriſon of *Mongaz*, a Place almoſt impregnable, refuſe to ſurrender for a conſiderable Time after this Submiſſion, under Pretence of waiting for Orders from Prince *Ragotski*? And was not he doing all he could in Conjunction with the Agent of *France*, to kindle that War anew? Was not this very much for the Purpoſe of *France*? Does not this Author know how much they have ſolicited the *Port*, either to make open War with the Emperor, or at leaſt to take the Malecontents under their Protection? Has not all our News from thoſe Parts, this laſt Summer, told us of the tickliſh State the Affairs of *Hungary* were in on theſe Accounts? What then does this Author mean by ſaying, *they could not plead their old Excuſe*? But ſuppoſe this Submiſſion had been made in the Emperor's Life, and been in all Reſpects as valid as it could be, and Prince *Ragotski* had come in, and all the Places the Malecontents were poſſeſs'd of had been ſurrender'd early in the Year; Was the *Turkiſh* War an Affair that

did not deserve the Attention of the *Imperial* Court? Is it not the Point they are most nearly concern'd in? Could any Thing have been more fatal to the House of *Austria*, than to have the *Port* declare War against them in that Juncture? Was not the Condition of Affairs in *Hungary*, and the Death of the *Emperor*, a very great Temptation to them? And can we think *France* did not press it with all their Might? How then could the Court of *Vienna* be secure the *Port* would not break with them? And without such a Security, how could they with any Safety draw their Troops from *Hungary*? Which, God knows, with all the Troops they had in it, would have been able to have made but a very poor Defence, against a tolerable Army of *Turks*. Had not the *Port* broke with the *Muscovite* without any such Provocation, notwithstanding they had but two Months before, with great Solemnity, renew'd the Peace for thirty Years? And why might they not break their Treaty with the *Emperor* as easily, when they had so much Temptation to it? This was a Point of the utmost Consequence; and all the Precaution the Court of *Vienna* could use on this Occasion, must be allow'd, by all reasonable Men, to be but prudent and necessary; especially

considering

conſidering the Artifices and Endeavours of the *French* to divide and embroil the Empire, which they threaten'd to invade with a great Army at the ſame Time, that they might throw Things into Confuſion, break the *Auſtrian* Intereſt, and prevent the Election of King *Charles*. Would it not, in this tickliſh Juncture, have been very wiſe in the *Imperial* Court, in order to favour an impracticable Project in *Savoy*, to ſend a Body of their beſt Troops, and almoſt their All, to ſo great a Diſtance from them; and leave themſelves naked on the Side of *Hungary*, where an old War was not quite extinguiſh'd, and a new one, it was apprehended, would very ſoon break out? Should they have tempted theſe Dangers by neglecting them; and left unguarded a Fire, that was cover'd rather than put out; when at the ſame Time they ſaw a new one beginning with great Fierceneſs in their Neighbourhood, which, ſhould it ſpread towards them, as there were great Endeavours uſed for it, the Remains of the paſt Fire would ſoon have rekindled, and the Flames of both would in a little Time have reach'd the Capital itſelf; and then all Attempts to extinguiſh them might have been too late, beſides that the more Help they

ſhould want, through the Diſtractions of the Empire during the *Interregnum*, the leſs they would have had? Let People put themſelves in their Caſe, and they will preſently be convinced, theſe were not *Speculative Reaſons*, or *Trifling Pretences*, for not complying with the Q.'s Demands; but ſuch as made their Compliance abſolutely impoſſible. And had theſe Dangers been out of the Queſtion, ſo that the *Imperial* Court could have ſpared the Men, (though 8000 be no trifling Number for a Court, who, if we may believe this Writer, have never this War, but once, had 20,000 in the Field on their own Account) yet where ſhould they find Money to put theſe Troops in a Condition to march, who, we may be ſure, wanted Cloaths, and Arms, and Horſes, and had great Arrears due to them, and muſt be paid when they are to ſerve out of their Country, though very little or no Pay contented them while they ſerved in it, in a plentiful and rich Soil, and where every Thing they could lay their Hands on was their own: A Circumſtance, which ſhould make this Author not ſo fond of *Inteſtine* Wars, though they *carry no Money out of the Country* that is the unhappy Seat of them. Where now ſhould the *Imperial* Court find Money for theſe Purpoſes:

poſes; when the Return of King *Charles*, the Management of his Intereſts in the *Empire*, and the neceſſary Expence of his *Election*, would call for much greater Sums than either their *Exchequer* or their *Credit* could furniſh, without ſuch Methods as nothing but the laſt Neceſſity can make adviſeable, or render practicable? If therefore ever Demand was impoſſible to be comply'd with in this extraordinary Juncture of Affairs, it muſt be allow'd this was ſo. Where then is this pretended *Contempt* of the Q.? Where this Diſregard and Neglect of the *Common Cauſe*, becauſe they did not do what, it is very evident, they could not? As it was the Intereſt of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, to ſhew all poſſible Deference and Reſpect to the Queen and the *States*, in this Situation of Affairs, ſo in my humble Opinion they did; and, I think, King *Charles* in particular could not give a greater Inſtance of it, than in leaving it to them, as he did, to govern his Motions, in a Matter of ſo great Concern; when, inſtead of returning to *Vienna*, as ſoon as he heard of his Brother's Death, he waited for the Opinion and Senſe of his Allies; and, in Compliance with them, ſtaid at *Barcelona*, above five Months after, that the War in *Spain*

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might not be neglected on his Part; though the Want of Money made it impoſſible for us to uſe our Troops, or make any Advantage of his Preſence with them. And when at laſt it was neceſſary for him to come away, that Affairs might ſuffer as little as poſſible by his Abſence, he took the brave Reſolution to leave his Queen behind; a Reſolution all have great Reaſon to be pleaſed with, who are not in the Intereſt of *France*, that is, all except this Author and his Friends; whom a contary Conduct in King *Charles* would have ſatisfied much better, as what would have facilitated the Loſs of all we have left in *Spain*, and enabled them to remove the Blame of it from themſelves.

But what makes this Complaint againſt the *Imperial* Court, for not complying in a Point they could not, ſtill more unjuſt, is, That the Common Cauſe ſuffer'd little or nothing by it; for the Deſign of this Demand was, to enable the Duke of *SAVOY to take Winter-Quarters on this Side the Mountains*; and all that was deſired was, that they ſhould join him *before the End of the Campaign*. Now I deſire this Author would let us know, what the Duke of *Savoy* did towards the Execution of this Project, or to make theſe Troops uſe-

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ful, if they had joined him at the Time appointed? Could he take *Winter-Quarters on this Side the Mountains*, without penetrating into *Dauphiné*. This was indeed expected that he would have done; and conſidering how the Campaign open'd on that Side, it is a Surprize to every body it was not done. But in Fact he hover'd about the Paſſes, without attempting to penetrate, till the Duke of *Berwick* had taken the neceſſary Precautions, and made *Lines*, and received conſiderable Reinforcement from *Alſace*, and other Parts. By which Means the Campaign was ſpent in the two Armies looking at one another; and the Duke of *Savoy* was obliged to leave the Field firſt, for Want of Forage and Proviſions to ſubſiſt the Troops he had. Suppoſe now theſe 8000 *Imperial* Troops had joined him ſome little Time before; Would he with his Addition have been able to penetrate, after the D. of *Berwick* had taken his Meaſures to hinder it, and drawn together what Troops he wanted? Or if this Addition of 8000 would have been too much for the other to oppoſe, with the Strength then with him, Could the March of theſe Troops have been conceal'd? And would not that have put the Enemy upon proportionably increaſing their

Strength, by drawing more Troops from the *Rhine*, where they are not wanted to be on the Defenſive only? And if this would not have been ſufficient, but the Enemy muſt have been obliged to draw ſome Troops from *Spain*, which I cannot by any Means allow they would, yet this would have been of no Uſe to us on that Side; ſince, as I ſaid before, it was impoſſible for our Army there to take the Field, though there had been no Enemy to oppoſe them.

But to make this Author greater Conceſſions than a modeſt Man can ask. Suppoſe theſe 8000 Men would have enabled the D. of *Savoy* to penetrate into *Dauphiné*; What is it he would have done there, beſides raiſing Contributions, and ravaging the Country? Would he have begun the Siege of *Briancon*, the Place which the Enemy knows all his Views end in, when the Campaign is drawing to an End, and the Snows begin to fall? What Time does this Author ſuppoſe ſuch a Siege would take up? Or where ſhould the Troops find Forage, while they are employed in it? Could they take a Town of that Strength without Time, or without Forage for the Time? Or could he take up Winter-Quarters on this Side, without ſo much

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as one Town to cover them? I will go one Step farther, and ſuppoſe for once ſuch a Siege could have been compaſs'd with Succeſs, and that Winter-Quarters might be taken; I would then ask, How they ſhould be kept? How ſhall an Army on this Side the Mountains ſubſiſt, when all Communication with the other Side is cut off, and the Paſſages are ſhut up with the prodigious Snows that fall in thoſe Parts for eight Months together? Did this Author ever hear of an Army keeping Winter-Quarters for Half that Time in an Enemy's Country, when they received no Subſiſtance from their own? And if ever this were poſſible, which it is not, How can this Army poſſibly defend themſelves againſt the Enemy, who can attack them early in the Spring with what Numbers they pleaſe; while thoſe that are attack'd, can receive no Relief or Support from any Part? What can Troops unaſſiſted do, who have been mouldring away a whole long Winter in bad Quarters, waſting themſelves to find Subſiſtance in an Enemy's Country, and perpetually harraſs'd by their Parties? It is impoſſible for Troops, in ſuch a Condition, half naked and ſtarved, without Money or Proviſions, and reduced perhaps to leſs than

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Half their Number, to make Head againſt a freſh Army: They can neither take the Field, nor keep their Quarters, unleſs they were Maſters of more ſtrong Places than they would be by this Suppoſition; according to which they will have but one only, for more Sieges than one they cannot be expected to make in ſo ſhort a Time on this Side the Mountains: Nor will Places of Strength ſurrender without a Siege; ſo that all their Troops muſt be drawn from the open Country, and crowded into this one Place and its Neighbourhood. And what but ſtarving could be the Conſequence of this, though the Enemy did nothing elſe but make a Sort of Blockade? But if they ſhould not be content with that, but reſolve by a vigorous Siege to recover this Place again, who ſhall hinder it? How can a Place be expected to be preſerved, than cannot hope for Relief in three, or perhaps four Months, from the Day on which the Siege of it ſhall be begun? For the Duke of *Savoy* therefore to take Winter-Quarters on this Side of the Mountains for any conſiderable Body of Troops, unleſs his Campaigns begin earlier than they have yet, and more Progreſs be made in them, than what we have ever yet ſo much as hoped for; I cannot but look on as a Pro-

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ject utterly impracticable; at leaſt ſo it was this laſt Campaign: And had he been joined by the *Imperial* Troops, it had ſerved to no other Purpoſe but to conſume ſo much Forage, and conſequently oblige him to leave the Field ſo much ſooner. So that the great Crime the *Imperial* Court are here charged with, upon full Examination into it, appears to amount to no more than this; that they could not ſpare a conſiderable Body of Troops from *Hungary*, where they were abſolutely neceſſary to make a terrible long March, for which they were in all Reſpects unprovided, to aſſiſt the D. of *Savoy* in a Project which it was impoſſible could take Place.

But this Author thinks, they ought to have comply'd with this Demand, *without conſidering whether they wanted them for their own Defence or not. For did we*, ſays he, *ever once conſider what we could afford, when our Aſſiſtance was deſired, even while we lay under immediate Apprehenſions of being invaded?* To which I anſwer, Yes, we did; and had been much to blame if we had not, *when we lay under the Apprehenſions of being invaded*: He knows, a good Body of our Troops embark'd at *Oſtend*, and ſail'd for *Scotland*, and more were ready to follow, had there been Occaſion:

Occaſion: And I hope the preſent M——y, if the ſame Apprehenſions ſhould return, would do the ſame Thing. And if this Author's Malice did not make him forget himſelf, he would have remember'd, that but a few Pages before he makes it a Crime in the *Dutch*, that when there was only a *Rumour of an Invaſion*, they ſent their *Quota* to the *Mediterranean*, and furniſh'd nothing to us. If therefore our own Example may be a Rule to our Allies, they may from thence juſtify themſelves for not complying to the Demand made them, *without conſidering what they could afford*. But if we had not acted a wiſe Part ourſelves, is that a Reaſon why they ſhould act a very fooliſh one? If their Caſe was as I have repreſented it, they had but too much Reaſon on their Side, nor could they do otherwiſe than they did. I ſhall end what I have to ſay on this Inſtance, with theſe three Remarks. Firſt, That it is no Inſtance at all of what it is brought to prove, *the Emperor's Diſregard of us*. And if it could be ſtrain'd to ſuch a Conſtruction, it is, Secondly, no Breach of any Article in any Treaty, which it ſhould be, to come under his general Propoſition, in which the Allies are accuſed of breaking all their Treaties with us. Nor, Laſtly,

Laſtly, does it affect the late M——y; they did not *tamely ſuffer this*, if it was a Fault; it is a Misfortune, if it be one, that has befallen the New M——. And if this Inſtance, which is moſt complain'd of, does not reflect on them, then, by Parity of Reaſon, other Omiſſions in our Allies do not neceſſarily reflect on the late M——y. Indeed I cannot but obſerve, in Juſtice to the late M——y, that of the five Inſtances urged againſt the *States* and the *Emperor*, three of them are of no older Date than this laſt Year; this now before us; what is ſaid of the Reception of Sir *J. Wiſhart*, and of the Conſent refuſed to the D. of *M.*'s Project for Winter-Quarters. And the other two, which relate to *Toulon* and the *Malecontents*, were as juſt Matters of Complaint, when the Officers of State and War were fill'd with thoſe who are the great Support and Ornament of the preſent Times, as they can be now; and therefore affect them as much as any of the late M——y. And ſince they muſt reflect Blame on one as well as the other, this Author will allow me to conclude, they reflect none on either.

The next Ally we are to be made out of Humour with, that our Treaties with him

may be broke into with leſs Ceremony, is the King of *Portugal:* With what Unfairneſs and Injuſtice this Author has condemn'd our Alliance with this Crown, I have already ſhewn; and now that he returns to *Portugal* again, *p.* 53, one would expect to be told how many Things he has done in Breach of theſe Alliances, or rather how many he has left undone; but to our great Surprize in this Article of *Portugal*, there is not one Fault found with them; the *States* and the *Emperor* run ſo much in this Writer's Head, that he can think of nothing elſe. And firſt for the *Emperor*; *he ſoon declared himſelf, it is ſaid, unable to comply with his Part of* 12,000 *Men, and of a Million of* Patacoons *that he was to furniſh by the Treaty. By which Means two Thirds were left on us, who very generouſly undertook the Burthen.* As for the *Emperor*, if he could not do his Part, perhaps it was ſo underſtood by *England* at the Time of the Treaty; though the Recovery of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy being properly the Concern of his Family, it was thought fit, that he ſhould be one of the Parties in this Treaty with the *Portugueſe*, for the Sake of other Articles, I mean the Conceſſions to be made to *Portugal*; which was the Inducement to them

them to come into the Alliance, and which no body could make but the Emperor himſelf. So that his Share muſt lie on the other Two; and if *England* took two Thirds upon themſelves, it was not *Generoſity*, but Wiſdom and Neceſſity. We endeavour'd firſt to perſuade the *Dutch* to divide the *Emperor*'s Share with us, but as they were ready to perform their Part of the Treaty, we could not oblige them to do more; *Portugal* was on Account of Trade moſt our Concern, and we were undeniably moſt able; and therefore after this Matter had been thoroughly conſider'd, we conſented to take the *Emperor*'s Part upon ourſelves. Now if it were underſtood at the Time of the Treaty, that the Emperor could not do his Part, as I confeſs I cannot ſee how he could, then there lies no Blame upon him; but whether there does or not, it do not affect the *Dutch*; they were to furniſh but a Third, and a Third they did furniſh. But ſuch is the ſtrange Talent of this Author, ſuch his Pique againſt the *Dutch*, a Quarrel with them being moſt for his Purpoſe, that he cannot leave this Article before he has proved the *Dutch* are moſt in Fault. *But neither is this*, ſays he, *the worſt Part of the Story; for though the* Dutch *did ſend their*

Quota, *yet they never took Care to recruit them.* How now does he prove this? Why, becauſe in 1706, *the* Portugueſe *Army, inſtead of going back to* Portugal, *were obliged to retire into* Valencia; *and after that Time the* Dutch *never ſent a Man to* Portugal, *nor paid one Penny of their Subſidies. Whereas the Q——— has, at ſeveral Times, increaſed her Eſtabliſhment to* 10,500 *Men.* What the new M——y have done, I know not, but the Q——'s former *Quota* was 8000 Men; and I cannot find, that in 1710, we had in *Portugal* more than eight Battalions of Foot, and ſeven Regiments of Dragoons, newly raiſed by my Lord *Gallway*, which very little exceed her Majeſty's *Quota* of 8000 Men; and are maintain'd at a much leſs Expence, than when they were all *Engliſh* Troops. But to return to the *Dutch:* Does it follow, they never recruited their *Quota* before 1706, or in that Year, becauſe they have not done it ſince? But has this Author never look'd into the *Impartial Enquiry into the Management of the War in* Spain? Does he hate any Thing that is *Impartial* to that Degree, that he cannot bear the Sight of it? Or does he not, without looking into it, very well know, that what he ſays is falſe; that after the firſt 4000 Men

Men the *Dutch* ſent to *Portugal* in 1703, they ſent four Regiments more in 1705, and in *Feb.* 1705-6, 1200 Men, and 4000 more the ſame Year, with the Troops ſent under my Lord *Rivers*? How then can this Author ſay, they never recruited their *Quota*, when they ſent in three Years 7700 Men, beſides leſſer Numbers of Recruits at ſeveral Times? Well, but they have ſent none, ſince the *Portugueſe* Army retired into *Valencia*. Firſt, that is not ſtrictly true; for they were then in *Valencia*, when the 4000 laſt mentioned ſail'd out of the Channel. Since that Time, it is true, they have ſent no Men to *Portugal*; but inſtead of the Troops they ſhould have there, they have conſtantly, as an Equivalent, increaſed their *Quota* in *Flanders* by the ſame Number, as may eaſily be judged by the Liſt of their Forces I gave the Reader in my laſt; from which it is very evident, that they have more Troops in that Service, than any Treaty does oblige them to. And if we have not follow'd their Example in this Point, it has been for theſe Reaſons: Firſt, That we have had a better Opinion of the War on that Side, than they; and hoped it would turn to more Account than in Fact it has: But the principal Motive with us to keep that War alive, has

been to preſerve a good Underſtanding with the King of *Portugal*; which it is more neceſſary a great deal for us to cultivate, than for the *Dutch*, in regard to the Advantages reſulting from that Trade: And upon that Account I thought we had good Reaſon not to examine too nicely into the Failures on their Part: Beſides, that with all their Faults, and in their worſt Circumſtances, they have been of Uſe, by diverting a conſiderable Number of the Enemy's Troops from acting elſewhere.

For an Inſtance how ill we are treated by our Allies, he tells us a Story of *Seven* Portugueſe *Regiments*: The Subſtance of which is this; *That after the Battle of* Almanza *theſe Regiments went off to* Catalonia, *which the Queen conſented to pay, provided the King raiſed as many more to ſupply their Place; which he engaged to do, but never did.* This is the Complaint againſt the *Portugueſe*; but not made ſo much to blame them, as to have ſomething to ſay, Right or Wrong, againſt the late M——y. *My Lord* G—, he ſays, *conſtantly paid the King of* Portugal *his Subſidies for almoſt four Years, without any Deduction for theſe Regiments; directly contrary to the ſeventh Article of the Offenſive Alli-*

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ance with that Crown. According to this Repreſentation my Lord *G*—— ought to have deducted the Pay of theſe Seven *Portugueſe* Regiments out of the King's Subſidies for the Years 1707, 1708, 1709, 1710; for in *Auguſt* 1710, this Author knows his Lordſhip was removed. Now this Repreſentation I ſay is ſcandalouſly falſe; and that my Lord *G*—— did not pay the King his full Subſidies, and theſe Seven Regiments too, for the Four laſt Years of his M---ry, nor indeed for any one Year; which he knows to be true, and which to them that do not know it, I prove thus: Firſt, The full Pay of theſe Regiments, as appears by the Eſtabliſhment, is 134,707 *l.* 5 *s.* 4 *d.* ½. Now to the 23d of *December* 1708, what Money was paid to them in *Catalonia* was, upon the Commiſſary's Vouchers, deducted at *Lisbon* out of the King's Subſidy: So there are two Years of this Charge ſtruck off at once. And ſince that Time, there was paid for thoſe Regiments by my Lord *G*—— but one Sum of 80,000 *l.* which is not above three Fifths of one Year's Pay; and even this Sum was never put on the Eſtabliſhment, or ask'd to be made good by Parliament, nor was the Payment of it order'd, but upon the moſt urgent

Neceſſity; as thoſe knew, who had the Honour to command the Q.'s Troops at that Time in *Catalonia*. For both the Ambaſſador and General of the *Portugueſe*, the Counts *d'Aſſumar*, and *Atalaya* did declare they could not ſerve that Campaign without Money, Bread, or Cloaths; and that if we did not give them Subſiſtance, they would ask a Paſsport of the D. of *Anjou* to return to their own Country. This was at a Time, when thoſe Troops could not be ſpared, for they made the greateſt Part of our Cavalry, and were very good Troops. For as that Nation have formerly diſtinguiſh'd themſelves in all thoſe Parts of War, which a long Peace has made them ſince forget; by the Experience of this War, they have recover'd in ſome Meaſure their ancient Virtue. Beſides, it was much to be fear'd, a Step of this Nature would not have ſtop'd there, but would have been ſoon follow'd by others; which every body, who knows how neceſſary this Alliance is to us, will perceive would have been of the moſt fatal Conſequence. Upon theſe Conſiderations her Majeſty was pleaſed to order a Sum without Account, but did not declare it was to be over and above their Subſidy; on the contrary, there are Letters under

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my Lord G——'s Hand, that he would ſecure enough in his own Hands to have it deducted at a Peace; but did not think it proper then to diſpute ſuch a Sum with ſo neceſſary an Ally, and a Court ſo much inclined to the *French* Intereſt, as that is known to be. This now is what the late Treaſurer did, and the Reaſons why he did it; *which* it ſeems *are above the Underſtanding of the preſent Lord Tr——, who has been ſo uncourtly as to ſtop it.* I am as juſt an Admirer of the Great Things perform'd by the preſent Treſ—, as this Writer can be; but with Submiſſion muſt ſay, he has not a very good Hand at *Panegyrick*, or elſe he would not, while he ſeems to commend the Succeſſor, really vindicate the other, as he does here. He does not indeed ſay, that this new Treatment of the King of *Portugal* has occaſion'd the Reports we have had of ſome ſecret Negotiations between him and the Enemy; but tells us, that in Effect we have got nothing by it; that it has put *the King upon Expedients to make Amends for this Deduction, by raiſing the Price of Forage, and demanding new Duties of us.* Now if this be the Effect of our uncourtly Uſage of him, I ſubmit it to the Reader's Judgment, whether it be better to oblige ſo neceſſary

ceſſary an Ally, and keep him firm to us, by making an annual Payment, which he cannot in Strictneſs demand, or hazard the Loſing of him by refuſing it, when in the mean Time it puts him upon ſuch Methods, that in the End nothing will be ſaved by it. Let this Author blame the *Portugueſe* as much as he will, the Succeſs of our new M——y in their Attempts to mend the Matter, will, by all impartial Men, be thought a full Vindication of the old Ones; and particularly of my Lord *G——n*, whoſe Adminiſtration the more it is examin'd into, the more will he appear to deſerve the Character that has ſo univerſally been given him.

What this Author has ſaid of *Portugal* is interrupted, *p.* 54. with a Paragraph upon the *Spaniſh* War, which would have come in as pertinently in any other Part of his Book: For here is no Ally complain'd of, no Pretence of any Treaty broke, no Demand from any of them refuſed to be comply'd with: All he ſays is, *That the War in* Catalonia *has been carried on almoſt entirely at our Coſt*. Which might be made Matter of Complaint againſt the late M——y perhaps, if it could be reconciled with that Neglect of *Spain* they have been accuſed of, or with that *particular* Care

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of it, that has been both by the Q—— and Parl——t recommended to their Succeſſors. But how this reflects any Blame on our Allies, or involves them in any Crime, I cannot ſee; unleſs it could be ſhewn, that they have not done in this Point, what they were obliged to, which is not here ſo much as pretended, much leſs proved againſt them. And therefore, there is but one poſſible Reaſon for ſaying what he does of the *Spaniſh* War in this Place, which muſt be this: That if *England*, who have been at almoſt all the Charge of the *Spaniſh* War, ſhall be willing to give up *Spain* at the next Treaty, as it is plain this Writer and his Friends deſign we ſhould, the Allies, in that Caſe, have no Reaſon in the World to complain or interpoſe, ſince they have done little or nothing towards recovering it. This is the Q——'s War, the Allies have no Part in it, and therefore ſhe may, without Regard to them, put an End to it upon what Terms ſhe will. This is plainly our Author's Aim. But this, as all the other Parts of this wretched Cauſe, we ſhall ſee is wretchedly ſupported. For, firſt, it is not true that they have done ſo little even in *Spain*, as this Author would inſinuate; nor, were it true, is the Argument good he would draw

draw from it; unleſs it could be ſhewn, that nothing can effect or contribute to the Reſtitution of *Spain*, but the War that is made in *Spain* itſelf; whereas the contrary has been proved in the *Management of the War*, with the greateſt Evidence, that *Spain* never can be gain'd by a War in *Spain*, but through *France*, and conſequently by the vigorous Proſecution of the War on the Side of *Flanders*; which has, both by Reaſon and Experience, been ſhewn to be the only Part, in which the Allies can weaken *France* enough, to make them quit their Hold of *Spain*. But if this be the proper Way to recover *Spain*, then thoſe who have contributed to a vigorous War in *Flanders*, have contributed to the Recovery of *Spain*, and conſequently have a Right to inſiſt on the Reſtitution of it; and *England* cannot, without a Violation of their Right, make a Peace on Terms by which ſo eſſential a Point of their Treaties ſhall be given up, ſuppoſing it were conſiſtent with our own Intereſt, which it is as clear as the Sun it is not, nor can be on any Terms; no Equivalent can poſſibly be given for it, as every body would be convinced from what has been writ on this Subject with unanſwerable Reaſon, if the Time were

yet come, that the Voice of Reaſon could be heard.

But if the War in *Spain* were the likelieſt Way to recover it, it is not true, that the Allies have done ſo little towards this Part of the War, as this Author would inſinuate, nor *England* ſo much. 'The *Spaniſh* Army, he 'ſays, on the Side of *Catalonia*, is, or *ought* 'to be, about 50,000 Men, excluſive of *Por*-'*tugal*, and our Troops at *Gibraltar*; which 'are indeed, no more than two weak Bat-'talions. And this whole Army is paid by 'the Q———, excepting only ſeven Batta-'lions, and fourteen Squadrons of *Dutch* and '*Palatines*; and even 1500 (he ſhould ſay '1300) of theſe are in our Pay, beſides 'the Sums given to King *Charles* for Sub-'ſidies, and the Maintenance of his Court.' This Author would have obliged us, if he would have given us the particular Numbers of which this Army is made up, and explain'd his *ought to be*. For to look back to the three laſt Years of this War before the Change; in 1708, I can find but 32,350 effective Men in *Catalonia*, including the *Portugueſe* Troops, of which 22,432 only were paid by the Q———; nor were there of our own Troops more than one Regiment

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of Horſe, three of Dragoons, and ſeven of Foot. And to take it according to the Eſtabliſhment, of 47,848 Men, 30,530 only were paid by the Q. The next Year the Q.'s own Troops in *Catalonia* were augmented to five Regiments of Horſe, eight of Dragoons, and thirteen of Foot; beſides which, the whole Number of Foreign Troops paid by *England* was 13,200, and ſo the Q.'s Part in this War continued for the next Year alſo. Now during this Time I find in this Army 7000 *Portugueſe*, to whom only 80,000 *l.* was paid by the Q. which I have already ſhewn, is not above three Fifths of their full Pay for one Year. There were likewiſe beſides the 1300 *Palatines* paid by the Q——, 6000 paid by the *Dutch*, and ſeven Regiments alſo, Horſe and Foot, of their own Troops. And as for King *Charles*'s Part, he raiſed what Troops he could in *Catalonia*, at leaſt Four thouſand more than his Subſidy from the Q. would maintain, after the Maintenance of his Court is deducted; and to do what he could farther for the Support of this War, there is no body, who looks into News, but knows that conſiderable Sums have from Time to Time been ſent from *Milan* and *Naples* to King *Charles*; and from the laſt of theſe Places we hardly

hardly hear of any Thing, but of the Pains and Application of the Vice-Roy, to find *Ways and Means* to ſupport the Service in *Catalonia*; which are puſh'd to that Extremity, as makes the People very uneaſy, and gives the Government almoſt the perpetual Trouble of preventing Tumults, or appeaſing them: Is this doing nothing for the *Spaniſh* War? Or does any body imagine the Money raiſed for it is ſunk into the King's Coffers, inſtead of being applied to the Service? Is not great Part of it, perhaps much the greateſt, ſpent upon the Place, in fitting out Convoys with Neceſſaries of one Kind or other for the Army; either Arms, or Cloaths, or Proviſions, beſides now and then ſome Troops? But if this be true, as we all know it is, then King *Charles* his Part in this War, if not ſo great as could be wiſh'd, is more conſiderable than this Writer repreſents it, and as much as could be expected from him, conſidering his Circumſtances.

All that follows in this Paragraph of the *Charge of tranſporting Forces from* Genoa, *and Levy-Money for Men and Horſes, and of the Misfortune of our Fleet being thus employ'd*, all this is nothing but a neceſſary Conſequence of a War in *Spain*; unleſs an Army can be raiſed without

without Men and Horſes, or ſubſiſt there without Recruits; or they could ſail from *Genoa* by Land. To make, therefore, theſe Objections, is nothing elſe but to condemn the *Spaniſh* War, which both her Majeſty and her People have ſo much at Heart. For if we will have an Army in thoſe Parts, it is infinitely eaſier to ſupport it from *Italy* than *England*. And I may add, that the *Dutch* have had their Share in the Trouble of Tranſportation, that is ſo much complained of; nor have their Fleet been employ'd in any Enterprizes for the Good of their Country, any more than our own. But it is Time to leave this Paragraph, which reflects no Blame on the late M----y, nor upon any of our Allies, nor when examined into, is it of any Uſe to his Cauſe. Only give me Leave to add in the laſt Place, that if we go back to the Beginning of the *Spaniſh* War, which is the only Way to judge impartially about it, we ſhall ſee the Imperial Court itſelf did not contribute a little towards the probable Succeſs of it, though they had furniſh'd neither Men nor Money towards it, in giving us the *Archduke* to be at the Head of it. If we conſider how much *England* ſolicited this, how impoſſible it was that we could ſucceed

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without it in *Spain*, where we pretended to nothing elſe but to favour a Revolution: How much the Honour of the Houſe of *Auſtria* was expoſed by making a nominal King, when we could not give him Poſſeſſion of any Part of the Monarchy; how much the Succeſſion of the Imperial Family was hazarded, by ſending one Brother upon ſo much Danger, when the other had no Son; how ſerviceable his Preſence in *Spain* was at firſt to us, and by what improbable Accidents our Hopes of an entire Revolution have more than once been diſappointed: Whoever conſiders theſe Things impartially, muſt allow, that the *Imperial* Court, in giving us the *Archduke*, gave us a great deal towards the *Spaniſh* War; and ſo I am ſure we all thought then; and therefore to have given *Spain* from King *Charles* to the Duke of *Anjou*, unleſs the Fate of the War had made it neceſſary, had been a great Injuſtice to the *Imperial* Court, if either his Father or Brother had lived, which yet was as much deſigned then as it is now; and if it would have been unjuſt then, it is ſo ſtill.

Pag. 55. We have a new Complaint againſt the laſt Emperor, *for draining into his own Coffers the Wealth of the Countries conquer'd or*

recover'd for him by the War, without increaſing his Troops. King *Charles*, the preſent Emperor, I believe would be glad to find any Truth in this; but the Miſchief is, all the World knows it is falſe. His Coffers, we are ſure, have for a long Time been very empty, and his Succeſſor no doubt will find it ſo. The Revenue ariſing from conquer'd Countries is much leſs than this Author ſeems to think it is; very little of it comes into the Emperor's Coffers, and the Little that does come, enables him to ſupport his Part of the War, better proportionably than he could otherwiſe. Which is very evident from what I have already ſaid of the Supplies ſent from *Milan* and *Naples* for the Service of the War in *Spain*. But to ſee what a ſmall Sum theſe boaſted Revenues come to, we muſt conſider, that there is no conquer'd Country can be kept without a great Expence while the War laſts: That upon the Conqueſt of a Country, many of the moſt conſiderable Perſons commonly remove from it, and thoſe that ſtay are to be gratified and kept in the Intereſt of the Conqueror, by ſuch Favours as intercept great Part of the Revenues. There is alſo many Times a Neceſſity of Remitting ſome Duties, in Conſideration of what the People

conquer'd

conquer'd have ſuffer'd by the War. Add to this the extraordinary Charge of reducing the ſtrong Places of theſe Countries, and the no leſs extraordinary Charge of repairing the Works that have been ruin'd in the Reduction of them, and perhaps of adding new Fortifications to ſeveral Places of a Country, that before, in one Part or other, lay too open. And all theſe Places muſt be provided with Garriſons, and furniſh'd with ſufficient Magazines of all Sorts. If theſe Articles are examin'd into, I am confident we ſhould find that the Emperor's Conqueſts, inſtead of filling his Coffers, have many of them been rather an Expence to him; and that the beſt of them have yielded him very little, for want of better Management than that Court has been ever thought to be acquainted with. To talk therefore of *draining great Wealth into Coffers*, ſpeaking of the Emperor, is all over a Jeſt, and too groſs Banter, I hope, to amuſe any one who has the Honour to *repreſent* his Country.

The next Paragraph contains nothing in it but what we are told of in this Book at leaſt twenty Times, of the many Towns we have taken for the *Dutch*; and therefore I ſhould take no Notice of it, but for a Sting in the

Tail of it; but which has the Misfortune, like moſt of the reſt, not to have in it a Word of Truth: *The* Hollanders, ſays he, *have made ſuch good Uſe of their Time, that in Conjunction with our G——, the Oppreſſions of* Flanders *are much greater than ever.* I wonder how our Author could miſs ſo fair an Opportunity of giving the new M——ry their due Praiſes for putting ſuch an effectual Check as they did to the farther Oppreſſions of theſe poor People, by removing the Perſon that reſided at *Bruſſels* on the Part of her Maj. and ſending a fitter in his Room: Nor is it leſs ſtrange that he ſhould not give us a black Liſt of theſe *Oppreſſions*, when it was ſo much for his Purpoſe, were there any other Reaſon for it, but that he cannot: And that he cannot, to my certain Knowledge, is not for Want of due Enquiry. Why then do not they tell us in what Manner my Lord *M.* has oppreſs'd theſe *Provinces?* Why do not they impeach his Favourite *C——n*, as they threaten'd, whoſe Services in this War are too great to be forgiven? Why do not they tell us how their publick Money has been miſapplied? With what Confuſion muſt they own, upon the Report of their moſt faithful Emiſſaries, that all the Clamours of Oppreſſion from the D. of

M.

M. have nothing in them? To ſupply this Author's Silence in this Part, I will tell the Reader in few Words, how theſe People were oppreſs'd, and how they have been relieved. Since 1708, when the Duke of *M.* was join'd by Prince *Eugene* with a Body of *Imperial* Troops, beſides a few Regiments raiſed and maintain'd by this Country, they have found Bread and Forage for theſe Troops. To anſwer this Charge, and other neceſſary Expences of the War, the Annual Revenue of theſe *Provinces* not being ſufficient, Money was borrow'd upon ſome Branches of it, to carry on the Service; none of which are engaged for above ten Years, and ſome not above four or five. This is the great Oppreſſion of theſe People. Now I would deſire this Writer to tell me, whether the War could have been carried on with the Succeſs it has been, without theſe Troops? And if not, which Way he propoſes they ſhould have been maintain'd. Should the Emperor have been at that Expence? He declares that though Bread and Forage are found for theſe Troops by the Allies, yet that they are a greater Charge to him, than if they had ſerved upon the *Rhine*. Shall the *Queen* and the *States* be at that Expence? Is not the War already

chargeable enough to us? Where then can it fall, but upon theſe *Provinces?* Is there any Reaſon why they ſhould not ſhare in the Burthen of the War? Is there any Reaſon that their Revenues ſhould be kept clear and diſengaged, when thoſe of all the reſt of the Allies are ſo much anticipated? What Pretence have they to complain? Has not the Aſſiſtance of theſe Troops enabled my Lord *M.* to carry the War out of their *Provinces*, which muſt otherwiſe have continued the unhappy Seat of it? And are not the Sufferings of one Campaign, when two ſuch Armies as ours and the *French* live upon them, greater than all theſe other Oppreſſions the War has brought upon them? Is not there every Year a great deal of Money ſpent in all their great Towns? Do not they find in the Army a good Market for the Produce of their Country? Are theſe no Advantages? And is it not by the Conduct of my Lord *M.* that they enjoy theſe Advantages, without thoſe Inconveniences they would be attended with, if the Neighbourhood of the Armies were not removed to ſuch a Diſtance from them? Beſides, Is not their own Preſervation, and the Intereſt of their Prince, concern'd in the Succeſs of the War? Why

then ſhould they not contribute their Share towards it? My Lord *M.* inſtead of being the Oppreſſor of theſe Provinces, has been their greateſt Benefactor: And it is very certain no one Act of Oppreſſion is by any of theſe Provinces perſonally imputed to him. But it is pretended Mr. *C——n* has oppreſs'd them under his Protection, and for his Intereſt: But if either of theſe could be proved, nothing is more certain, than that we ſhould long ſince have heard of them: But to prove that Mr. *C——n* has not oppreſs'd them, I ſhall ſhew, he could not; it being well known, that neither he, nor the Deputies of the *States*, who are called the *Conference*, ever touch'd a Penny of the publick Monies; their Buſineſs was to repreſent to the *Council of State* what Sums the ſeveral Branches of the Service would want, and oblige them to comply effectually with thoſe Demands: And this is called Oppreſſion; but after this, there remain'd no more for them to do. The Money was levied and collected, and iſſued by Hands of their own; which made it impoſſible there could be any Fraud or Oppreſſion on the Part of Mr. *Ca——n*, or the Deputies; it was difficult indeed often to make the *Council of State* do what was neceſſary for the Service; and

this obliged the *Conference* to be ſometimes rough with them, and let them know, their Demands muſt be complied with; and that they had nothing elſe to do, but to conſider of and find out the moſt proper Means for Raiſing the Money that was wanted. The *Conference* have likewiſe over-ruled the *Council of State* in the Buſineſs of chuſing their *Magiſtrates:* And ſince the Surprize of *Gand*, which every body is convinced was the Effect of Treachery, and the Diſcovery that made of the Inclinations of many in thoſe Provinces to the *French* and *Bavarian* Intereſt, they have found it neceſſary to intermeddle in an Affair of ſo much Conſequence, and to uſe their Endeavours, that none may be put into the Magiſtracy, but Men of known Affection to the Allies and the Houſe of *Auſtria*. If theſe were Oppreſſions, it muſt be owned theſe *Provinces* have been oppreſs'd till this laſt Year: Which has given them all the Relief they could deſire; for inſtead of finding Bread and Forage for the whole Body of *Imperial* Troops, they have this Campaign refuſed to provide for ſo much as one ſingle Regiment of *Huſſars*, which Prince *Eugene*, when he march'd to the *Rhine*, was prevailed on to leave behind him, the Service being in great

Want

Want of them: And I have been aſſured, there is not the leaſt Thing, which my Lord *M.* asked of them this laſt Campaign for the Service, that was not either abſolutely denied, or not complied with, but after repeated Demands, and with great Difficulty; nay, their Diſaffection to the Common Cauſe met with ſuch Encouragement, that towards the End of the Campaign, when the Army could no longer ſubſiſt in the Neighbourhood of *Bouchain*, without a Supply of Forage from theſe *Provinces*, though my Lord *M.* found Means to ſubſiſt the Army longer than any body expected without coming to this Reſource; and the immediate Conſequence of their Refuſal, to ſay nothing of remoter ones, muſt have been our Army's retiring back into theſe *Provinces*: Though this was repreſented to them in the moſt moving and earneſt Manner poſſible, and it was evidently for their own Intereſt to comply with a Demand that was ſo neceſſary, yet did they for ſome Days refuſe to do ſo, and ſent a Deputation to the Army to deſire they might be excuſed. And by theſe Delays the Troops ſuffer'd not a little. So happily are Affairs changed with this oppreſſed People, as to the Share in the War, which they were before obliged to ſubmit to:

Nor

Nor are they leſs relieved in the Point of chuſing their Magiſtrates; and the good Uſe they have made of their Liberty in this Reſpect is, that they have put into the Magiſtracy of *Gand*, the very Perſons that are ſuſpected of having betray'd it to the *French*; ſo that it would be no Surprize, if I ſhould hear the ſame Thing was done again; and their other Towns are fill'd with Perſons of the ſame Faction. Theſe are the *Oppreſſions*, and this the Relief of theſe poor *Provinces*. And let this Author diſprove a Word of this if he can, or ſhew that my Lord *M.* has in any other Senſe joined with the *States* to oppreſs them in any one Inſtance.

The laſt Part of our Author's Charge againſt the Allies, is pointed againſt the *Princes* of the Empire, of whom the Q. has hired Troops; but the *Dutch* are ſo perpetually in this Writer's Way, that he can dart his Venom to no Point in the Compaſs, but ſome of it will fall on them. *In order*, ſays he, *to augment our Forces every Year in the ſame Proportion as thoſe for whom we fight diminiſh theirs, we have been obliged to hire from ſeveral Princes of the Empire.* In this Sentence there are more Falſities than Words: We did not begin to *hire*, in order to *augment*

ment our Forces: Our firſt 40,000 Men were, for the greater Part, compoſed of hired Troops, to ſave *Engliſh* Blood, and husband our Money to the beſt Advantage; and that at the End of the War there might lie fewer on the Nation to be provided for. Theſe Forces we have not augmented every Year; and whenever we did augment our Troops in *Flanders*, the *States* did, as I have already ſhewn, equally augment theirs; ſo far were they from diminiſhing their Troops from Time to Time, as this Author frequently inſinuates; much leſs could the *Proportion*, in which they diminiſh'd their Troops, be the Rule by which we increaſed ours; nor is it for them we fight, but for ourſelves; the Concern is common, and our Safety inſeparable. But, ſecondly, *the Miniſters of theſe Princes have perpetually importuned the Court with unreaſonable Demands, under which our late M——rs thought fit to be paſſive.*

All the Princes, of whom we have hired Troops, have not been importunate with unreaſonable Demands; particularly not the Elector of *Hanover*; to name no others; nor have the reſt been perpetually ſo unreaſonable, though they are, it muſt be confeſs'd, for making as good Bargains as they can; nor, when

when their Demands were unreaſonable, were the late M—rs ſo very paſſive; which is ſaid to intimate, as if they were well paid for doing ſo, the General in particular. Whereas I will undertake to ſhew, that upon any one unreaſonable Demand made by any one of them, there was more Argument and Expoſtulation uſed on the Part of my Lord *M*——, before it was complied with, than can be produced from certain Offices for the whole four Years ſome Great Men were in them; and there is hardly one Inſtance, wherein theſe importuning Miniſters have not, in ſome Degree, receded from their firſt Pretenſions, and many have been utterly refuſed. But, Thirdly, *theſe Demands were always back'd with a Threat to recall their Soldiers, which was a Thing not to be heard of, becauſe it might diſcontent the* Dutch. If they have threaten'd to recall their Troops, (which, by the way, has been more ſince the new M———ry, than ſince the Beginning of the War) it has been chiefly upon Pretence that they were neceſſary for their own Safety; and that they muſt therefore recall them, unleſs the Allies would concur in the neceſſary Meaſures to ſecure the Peace of the Empire, and oblige *Sweden* ſo far to a Neutrality. But whatever was the particular

ticular Occaſion, the Treaties for their Troops are but for a Year only; and when they are to be renew'd, they are at Liberty to inſiſt on new Articles; and if they are unreaſonable in this, it is becauſe they know they are neceſſary, and that the War is our Concern more than theirs; and that is the Reaſon they inſiſt ſometimes on Demands that are thought not very reaſonable. And if the *Recalling their Troops* is a *Thing not to be heard of*; it is not becauſe it *might diſcontent the* Dutch, but becauſe the *Dutch* and we both want them; for the *Dutch* hire Troops as well as we, and of the ſame Princes, and are importuned with the ſame Demands; and after their utmoſt Endeavours to beat down the Price, they make the ſame Conceſſions we do, and for the ſame Reaſons: That a Stop may not for a little Matter be put to the Progreſs of our Arms, and the Fruits of a glorious War be loſt after ſo much Succeſs: Which is of ſuch Conſequence, that the *French* would be glad to take the Bargain out of our Hands, and would give theſe Princes more Money to keep their Troops at Home, than we and the *States* pay to have them in the Field. A Man muſt be a Fool not to ſee the Conſequence of having a Body

of

of good Troops recall'd in the Beginning or Middle of Campaign, which yet had been our Caſe the very laſt Campaign, had not the Care and Prudence of the D. of *M.* prevented it, who found out a Way to keep the Troops, without yielding to any one unreaſonable Demand.

Laſtly, *Theſe Princes never ſent their Contingent to the Emperor, but gave for an Excuſe, that we had already hired all they had to ſpare.* There is more Truth in this Sentence than is uſual with this Writer: It is true, they have not furniſh'd their Contingents, generally ſpeaking, ſo well as they ſhould do; and that they have made this their Excuſe, that they had lent their Troops to us, or rather they pretended, there was a Sort of Merit in this, and that therefore more was not to be expected from them. But this Author knows, that this is a Pretence only; that thoſe Princes, who think themſelves at a good Diſtance from Danger, have in no Times furniſh'd their Contingent well; and that if they have not this Excuſe, they will find another. But is this any Fault in our Principal Allies? Is it a Fault in the late M———y, that the Princes of the Empire do not ſend their *Quota*'s

to

to the *Rhine*, as they ſhould? Is it not well known that the Emperor himſelf cannot cure this? That it is a fundamental Fault in the Conſtitution of the Empire, that there is no where lodg'd a ſufficient Power to oblige the ſeveral Princes to contribute effectually to the Defence of it, the Share they are obliged to, by the Reſolutions of the *Dyet*; though that *Dyet* be themſelves, and the Reſolutions of it conſequently their own Acts. This Deficiency therefore on the Part of theſe Princes, is no Fault neither in the late M----y, nor in the *States*, nor in the *Emperor* himſelf; it is an unavoidable and incurable Evil, ariſing from the very Nature and Form of that Government. Nobody can doubt of the Truth of this, who has ever read *Puffendorff*'s ſhort but judicious Account of *Germany*, publiſh'd under the Name of *Monzembano*, which has been tranſlated into moſt Languages, and in 1689, into *Engliſh*, entitled, The *Hiſtory of Germany*, but not own'd to be a Tranſlation.

But to return: As this Writer never contents himſelf with ſaying one Thing but once, we have, *P.* 34, a Reflection on thoſe Princes, in Words ſo very ſcandalous, that I wonder this great Maſter did not reſerve them for a finiſhing Stroke to this moſt impudent Invective;

vective; in which our Allies are repreſented in ſuch falſe and odious Colours, as nothing can excuſe, or poſſibly account for, but a form'd Deſign to break all Faith with them, and to careſs the Common Enemy at their Expence; which is a Thing ſo ſhocking to *Engliſh* Juſtice and Honour, that it is no little Pains muſt be uſed to prepare them to ſubmit to it. The Reflection is this; *There is hardly*, ſays he, *a Petty Prince, whom we half maintain by Subſidies and Penſions, who is not ready, upon every Occaſion, to threaten us to recall his Troops, (though they muſt ROB or ſtarve at Home) if we refuſe to comply with him in any Demand, however ſo unreaſonable.* Here is a general Character of all the Princes to whom we pay Subſidies. Is this Language fit for Sovereign Princes; for Eſtates and Crown'd Heads? Are ten or a dozen Princes to be branded with ſuch Words of Infamy at once? Should not the Elector of *Hanover*, at leaſt, be in Decency excepted from the common Herd? Thoſe that are acquainted with the Empire, can tell this Writer, that ſome of theſe Princes, whom he treats in ſo villanous a Manner, are ſo venerable for their Wiſdom and Goodneſs, that they would command the Reſpect of all that

have

have the Honour to know them, though their Dignity were laid aſide; but that, at leaſt, ſhould ſecure them from ſuch bold Inſults, whatever their perſonal Merit be. Shall not the high Station of Princes protect them from ſuch Language? Shall Sovereigns be treated thus by a Man, who would make implicit Obedience to the Prince one of his diſtinguiſhing Characters? Shall it be a Crime in an honeſt *Engliſhman*, when he ſpeaks of a Tyrant, who has made *the World a Wilderneſs*, and is ever thirſting for the Ruin of us and our Religion? Shall it, I ſay, be a Crime to ſpeak of his Falſhood and Perfidiouſneſs, Barbarity and Cruelty, his horrid Perſecutions, his unjuſt Wars, his boundleſs Ambition, his Bigotry and Superſtition, of the Millions of People he has deſtroy'd, and the vaſt Extent of Countries he has laid Waſte: Shall it be a Crime to ſpeak of theſe Things in Words proper to them, becauſe he is a Crown'd Head? And ſhall it be permitted to an inſolent Scribler, to treat, in this licentious Manner, Princes who are our Friends, in the ſame Intereſt with us, and two of the ſame Religion? For under this Character of *Petty Princes* are included, and indeed principally intended, the Kings of *Denmark*, *Pruſſia*, and *Poland*; the

firſt of whom might expect better Treatment from an *Engliſhman*, as a Proteſtant Prince, and an old Ally, and upon Account of his particular Relation to her Majeſty. The Second has been a very hearty and zealous Promoter both of the Common Cauſe and of the Proteſtant Religion; his Purſe and his Country are always open to poor Refugees; and his Endeavours to reconcile the two Reform'd Religions can never be enough commended: And the laſt of theſe Princes, though it will always be a Blemiſh to him, that he parted with his Religion for a Crown; amidſt all the Troubles he has had, he has been always true to the Allies, and done ſomething for the Common Cauſe whenever he was able; while his victorious Enemy, inſtead of ſending his *Quota* to the Aſſiſtance of the Empire, forced the Emperor to remit, by a diſhonourable Treaty, all Demands paſt, preſent, and to come, till he ſhall have put an End to the Wars he is engaged in. Theſe are ſome of the Princes, who we are told muſt do that, the Sound of which the meaneſt Man of common Honeſty abhors, ROB, or Starve, if it were not for our Subſidies. If this Author be in the Secret, what muſt we think of our Alliances? For this is the Language of an Enemy;

Enemy; it is Language which a generous Enemy would ſcorn to uſe. I cannot but think, from many Paſſages in this Book, and this, among others, that the Writer of it is at Bottom an Enemy to every Thing an *Engliſhman* has a Value for; to our Trade, to our Succeſſion, to our Religion, to all Alliances that are for our Security, to every Thing that interfetes with the Intereſt of *France*, to Faith, Honeſty, and good Manners; elſe ſo many Things could not fall from him, that are not conſiſtent with any other Character.

Theſe are the Crimes charged on our Allies; and theſe the Anſwers to them. Let now one be ſet againſt the other; and I leave it to every indifferent Reader to judge, whether this Writer has proved his Point, *That our Allies have each of them broke every Article in their Treaties with us*: Or whether, on the contrary, it be not plain, That this Charge is in every Part falſe, more or leſs: And that the Faults they are accuſed of, are either no Faults at all, or not voluntary; much leſs deſign'd to prejudice the Common Cauſe, or the Effects of their Neglect and Diſregard to the Queen. The Failures they are charged with, are either not true, or but few, and in

Caſes where they could not be avoided; proceeding from their general Weakneſs and Inability, or from the Difficulty or Neceſſity of their Affairs at ſome particular Junctures. Or if there are any Inſtances that cannot be thus excuſed; yet the late M——ry have been ſo far from being paſſive under them, that they have always uſed the moſt proper Methods to make them act up to their Alliances, and exert themſelves in the moſt effectual Manner againſt the Common Enemy. There has, indeed, been little Need of ſuch Remonſtrances or Expoſtulations with the *States*; as every body may judge from what has till now been the univerſal Senſe of all even among ourſelves. And notwithſtanding what this Author affirms, of their Furniſhing us nothing on the Rumour of the Invaſion, and of their then ſending away their Fleet to the *Streights*; we have the Authority of Queen, Lords, and Commons, againſt him: For both Houſes, in their joint Addreſs at that Time, tell her Majeſty, *all her good Subjects were very ſenſible of the Zeal the* States General *had ſhewn upon that Occaſion*: And her Majeſty in her Anſwer has theſe Words; *I am alſo very well pleaſed with the Juſtice you have done the* States General, *in taking Notice*

of

of their timely Care for our Safety, and their Readineſs to give us all poſſible Aſſiſtance. But with reſpect to our other *Allies*, the late M——y, both by themſelves and in Conjunction with the *States*, always preſs'd the Service of the Common Cauſe with the greateſt Earneſtneſs. And the Remonſtrances that have been made in the Name of the Q——, and the *States*, this War, would fill many Volumes: Great Numbers of which are ſtill in being, and can, on Occaſion, be produced to the Confuſion of thoſe, who, while they reproach the late M———ry with Neglects they knew them to be not guilty of, will never themſelves, in Ability or Diligence, appear equal to them. But if, after all the Pains they could take, ſome Imperfections have ſtill remain'd in our Allies, and all Parts have not done what by their Treaties they were bound to, is there any Thing ſtrange in this? Was there ever any great, or indeed ſmall Alliance where it was otherwiſe; or can we reaſonably hope, in any future Alliance, there won't be Room for ſuch Complaints? What then would this Writer have? When he can ſhew us an Alliance without Faults, in all paſt Hiſtories; or how there ever can be one, he may be allow'd to blame

the preſent Confederacy, as freely as he will; but till then, I muſt tell him, inſtead of Blame, it will excite the Eſteem and Admiration of all impartial Men to conſider, how an Alliance, conſiſting of ſo many Parts, which are under very different Forms of Government, and no leſs different Intereſts, could be form'd under ſuch diſadvantageous Appearances, as there were at the Beginning of this War; or how it could be kept together ſo many Years, and be render'd ſucceſsful againſt ſo powerful an Enemy. It is really wonderful, if we conſider either the Power or the Artifices of *France*, that in ſo long Time, no Part of a Confederacy, conſiſting of ſo many Members, has been forced or corrupted into ſeparate Meaſures; this is without Example, and what we muſt not hope to ſee again, if ſome Men can obtain the Ends they have in View. Nothing is more known, or more obvious to the moſt ordinary Underſtanding, than the Advantage a *ſingle Power* has over a *Confederacy*: But what is it this Advantage conſiſts in? Is it not, that all the Parts of it are not under the Direction of one; that their Strength cannot be united ſo, as to bear all at once; that they will have different Views; that ſome or

other,

other, through Weakneſs, or Corruption, or ill Government, won't do their Part; that all Projects muſt be liable to the Debates and Opinions of many independent Powers; that this will make ſome be laid aſide, others delay'd, others at laſt very imperfectly executed; and all will be expoſed to be diſcover'd to the Enemy; while their Deſigns can be kept with the utmoſt Secrecy? Are not theſe and the like Inconveniences incident to all Alliances in the very Nature of them? Nay farther, has not *France*, by the abſolute Power of the Prince, a great Advantage over not only the Confederacy, but over any ſingle Power in it? Can *England* itſelf, which makes the greateſt Figure in it, manage Things with that Vigour, Diſpatch, and Secrecy, that the Councils of *France* are govern'd with? It is plain, that the Nature of our Conſtitution and Government by Par——ts makes this impoſſible under the beſt Prince, and the wiſeſt Adminiſtration. But if *France* has an Advantage over us in this Reſpect, it has a much greater over the *States*, that are really Seven Confederate *Republicks*, not one; and nothing can be reſolved without the Conſent of each of their Repreſentatives; nor can thoſe Repreſentatives conſent in any

Caſes of Importance, without Inſtructions from their reſpective *Provinces*; which is a Conſtitution very ill form'd for War; however, it may ſubſiſt in Times of Peace, which their Government is framed for; and which, therefore, when it can be ſafe, they are neceſſarily diſpoſed to. But ſtill much greater is the Advantage of *France* over the *Empire* on this Account; that is ſuch an imperfect Conſtitution, that it wants a Name; the Independency of the Parts is ſo great, and the coercive Power of the *Emperor* ſo weak, that they can neither timely take Reſolutions, nor execute them vigorouſly when they are taken; by which Means a vaſt Body, which were it well united under one Head, would itſelf be almoſt a Match for the Power of *France*, is now ſo languid, feeble, and unactive, that it is not able to defend itſelf from that very ſmall Part, which the Maritime Powers have left the Enemy at Liberty to turn againſt them.

But if *France* has ſo much Advantage over each of the Principals in this War, is it any Wonder an Alliance, made up of them and ſeveral other weaker Parts, cannot act with that Vigour and Unity, and Diſpatch and Secrecy, a ſingle Power can? Will there not unavoidably

unavoidably be Delays and Differences of Opinion, and Failures and wrong Management on one Account or other in the Whole, when every Part it conſiſts of, is itſelf ſubject to each of theſe Imperfections and Inconveniences? Has not all Experience confirm'd the Truth of this? What then can be more unjuſt than to complain of our Allies, or of the late M———y, becauſe in the preſent Confederacy theſe neceſſary Evils could not wholly be prevented? The Succeſs of the Alliance is the beſt Proof; that it has in the main anſwer'd the Ends for which it is formed; and that not only beyond former Example, but even beyond what could reaſonably be expected from it; as all know who are acquainted with Hiſtory, or remember what has paſs'd in *Europe* for theſe laſt fifty Years; or no longer backward than the laſt War; or with what Diſadvantages the preſent War was begun. The Vigour, Unanimity, and Secrecy with which this long War has been conducted; and the firm Adherence of all the Parts of it to the Intereſt of the Common Cauſe, will make a noble Figure in Hiſtory, if it continues but a very little longer, and be the Admiration of Poſterity; and its Succeſs will reflect immortal Honour on the late M——y;

M——y; who by their diſintereſted and ſteddy Conduct, by their Prudence and Addreſs were able to keep ſo long together ſo great an Alliance, and to make the ſeveral Parts of it act in ſuch Concert, as to pull down, and humble, a Power ſo *exorbitant* as that of *France* at the Beginning of this War; a Power which then ſo little dreaded all the Efforts the Allies could make, that they would not have given an Inch of Ground in *Flanders* to purchaſe a Peace. A Man of the leaſt Candor and Ingenuity muſt own, that this in Fact is true; that this is the Succeſs this Confederacy has been attended with, and that it is owing to the Abilities and Integrity of the late M——y.

But the Objections of this Writer againſt our Allies, are not only unjuſt but abſurd, and in their Conſequence fatal and deſtructive to us and our Allies both. For if no Confederacy muſt be made or kept up till theſe Inconveniences can be avoided, it is to no Purpoſe to think of making any; and we muſt of Neceſſity ſubmit to the Common Enemy. For when one Power is exorbitant, no ſingle Power can ſtand againſt it, for if it could, that other would not be exorbitant. If therefore a ſingle Power would preſerve itſelf, it muſt

be

be by aſſociating with other Powers; but that can never be done, or at leaſt not to any Purpoſe, if theſe Powers, ſo aſſociating, ſhall quarrel among themſelves, and diſſolve, upon the firſt Failure or Difference of any one of them: No Alliances at this Rate can be practicable: But if the ſingle Powers of *Europe* can defend themſelves neither with nor without Alliances, they muſt one after another inevitably be deſtroy'd, and ſubmit their Necks to him, who is much too hard for any one ſingle; though could they unite, and bear with one anothers Imperfections, they might be able to make a Stand; and by exerting themſelves in Proportion to their Strength, they might at length ſubdue him, who without ſuch a Confederacy would in Half the Time have ruin'd them. No Alliance ever was, or ever will be attended with leſs Imperfections, than the preſent has been; and therefore, if this Author's Advice be taken, this muſt be diſſolved, and for the Future, no new one muſt be made; and then there will no Part be left for *England*, but to ſubmit to *France* tamely without reſiſting, or to make a ſhort-liv'd Reſiſtance, that cannot but end in the certain Ruin of it. What Folly and Deſtruction is at the Bottom of this fatal Advice,

if

if *England* could be ſo far deluded, as to fall into it, we may eaſily ſee, by reflecting on the Conſequences that would attend *Holland*, or the *Empire*, if they, whoſe Governments are a Sort of Confederacy, ſhould follow theſe Councils. Suppoſe, becauſe the Circles of the *Empire* do not all do the Part they are obliged to, and furniſh their reſpective Contingents for the War, an Incendiary, ſuch as this Author, ſhould take upon him to ſow Diviſions among them, and raiſe a Ferment in that great Body; and repreſent, in the moſt aggravating Manner, to the *Circles* moſt expoſed, upon whom the Burthen of the War has lain heavieſt, the great Negligence of the reſt, and their Diſregard to the Common Intereſt of the *Empire*; and by theſe Invectives, thoſe Circles, who hitherto have done more than their Part, ſhould be ſo incenſed againſt the reſt, as to reſolve to do no more; what would be the Conſequences of this? Muſt not they themſelves, who are thus incenſed, be ruin'd firſt, either by ſubmitting to the Common Enemy, or making a leſs Reſiſtance than they did before? And would not the Ruin of one Part draw after it that of another; and that again of a Third, till the whole *Empire* was deſtroy'd?

And

And it would be the ſame with *Holland*, if the two *Maritime Powers* ſhould diſcontinue their Efforts againſt *France*, becauſe the Inland ones do not exactly perform their Parts, according to the Proportions agreed on among themſelves; though by the Neceſſity of their Affairs, ſome Misfortune that has befallen them, or by a Decay of Trade, or ſome other Reaſon, they really cannot do ſo much as they ought; or perhaps, through the ill Management, or Perverſeneſs, or Corruption of ſome of their Governors, will not. Would not this Procedure unavoidably end in the Ruin of the Whole? If any Part of a Confederacy do not do what they can, or by their Treaties are obliged to, it becomes the reſt to uſe their beſt Endeavours to induce them to it; but when that will not do, they muſt make the beſt of a bad Market; a little Aſſiſtance is better than none at all: And if they have, upon the Whole, Hopes that they can maintain their Ground, while the Alliance is preſerved, they ought to preſerve it, ſince without it, and upon their own Bottom, they are ſure they cannot.

But what I have ſaid of *Holland* and the *Emperor*, it is eaſy to apply to an Alliance of many confederated Powers, which can no Way

Way ſupport themſelves againſt the Common Enemy, but by a good Agreement among themſelves; and a good Agreement cannot be long preſerved, if the ſtronger Parts won't bear with the Failures of the Weaker, or every Difference in Sentiments ſhall be thought a juſt Cauſe for breaking off, or throws them into Quarrels and Animoſities, which, whether deſigned or not, muſt in a little Time end in a Diſſolution. This muſt be the Conſequence of following the Meaſures this Author would lead us into. And I defy him to ſhew what other End this villanous Invective againſt our Allies can tend to, or is deſign'd for? Would not one think there was a Reſolution taken to break with our Allies, and the Buſineſs of this wicked Libel was to prepare People for it, and inflame them, if poſſible, ſo far as to make them fond of, or at leaſt be patient under the Breach of an Alliance, which could end in nothing but the Ruin of us and our Poſterity? For whatever Reaſons can be given for diſſolving this, will hold againſt all that ever ſhall be made; and if this miſcarries when it is ſo near obtaining the End it aims at, it is eaſy to ſee, ſo good a one cannot poſſibly be form'd again. And therefore, if we do not ſucceed now, *England*, with or without Allies, muſt

muſt be ruin'd. A Man, that ſhould attempt in ſo open a Manner to diſſolve the Confederacy of *Holland* or the *Empire*, would be hang'd for his Pains; and ſince this Author's Deſign is not leſs pernicious, I cannot but wiſh he may meet with the Reward that he deſerves.

Having finiſh'd what I had to ſay in Defence of our Allies, and in Behalf of the Confederacy, on the Preſervation of which the Safety of *England* entirely depends; I was obliged to keep this Part a good while from the Preſs, in Expectation of farther Light into ſome Facts: With which I ſhall conclude this Paper. And I am in the laſt Place to conſider what this Writer has to ſay againſt *the Management of the War by the late M——y*; whoſe Defence will appear to be a very eaſy Task, there being nothing, with reſpect to them, hard to be accounted for; but that after having had for ſo many Years the Thanks of the Nation, and of all *Europe*, they ſhould now be thought to need any Defence. But this I muſt reſerve for a Fourth Part, in which I ſhall likewiſe take ſome Notice of the Five Reaſons for an ill Peace, with which this Author fills his thirty laſt Pages; and with a very

very few Words in Anſwer to them, ſhall put an End to all that I can think needful to be ſaid by Way of Antidote to the Poiſon of this Book, which is the Sublimate of his Faction, and the laſt Effort of their Skill in political Chymiſtry, to work the Nation into a Phrenſy, to make them court their own Ruin, or at leaſt to lull them into a Security, which, if indulged but for a little while, may prove fatal to us all.

Poſtſcript.

THE following Particulars having been lately received, which were either omitted, or not ſo fully explain'd before; they were thought proper to be added, as further Proofs of the Author's Candor, Modeſty, and Truth.

Page 54. he ſays, *the whole Army in* Catalonia, *which is or ought to be* 50,000 *Men, excluſive of* Portugal *and* Gibraltar, *is paid by the Queen, excepting only Seven Battalions and Fourteen Squadrons of* Dutch *and* Palatines;

and

and even 1500 *of theſe are in our Pay*; *beſides the Subſidies to King* Charles. He does not therefore, in this Number, include the *Spaniards*, who have always been paid out of the Subſidy, and never received a Farthing out of any other Money. According to his Relation, the Queen pays about 43,500 Men out of the 50,000. Now to ſatisfy the World with how much Honeſty our Author ſets forth this Matter, here follows an exact Abſtract of all the Forces that have been every Year paid by the Queen, or provided for by Parliament, for the Service of *Catalonia*, or to act on that Side ſince the Commencement of the War there, which was in the Year 1705, excluſive of *Portugal*, and beſides the Subſidies granted the King of *Spain*.

	Men.
For the Year —— ending at *Chriſtmas* 1705, —— ——	4970
For the Year 1706, —— --	18,757

N. B. In this Number is included 5330 Men, which the Parliament provided for, to ſerve in other Parts, *viz.* one Regiment

to ſerve in *Portugal*, Four in *Flanders*, and the Battalion of Guards on the Eſtabliſhment of Guards and Garriſons.

For the Year 1707, the Numbers provided for, to ſerve in *Spain* and *Portugal*, were 29,395 Men, of which the Corps that ſerved in *Spain*, excluſive of *Gibraltar*, if compleat, according to the Eſtabliſhment, would amount to 25,141 Men. And adding the Battalion of Guards, and the Marines, —— —— -- 27,141

N. B. Of this Number Six Regiments of Foot were reduced, and the Officers ſent home to recruit in *March* 1706-7.

For the Year 1708, of the Troops provided for, to ſerve in *Spain*, *Portugal*, and other Parts, there ſerved on the Side of *Catalonia* — 17,910

N. B. The Numbers voted for this Year to ſerve in *Spain* and

other

other Parts, were 30,530: Of which, 12,620 ſerved in *Portugal*, *Gibraltar*, *Great-Britain*, and on the Expedition under General *Erle*.

For the Year 1709, of the Troops provided for, to ſerve in *Spain*, *Portugal*, and elſewhere, there ſerved on the Side of *Catalonia*, including 3800 *Portugueſe*, to which Number they were reduced from 7000 Men; towards whoſe Pay the Queen gave 80,000 *l.* for this Year, —— —— 32,644

For the Year 1710, of the Troops granted for *Spain* and elſewhere, there ſerved on the Side of *Catalonia*, including the Garriſon of *Port-Mahone*, and the 3800 *Portugueſe*, —— —— — 33,995

For the Year 1711, — — 32,900

N. B. Several Regiments taken at *Bribuega*, the latter End of the Year 1710, continuing ſtill Pri-

ſoners,

ſoners, are not included here, although provided for to ſerve in *Catalonia*. — —

The Subſidies granted the King of *Spain* were

For the Year 1706, — ——	103,000
For the Year 1707, ——— —	150,000
For the Year 1708, — —	150,000
For the Year 1709, ——— —	150,000
For the Year 1710, — ———	150,000
For the Year 1711, ——— —	150,000

Out of this has been defray'd (beſides paying the *Spaniſh* Troops) the Charge of Fortifications, (except thoſe of *Port-mahone* and *Gibraltar*) with the Charge of ſubſiſting great Numbers of *Spaniards* at *Lisbon*, and elſewhere, as they deſerted from the Enemy, purſuant to the Encouragement given by the Queen's General in his Manifeſto, and ſome other Heads of Expence; ſo it may be imagin'd

gin'd what great Number of Troops could be kept on Foot by the Remainder.

In the ſame Paragraph he ſays, *We were at the whole Charge of Tranſporting all the Troops from* Italy, *and paid Levy-Money for every individual Man and Horſe.*

But we never paid for the Tranſportation of one Man or Horſe, but thoſe that were actually in the Queen's Pay; the *Dutch* conſtantly paying the Charge of thoſe in the Pay of the States. And as to the Levy-Money, there was never one Farthing paid for the Horſe. What was allow'd was 5 *l.* for each of the effective Men that ſhould be actually embark'd; and it was only for the Imperial Regiments, none being paid for the *Italians*, *Neapolitans*, or *Griſons*; and if we had paid for the Man and Horſe, it would have come to Twenty Pounds at leaſt.

P. 56. he ſays, " Seven *Portugueſe* Regi-
" ments, after the Battle of *Almanza*, went off,
" with the reſt of that broken Army, to *Ca-*
" *talonia*; the King of *Portugal* ſaid he was
" not able to pay them while they were out
" of his Country; the Queen conſented there-

" fore to do it herſelf, provided the King " would raiſe as many more to ſupply their " Places. This he engaged to do, but never " perform'd. Notwithſtanding which, his " Subſidies were conſtantly paid him by my " Lord *G——n*, for almoſt four Years, with- " out any Deduction upon Account of thoſe " Seven Regiments." Every Word of this is utterly falſe.

Five of theſe were Horſe, and the other two Foot; their Pay, when compleat, amounted to 134,707 *l.* 5 *s.* 4 *d.* ½. *per Annum*, which was entirely born by the King of *Portugal* to the laſt of *December* 1708; but having, in the Year 1708, raiſed a new Army, and the Expence of theſe Seven Regiments increaſing much by the extraordinary Charge of furniſhing Money, Proviſions, and other Neceſſaries for them, in a Country where the Court of *Portugal* had but a ſlender Credit; the Qu——n, to eaſe the growing Charge, conſented to pay 80,000 *l.* towards their Pay for the Year 1709. They were paid about the like Sum for the Year 1710, and for the preſent Year 1711, they receive Subſiſtance for the Effectives in like Manner as the other Forces. And from the End of *December* 1708, in which Time the Qu---n did not expend

one

one Groat for the ſaid Seven Regiments to the End of *Auguſt* 1710, which was the laſt Month's Subſidy the K. of *Portugal* ever received in Lord *God---n*'s Time, is 20 Months. Which this excellent Author aſſures us is almoſt four Years.

And notwithſtanding what he ſays, that the King of *Portugal* raiſed no Forces in the Room of theſe Seven Regiments; he knows that the *Portugal* Miniſter, upon an Enquiry into this Matter laſt Winter, gave the Court here entire Satisfaction to the contrary. Nor is he ignorant, that in the Year 1708, there was 25,000 *l.* paid out of the Treaſury here, in Part of the Subſidy for buying Horſes on this Side, towards remounting the King of *Portugal*'s Cavalry, which was expended accordingly, and the Horſes tranſported at his Charge, and the Money deducted out of his Subſidy. This alone would go near to mount four of the five Regiments of Horſe aforeſaid.

In the ſame Paragraph he takes Notice of our being put to double Expence in maintaining our Troops by the Charge of Forage; which is as falſe as the reſt. The Army in *Portugal*, as well thoſe in the King of *Portugal*'s Pay, as thoſe upon the Qu——n's Eſtabliſhment,

are furniſh'd by Contracts made with *Engliſh* Merchants and Factors. The Corn they uſe is almoſt entirely the Product of *Great Britain* and *Ireland*; and the Rate agreed upon in the Contract is govern'd by the Price the Corn bears at the Market of *Lisbon*. Of late Years it has been ſo high, that it became difficult to get People to contract; inſomuch that for the Year beginning at *Michaelmas* 1710, there was ſuch an Advance in the Price agreed upon, that the Ration of Bread or Forage came out at a greater Rate than the Soldier could allow for it out of his Subſiſtance; and therefore the Exceeding became an extraordinary Charge to the Government, and occaſioned an Expence to the Queen for that Year of about 5000 *l.* The Contract for the Year beginning *Michaelmas* 1711, was ſtill at a higher Price; ſo as the extraordinary Charge to the Queen, for the Year which ends at *Michaelmas* 1712, would amount to 30,000 *l.* provided the Troops there are compleat, according to their Eſtabliſhments: But as there are many Regiments already reduced, and others drawn off, this Charge will not amount to above 10,000 *l.* a Sum very ſhort of double the Charge of maintaining our Troops, as our worthy Author affirms it is. And to ſhew how

how little Intereſt the Kng of *Portugal* has in the extraordinary Expence by theſe Contracts, wherein he bears by much the greateſt Part for his own Troops; when this Matter was taken Notice of here, *Don Luis de Cunha*, the *Portugal* Envoy, preſented a Memorial to her Majeſty, propoſing that ſhe would be pleaſed to give Directions for Furniſhing her Troops in *Portugal* with Bread and Forage by Commiſſaries or Contractors of her own Appointment, and upon the beſt Terms they could for the Advantage of her Majeſty; for that the Court of *Portugal* found it very difficult to get Perſons to contract, although at much dearer Rates than uſual.

THE ALLIES AND The Late Miniſtry Defended againſt FRANCE, And the Preſent Friends of *France*.

PART IV.

Containing a Vindication of the late M——y in relation to the Management of the War on the Part of *England*; with an Anſwer to the Author of the *Conduct*'s five Reaſons for making a Peace with *Spain* and the *Indies*.

To which is added a *Poſtſcript*, in Anſwer to his *Remarks on the Barrier Treaty*.

Si nullam noſtris ultra ſpem ponis in armis,
Oremus Pacem, & dextræ tendamus inertes:
Quanquam O! ſi ſolitæ quicquam Virtutis adeſſet,
Sunt & Opes nobis & adhuc intacta Juventus,
Auxiliique Urbes ſociæ Populique.——

HAVING in the former Parts of this Defence vindicated our Allies, and ſhewn how groſly their Conduct in the Management of the War has been miſrepreſented in every Part of it; I come now, in the laſt Place, to do the

the ſame Juſtice to the late M——y, with reſpect to the Proſecution of it, on the Part of *England*: Which, if we will believe this Author, has been carried on in the worſt Manner poſſible. *We have*, ſays he, *pag.* 31. *ſpent all our Vigour in purſuing that Part of the War, which could leaſt anſwer the End we propoſed in beginning it, and made no Efforts at all where we could have moſt weaken'd the Common Enemy, and at the ſame Time enrich'd ourſelves.*

Which Propoſition, *p.* 26. he has changed into this: *As we have waſted our Strength and vital Subſtance in this profuſe Manner, ſo we have ſhamefully miſapplied it to Ends at leaſt very different from thoſe for which we undertook the War, and often to effect others, which after a Peace we may ſeverely repent.* If this Author had intended to write with the leaſt Fairneſs, he could not in the Compaſs of a few Pages thus ſhift his Terms, and change the Propoſition to be proved into another; which, inſtead of being the ſame, but in clearer Words, is very different, and much leſs intelligible: For all thoſe big Words of *ſhamefully miſapplying to Ends at leaſt very different from thoſe for which we undertook the War, and often to effect others which we may ſeverely*

ſeverely repent, are ſpoke in the Air, and have no Idea to anſwer them, nor any other Meaning, but that we have gain'd a good *Barrier* for the *Dutch*; as if their Security were not ours as well as theirs, or it were ſafer for us, that the Towns taken in *Flanders* ſhould be in *French* Hands, than in thoſe of the *States*: Which is a very natural Thought for Men in the Intereſt of *France*, but what can never be the Senſe of any good *Engliſhman*.

But to conſider this Charge againſt the late M——y more diſtinctly, theſe two Objections are contain'd in it:

Firſt, That during their Adminiſtration *we ſpent all our Vigour, and waſted our Strength and vital Subſtance in a moſt profuſe Manner*.

Secondly, That *we have purſued the War in that Manner, which could leaſt anſwer the End we propoſed in beginning it*.

Upon the firſt our Author gravely tells us, that *we can ſee no Reaſon from the Words of the Grand Alliance, by which we were obliged to make thoſe prodigious Expences we have been at*; that *by what he has always heard and read, he takes* the whole Strength of a Nation *to be the utmoſt that a Prince can raiſe annually*.

nually. But who beſides himſelf ever imagin'd that *England* made the Efforts it has done this War, purely in virtue of thoſe two Words in the Grand Alliance, *totis viribus, with their whole Strength?* It was not thoſe Words obliged us to this, it was Reaſon and Experience convinced us it was neceſſary to do what we did; we proportion'd our Strength to that of the Enemy, and made ſuch an Increaſe from Time to Time, as would give us a Superiority, without which an offenſive War muſt have been to no Purpoſe. This Author might, upon reading the Grand Alliance with the leaſt Attention, have ſeen, it was not Words but Things made us do what we did; for in the fourth Article of that Alliance, after it is ſaid that the Parties *ſhall aſſiſt each other with all their Forces*, (or all their Strength) it follows, *according to a* Specification *to be agreed upon in a peculiar* Convention *to that Purpoſe, that ſo they may attain the* Satisfaction and Security *before-mentioned*. I cannot but obſerve by the Way, with reſpect to this *Convention*, that the Author pretends, *p.* 42. to give us the preciſe Terms of it, and from thence to accuſe the *Dutch* of breaking it; when it is plain, by what has been reported to the *Commons*, that he

he never ſaw a Word of it. Now it is evident from this Article, that *England* enters into no Engagement but what is reciprocal, and that the *States* and the *Emperor* obliged themſelves to do all they can, as much as *England* did. It is likewiſe evident, that the Proportions firſt ſettled were in virtue of a *Convention* for that Purpoſe; and all ſubſequent Proportions or Augmentations of our Forces have been made by ſubſequent Conventions, in ſuch Manner as the Parties contracting were able, and in ſuch Degree as the Oppoſition of the common Enemy made neceſſary. But by all this Author has ever *heard or read*, the whole Strength of a Nation *is the utmoſt that a Prince can raiſe annually. And therefore if he be forced to* MORTGAGE *or* BORROW, *it is not properly ſpeaking* HIS OWN STRENGTH. And what if it be not? Why then he is not by theſe Words of the Treaty obliged to it. I agree with him: But what then? Shall I not uſe the Strength I want, if I can get it, becauſe it is not properly my own? What trifling is this? I would deſire this Author to tell us, what learned Treatiſes he has read *de totis viribus*, or from whence it is he has extracted theſe fooliſh *Politicks*, which till then I ſhall violently

violently ſuſpect are his own; for ſure no Man of Senſe ever pretended, that in an offenſive War, to reduce the *exorbitant Power* of a formidable Enemy, you muſt not by any Means *borrow Strength*, if what you have of your own be not enough: Which is the ſureſt Way a Nation can take to be deſtroy'd; as will be exceeding evident, by putting a Caſe.

Suppoſe then, two Nations enter into War upon a pretty equal Foot; and while both, in this Author's Language, uſe *their own Strength*, they are ſo well match'd, that neither can get any Advantage of the other. Upon this, one Side increaſe their Forces, by raiſing Money upon Funds of Intereſt, beyond what their annual Income would enable them to do, and by this Means are an Overmatch for the other. What now would this able Writer adviſe the other Side to do? If they do not, they are ſure to be beat, and muſt ſubmit to ſuch Terms as the Victor ſhall impoſe; who, by the Addition he has made to his Strength, is ſo powerful, as not to be withſtood. This then is certain Ruin and Deſtruction: But if, after the Example of the Enemy, the other Side will increaſe their Forces likewiſe, they may bring the Balance on their Side, and by

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an extraordinary Effort ſubdue the Enemy, that will otherwiſe unavoidably ſubdue them. Now in this Caſe a Man muſt be mad, that would ſay this is impolitick, or adviſe againſt it, unleſs he really be in the Intereſt of the Enemy, and deſigns to betray the Side he would ſeem to eſpouſe.

But this is exactly our Caſe. We are engaged in a neceſſary War to reduce the Power of *France*; we ſet out at firſt with a moderate Strength, and at an Expence that may be ſupply'd within the Year; but upon Tryal it is found this won't do; we are at a full Stand, and can make no Impreſſion on the Enemy, who by an artificial *borrow'd* Strength, and by raiſing vaſt Sums beyond what the Taxes of the Year could produce, will become much ſuperior to us, if we do not take the ſame Courſe. What then have we left but to follow their Example, and uſe all the Methods we can to find the Money neceſſary to give us the Superiority? Without which, the Ends for which we went into the War muſt be defeated, the Expence that has been made all loſt, and the exorbitant Power, we intended to reduce, made more exorbitant than before, and will at laſt triumph in the Ruin of us and our Allies: Thus we ſhall loſe the Whole

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for Fear of *mortgaging* a Part. This muſt needs be the Conſequence of this wiſe Counſel, which, under the ſpecious Cover of a prudent Frugality and ſafe Meaſures, is ſo deſtructive and pernicious, that no Nation was ever yet deluded into it; neither our Enemies or Friends have ever yet taken this Advice, no one of our Allies, nor ourſelves hitherto, nor I hope ever ſhall. We muſt either not go to War, or find Ways to be ſuperior to the Enemy; and we cannot be ſo by what is properly our own Strength; we muſt *borrow*, if we can find *Credit*, upon reaſonable Terms, and by Help of that Credit have a reaſonable Proſpect of *Succeſs*, and of attaining ſuch an End of the War, as will anſwer the Expence.

If this Author could prove either that we have not had ſuch *Credit*, or had not ſuch a Proſpect of *Succeſs*, he would prove ſomething; had the late M——y involved the Nation needleſly in Debt, and raiſed Money by *great Præmiums* and *high Intereſt*, and the Money, when ſo raiſed, had been miſapplied, or the War not purſued with Vigour and Succeſs, there might be Reaſon to find Fault: But the contrary to both theſe Suppoſitions is notoriouſly true. If we conſider the State

of *Credit* before the late M——y came in, or what it has been ſince they went out, they are ſo far from deſerving Blame, that it is Matter of great Wonder how they were able to keep up the publick Credit to ſo high a Pitch, during ſo many Years of a moſt extenſive and devouring War: Whereas had the late M——y gone into the ruinous and wicked Meaſures of this weak Writer, the State of our *Credit*, inſtead of being carried to the Pitch it was, would have been lower than it was before, or has been ſince. For the Way he propoſes to find Money for the War, *p.* 25. is what could not fail to break our Credit all at once. It *would have been enough for us*, in his Opinion, *to have ſuſpended the Payment of our Debts contracted in the former War: This, with the Land, and Malt, and ſome other Taxes, would have been ſufficient for all Purpoſes.* And is not this a wiſe Expedient? To *ſuſpend the Payment of our former Debts*: Would any body lend, at reaſonable Intereſt, or indeed upon any Terms, their Money to the Government, when they find former Debts are not paid? How ſhall that vaſt Number of poor People maintain themſelves, whoſe little Fortunes are lent to the Publick, if the publick Payments are ſuſpended? Can he tell

us how a Government can ſubſiſt without the Help of Credit? Or can Credit ſubſiſt upon theſe Terms? Sure no Advice can be more unjuſt to Particulars, or more fatal to Government; and yet our Author is ſo fond of it, that we have ſeveral Hints of this Kind in his Book, which is a very great Diſcouragement to lend at this Juncture, and conſequently a very great Diſſervice to the preſent M——y, when they are under a Neceſſity of borrowing ſuch great Sums to ſupport the War, which is the moſt effectual Way to end it by a good Peace. The late M——y had other Notions of Credit, they were wiſer as well as honeſter than to go into ſuch fatal Counſels; their Conduct in this Point was ſo extraordinary, that they have often had the Thanks of the Nation for it in ſo diſtinguiſhing a Manner, as no M——y ever had before, or perhaps may ever have again.

Nor was the Nation under their Adminiſtration leſs happy in the vigorous Proſecution of the War, as the Event fully ſhews. For if the Enemy offer advantageous Terms of Peace, as we are ſure they did, and we are told do ſtill, this certainly is owing to the Succeſſes we have had againſt them, and thoſe Succeſſes are the Effect of a ſuperior Strength

rightly uſed; and that Superiority of Strength, it is evident, aroſe from the good Condition of our publick Credit, which enabled us to make a great Addition to our natural Strength, that of itſelf was not ſufficient; and the good Condition our Credit was in, was the Reſult of the Fidelity and Abilities of the late M——y. Had they not been wiſe and honeſt, Credit muſt have ſunk; without Credit we could not have had a Strength ſuperior to the Enemy, and without a Superiority we muſt have continued the War without any Proſpect of Succeſs, or ſubmitted early to an ill Peace.

Nothing, therefore, can be more fooliſh Policy, than for a Prince, in the Proſecution of a War, to content himſelf with what he can raiſe annually, without *borrowing*, if the Strength of the Enemy make it neceſſary; nor can any Thing be falſer, than to accuſe the late M——y of waſting our Strength and vital Subſtance in a profuſe Manner; unleſs it could be ſhewn, that a good Peace may be had without Succeſs, or that the Succeſſes we have had, might have been obtained with leſs Strength than we have uſed. The firſt, I preſume, no body ever pretended; the *French* Court may buy good Terms of Peace, but I never

never heard that *good* ones could be bought of them: No, there is but one Way of getting ſuch Terms from *France*, they muſt be beat into them. And this Way has hitherto been practiſed with the greateſt Appearance of Succeſs. Nor is it pretended, except by this Writer, that the ſame Succeſſes might have been had without the Uſe of the ſame Strength. He, indeed, *p.* 29. is of Opinion, that *Forty thouſand Men on the Part of* ENGLAND, *joined to the Quota's of the* Emperor *and* Holland, *would have been enough to withſtand all the Power that* France *could bring againſt them.* I cannot, I confeſs, wonder at our Author's being of this Opinion, that 40,000 Men would be ſufficient, ſince he has told us, *p.* 23, that he makes no Doubt but *Holland* would have been able, with the Aſſiſtance of 10,000 only, to defend their Frontiers; and that after *France* was actually poſſeſſed of them, for *Flanders* is the *Dutch* Frontier, which was treacherouſly given up to *France* before the War: But every body elſe muſt have been convinced by long Experience, that neither Ten nor Forty Thouſand, nor both theſe Numbers together, are ſufficient to *withſtand the Power of FRANCE*, if this Author means by *withſtanding*, making

a vigorous War; which, if he does not, he means nothing: For to ſtand ſtill, and be only on the Defenſive in an offenſive War, is ridiculous, and can end in nothing but a lingering War, drawn into Length to no Purpoſe. To reduce an *exorbitant Power*, the War muſt be puſh'd with Vigour; and to do that, all the Strength both of us and our Allies, the Event ſhews, has been little enough; and had it been managed by a leſs able Hand, it might have ſtill wanted to be encreaſed: For the Superiority we have had, is owing more to the right Uſe that has been made of our Strength, than to the Greatneſs of the Strength itſelf. There is therefore no Pretence to ſay, that our Strength has been *waſted in a profuſe Manner*; leſs Strength would not have done, nor the ſame under the Direction of a leſs able Hand.

There is but one Objection can be made to this, and that is, That though a ſmaller Force would not have done in thoſe Parts where we choſe to puſh the War, yet it may be ſaid, thoſe Parts were ill choſen; that the Scene of the War might and ought to have been laid elſewhere. Which is, in Effect, the ſecond Objection this Author makes to the Conduct of the late M———y, which ſhall immediately

ately be conſider'd: Let me only, to conclude this firſt Point, give this Author in Return a Touch of my *Reading* from a Writer, whom I take to be this Author's great Maſter in *Politicks*, as he was for many Years of the whole Party. In *his Means and Methods of Reſtoring Credit*, he ſays, "That though *it may not* "*perhaps* conſiſt with the publick Good to "create by Law a large Intereſt and Eſtate "to one Part of the People, upon the Goods "and Subſtance of the other; yet Nations "that have had a War too big to be ma-"naged by any Income to be raiſed within "the Year, could not avoid proceeding in "this Manner, and muſt be contented for a "while to pay Taxes to one another; which "may be done without great Miſchief to the "Subjects, provided a due Moderation be ob-"ſerved." And in his *Eſſay upon Univerſal Monarchy*, ſpeaking of *France*, he ſays, "That "as to their Debts and Poverty, they ſeem "to be in the Caſe of a private Man, who "has embroil'd his whole Eſtate to bring "about ſome great Undertaking, in which, if "he ſucceeds, his Fortune is made for ever; "ſo, continual Action and high Deſigns, car-"ried on for near forty Years, have no doubt "very much impoveriſhed the Body of their-

" Kingdoms; but if they proſper, if they " obtain that large Empire, perhaps over the " Whole, to which they have ſo long aſpired, " or if they can only *annex* the *Spaniſh Do-* " *minions* to their Crown, they will be richly " paid for all their paſt Expences."

I leave the Scholar to reconcile his *Politicks de totis viribus* with theſe of his able Maſter, and paſs to his ſecond terrible Objection againſt the late M———y, *That we have purſued the War in that Manner that could leaſt anſwer the End we propoſed in beginning it.* The direct Contrary to which I undertake to prove with the greateſt Evidence, by making good theſe two Propoſitions: Firſt, *That* Flanders *is the only Side on which the Enemy could be attacked with Succeſs upon the Continent.* Secondly, *That it is impracticable to make a vigorous War by Sea, or in the* Weſt-Indies. The firſt of theſe Propoſitions is already proved at large in the Letters of the *Management of the War,* and therefore inſtead of repeating what is there ſaid, I beg Leave to refer the Reader to them; for they have, in my Opinion, exhauſted this Queſtion, and left no Room for any Thing to be ſaid againſt it; at leaſt nothing material has been ſaid yet. From whence we may fairly conclude, nothing

thing can be ſaid; for all the Libels of the Party the laſt Year were filled with this Objection: Whence therefore is it, that they are ſince ſo tame in the Defence of it, but that they find it is wholly defenceleſs? In Truth, no Propoſition in *Euclid* is more clearly proved, than it is there ſhewn, that *Flanders* conſider'd in itſelf, and compared with all the other Scenes of the War, upon the *Rhine*, in *Italy*, and *Spain*, is the moſt proper, or rather the only Part, where the War could be puſh'd with Succeſs; it is the moſt ſenſible Part *France* can be wounded in, not only in the Opinion of all our Allies, but by the Confeſſion of the *French* themſelves, who have been content to neglect all the other Parts of the War, and forgo the Succeſſes they might have expected on every other Side, to guard this ſingle Point; that if they could not keep their Ground on this Side againſt the Allies, they might at leaſt diſpute every Inch of it, and ſell it as dear as they could. Indeed our Author himſelf ſeems to be convinced of this, by what he pretends to ſay againſt it; for he does not offer to give any other Part the Preference to *Flanders*; he does not attempt to prove, that an offenſive War could be made at a cheaper Rate, or with

with more Succeſs on any other Side upon the Continent; and therefore ſo far ſeems to give up the Queſtion: All he ſays amounts only to this, that it is with great Difficulty that *France* is attack'd on the Side of *Flanders*; which is very true, but nothing to the Purpoſe, unleſs he could tell us in which Side it would be leſs difficult; but that he does not pretend to; but inſtead of Reaſon and the Experience of many Years, gives us a Saying of old Duke *Schomberg*'s, that *to engage FRANCE on this Side was to take a a Bull by the Horns:* Be it ſo, but taken him we have, and, if we pleaſe, may keep our Hold, till we have brought him down as low as our common Safety makes it neceſſary he ſhould be. But *ten glorious Campaigns are paſt, and yet we are not in a Condition of bringing FRANCE to our Terms.* To which I anſwer, that had the chief Seat of the War been laid any where elſe, inſtead of ten *glorious* Campaigns, we might before this have been ruin'd by half that Number of *inglorious* ones. And if *France* is not yet brought to our Terms, it is not becauſe the propereſt Methods have not been taken for it, but for other Reaſons I need not name; and notwithſtanding what has paſſed upon another Scene,

to

to the Diſadvantage of the Enemy, I muſt take Leave to affirm, that *Spain* muſt be won through *France*, and that *France* muſt be reduced by a vigorous War in *Flanders*.

Laſt Year, indeed, our Author's Friends were in Appearance of another Mind, and nothing would do, but puſhing the War with Vigour in *Spain*, and the late M----y were greatly blamed for *laying the CAUSE of the War in one Country, and the Seat of it in another*. What has been ſince done towards the Proſecution of the War on that Side, or what is the Opinion of the Nation in this Point upon cooler Thoughts, we all know; nor is it needful to ſay more, ſince our Author himſelf gives it up. But yet he thinks our Succeſſes in *Flanders* are of ſo little Significancy, that *France* can never be reduced this Way. *Do they indeed think*, ſays he, *that a Town taken for the DUTCH is a ſufficient Recompence to us for ſix Millions of Money? Which is of ſo little Conſequence to the Determining the War, that the FRENCH may yet hold out a DOZEN YEARS more, and afford a Town every Campaign at the ſame Price.* But can this Author find a *Dozen* good fortified Towns between *Bouchain* and *Paris?* And if he could, why muſt we take

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but one a Year? Are there two ſuch Towns left as *Mons* and *Tournay*, and were they not both taken in one Campaign, and that the ſhorteſt we have made this War? Is there any one Place left, ſo inacceſſible as *Doway* or *Bouchain* were? Would not one fortunate Day lay open the very Heart of *France* to us, and give Opportunity for the ill Humours to break out, which have been bred in the People by the heavy Oppreſſion and Perſecution they have long groan'd under, and want only a favourable Juncture to diſcover themſelves? And that, in all Probability, would throw Things into that Confuſion, as would not only oblige the Enemy to ſubmit to reaſonable Terms, but might perhaps reſtore the ancient Government of *France*, which would be the beſt Security of a laſting Peace the Allies can have, and the greateſt Advantage to the *Proteſtant* Intereſt its Friends could wiſh for. But I cannot expreſs the happy Situation our Affairs are in on the Side of *Flanders*, and how very near we are reducing *France* to Reaſon, if the War there be vigorouſly purſued, better than in the Words of the *Petition of the Council of State to the States General* lately publiſhed. *The Army of the Allies*, ſay they, " advancing as it were but one Step from the

" neareſt

" neareſt Frontier, and performing only one " proper and good Exploit, may penetrate to " the Source of the *Schelde*, the *Soam*, and " the *Oyſe*, and ſo on to the *Seine*, and to the " very Capital of the Kingdom, as former- " ly the *Spaniards* might have done, after " the Battle of St. *Quentin*, had not the *ſel-* " *fiſh Views and Paſſions* of ſome Perſons " prevailed above the plaineſt Reaſons of " State."

But where now are the *dozen Years* our Author dreams of? When he or his Friends underſtand Foreign Affairs ſo well as the *Dutch*, or can pen any Thing ſo well as the *Petitions of their Council of State*, their Libels may deſerve ſome Credit upon theſe Subjects; and if they have none till then, we are ſure we are ſafe, and all they can ſay, can never delude us to our Hurt, or make us take up with an ill Peace, when the Power of a good one is ſo near, and in our Hands.

But there are two or three other Intimations, in what this Author ſays of the *Flanders* War, that muſt not be wholly paſs'd by. Firſt, he would inſinuate, that our whole Strength is employ'd in *Flanders*; better perhaps it were ſo: But this is ſo far from being the Caſe, that the War in *Spain* and *Savoy* coſts

coſts a great deal more than that in *Flanders* does. And it is not a Third of the ſix Millions that is ſpent in that Service: Again, this Expence is not made to take a ſingle Town, but to ſave all the weak Parts of the Alliiance, which the *Flanders* War has done effectually, and to wound the Enemy in the moſt ſenſible Part, in order to make them think of Peace in Earneſt; which Effect all the World ſees it has; and whatever Expence we are at to gain a Town, the Loſing of it coſts the Enemy a great deal more. Another Thing this Writer often inſinuates is, that it is *We*, that is *England* that gains their Towns, and not the *Dutch*; which is ſo ridiculous a Notion, that it is a Wonder to me, how any body above the Vulgar can fall into it. They, indeed, fancy it is *Engliſh* Blood and *Engliſh* Money does every Thing, and that this Taking of ſo many Towns puts us to a vaſt Expence, which otherwiſe would be ſaved. But how very ſilly is all this Talk? Does not every body know, that the Queen's *own Troops* are not a tenth Part of the whole Confederate Army? That our Proportion of the Troops employ'd in a Siege are ſeldom above five or ſix Battalions in 30 or 40? That it is the *States* and not *England* are at the prodigious Expence

Expence of *Ammunition* and *Artillery* that have been employ'd and ſpent in the Sieges we have made? And when a Town is taken, how can it be ſaid to be taken for the *Dutch* only? Though it is plain they are moſt properly the Takers of it. If it be made a Part of the *Frontier*, we have our Security in it, as truly as they, while they are at all the Expence of keeping it; and if it be not made a Part of the *Frontier*, but be given up again to *France*, neither they nor we are the better for it, otherwiſe than as ſuch a Conqueſt has contributed to bring the Enemy to Reaſon. But once for all, with reſpect to the Towns taken in *Flanders*, I would deſire this Author to tell us, what Part he would have us take? Can the Enemy be reduced without taking Towns from them, and breaking into their Frontier? Can they be taken without Sieges? Or can Sieges be made without Expence? Can this Expence be made with greater Eaſe to *England* than it is? Is not our Expence for the Campaign much the ſame, whether any Siege be made or not? But if Sieges muſt be made, and Towns taken, what would this Author have us do with them? Shall we reſtore them again to *France*, or leave them to a Power, that is not able to defend them, as

we

we are, by the Experience of fifty Years, aſſured? Or ſhall we keep a Part of them ourſelves, for no other Uſe, but to have at a great Expence, a Pretence for keeping up a great body of Troops? If none of theſe Ways are eligible or practicable, there is nothing remains but to leave them to the *Dutch*, by which Means we ſhall have the Advantage of a good *Frontier* without the Expence of it. And none but a Partiſan of *France* can be in other Sentiments, or be capable of thinking that it is better for us the Towns in Queſtion ſhould be in *French* Hands, than in thoſe of our good Allies the *States*; the Contrary to which always has been, and, I am perſuaded always will be the Senſe of this Nation, in Spite of the vain Jealouſies ſome Men with ſo much Pains endeavour to infuſe.

But it is Time to leave this Argument, and with it all the Scenes of Action upon the Continent, and to conſider what this Author ſays of a War carried on by Sea, and in the *Weſt-Indies*. But I muſt firſt take Notice of his wiſe Remarks upon the War in *Spain*: *This War*, ſays he, *muſt be imputed to the Credulity of the Miniſters, who ſuffer'd themſelves to be perſuaded by the* IMPERIAL *Court, that the whole Kingdom would revolt upon the Appearance*

pearance of the Archduke. But firſt, we were not perſuaded into this Belief by the *Imperial* Court, but both the *Imperial* Court and our's were perſuaded into it, by the *Almirante of Caſtile*, the *Count de Cifuentes*, and other Grandees that were true *Spaniards*, and in the *Auſtrian* Intereſt; and one of them went to *Vienna* himſelf. And though it was at our Importunity that the *Imperial* Court were prevail'd on to part with the Archduke, and declare him King of *Spain*, to which the then Emperor ſhew'd a great deal of Reluctance; yet our Miniſters did not act in this a *credulous* Part: They govern'd themſelves in this War by the Opinion of thoſe who were upon the Spot; who were by that Means beſt able to judge, and who were in Point of Intereſt moſt concern'd to judge rightly. And nothing is more fooliſh than to judge of Things by the Event only, or more unjuſt than to give the odious Name of *Credulity* to a Perſuaſion grounded upon as much Certainty, as the Nature of Things, while future, can well admit of.

Well, but *we tried, and found we were deceived, yet drove on the War at a prodigious Diſadvantage with great Expence.* This is by no Means ſo.---The War in *Catalonia* was

till the Battle of *Almanza* carried on either at a great Expence, or great Diſadvantage: It was ſo far from being diſadvantageous to us, that our firſt Succeſs gave us Poſſeſſion of all *Catalonia*, of which the Enemy has not, with all their Efforts, been able to diſpoſſeſs us ſince. And the Expence was no more than was abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve the Conqueſt, or Revolution rather, that was made in that *Principality*. And had not ſome Perſons been ſtrangely wanting in their Duty, the Care that was taken to ſupport our firſt Succeſs, had the next Year put us into Poſſeſſion of the whole *Monarchy*. So far therefore there is no Reaſon to complain of that War, or the Expence it occaſioned; which would have been Money as well laid out as any the Nation ever ſpent, had not the fatal Meaſures taken, after raiſing the Siege of *Barcelona*, defeated all our Hopes, when the whole Kingdom, in a Manner, was in our Hands. Our Author, indeed, imputes this to the *corrupt Management of the M——y, that my Lord* P—— *was left wholly unſupported, expoſed to the Envy of his Rivals, diſappointed by the Caprices of a young experienced Prince, under the Guidance of a rapacious* German *M———y, and at laſt called Home in Diſcontent*;

content; *by which our Armies were made a Sacrifice to Avarice, ill Conduct, and Treachery.* To the great Number of Lies contained in theſe few Words, I anſwer, that my Lord *P.* was not left *unſupported*, as appears by his own Letters, in which he owns, That *he had nothing to tax the late M——y with, for they had well ſupported him both with Men and Money.* But I can tell him who was left unſupported in the Neighbourhood of *Madrid*, for ſix Weeks together, and at laſt was joined with but two *Spaniſh* Regiments of Dragoons, and Part of an *Engliſh* one; when the Remainder of that, two other entire ones, and thirteen Battalions of *Engliſh* Foot were left behind. This was the General who had Reaſon to complain, that he was left *unſupported*, and *expoſed to the Envy of his Rivals*: For had that Expedition been crowned with Succeſs, the Glory had been chiefly his; and for that Reaſon, I preſume, it did not ſucceed. As to the King of *Spain*, I ſhould think this Author, as great an Enemy as he is to Decency and good Manners, ſhould of all Words not have applied *Caprices* to that Prince; who was never by any body elſe accuſed of Giddineſs, Irreſolution, and ſome other Qualities which that Word denotes:

Which properly belong to a certain General that this King had once the Misfortune to be troubled with; the Hero of this Author and his Faction, whom they have ſometimes had the Impudence to compare to the D. of *M.* himſelf. As to the laſt Part of this memorable Sentence, it muſt fall, if any where, on my Lord *G——y*, who ſucceeded to the Command upon the other's being recalled. But to ſhew that this Writer not only never cares what he ſays of any body, but that he never has any Knowledge of the Perſons he is ſpeaking of, he accuſes that noble Lord of Avarice, Treachery, and ill Conduct, who left a great Fortune to preſerve his Conſcience, and gives Half of the Little he ſtill enjoys, among his ſuffering Countrymen; whoſe Honour and Fidelity was never queſtioned, but by ſuch Men as have no Notion of either; and whoſe Conduct, though he once was unfortunate, has been juſtified in a late * Book beyond all Poſſibility of Contradiction; and has been ſo often approved by her Majeſty herſelf, that upon this Account at leaſt our Author ſhould not have made ſo bold with it.

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* *An Impartial Account of the late War in* Spain.

But

But to go on : *We ſhould either have puſhed that War with the utmoſt Vigour in ſo fortunate a Juncture, or have kept on the defenſive, and not gone on in ſo expenſive a Management.* I anſwer, the War was puſhed with the utmoſt Vigour on the Part of the late M——y. Upon the firſt News of the Siege of *Barcelona* being raiſed, they immediately prepared a Reinforcement of Ten Thouſand Men, though they were ſo long detained by contrary Winds, that they did not ſail from *Torbay* till *October*, and did not reach *Catalonia* till *February* following. I would be glad to know, what is puſhing a War with Vigour at ſuch a Diſtance, if this be not; or what has been done like it ſince the Battle of *Saragoſſa*, under the new M——y, though *Spain* was ſo earneſtly recommended to their particular Care, and was in ſo great Want of ſome ſpeedy Help; and though laſt Year, the firſt of the new M——y, Fifteen Hundred Thouſand Pounds was given for it, with what Succeſs I need not ſay. But the whole Affair of the War in *Spain* is by the Author of the Book juſt mentioned, ſet in ſo full a Light, that a Man muſt be paſt Conviction, who cannot be convinced by that Book; or if he be con-

vinced himſelf, he muſt be loſt to all Shame, that can impoſe on People ſuch groſs Falſities, after they have been ſo fully detected. Sure, Men cannot be long deluded amidſt ſo much Light. A Book writ with ſo much Clearneſs, Solidity and Evidence, muſt have its Weight with Men, if they will but open their Eyes; but, if not, it will at leaſt tranſmit to Poſterity in their true Colours both Men and Things, which, in the ſhort-liv'd Libels of the preſent Times, are ſo ſhamefully miſrepreſented.

But to ſhew that the War in general has been purſued in that Manner that was moſt likely to anſwer the Ends of it, I proceed now to the ſecond Propoſition I undertook to prove; That *it is impracticable to make a vigorous War by Sea, or in the* Weſt-Indies.

Our Author wonders, *Page* 30. how it came to paſs, that the very *Stile of MARITIME POWERS, by which, in a contemptuous Manner, we are coupled with the* DUTCH, *did never put us in Mind of the SEA, and that the* WEST-INDIES *ſhould never come into their Heads.* He thinks *if we had contented ourſelves with our firſt Supply of* 40,000 *Men for* FLANDERS, *we might*

might have employ'd the reſt much better in Expeditions to the WEST-INDIES, *both for the Common Cauſe and our own Advantage.* It is great Pity ſo able a Stateſman has not given us his Scheme more diſtinctly, and told us what Numbers of Forces ſhould have been maintained in *Portugal* and *Catalonia*, and what Sums allow'd for thoſe Services; how much ſhould be expended in Deſcents upon *France* or *Spain*; what Numbers of Ships, and how many Troops he would have for the *Weſt-Indies*, with an Eſtimate of the annual Charges. If our Author had but form'd his Scheme himſelf, and drawn it into Particulars, I believe it would have carried its own Condemnation along with it, and we ſhould never have been troubled to give an Anſwer to it, or it might have been done with great Eaſe. Schemes, while in Paper only and in Generals, are very pretty Things; but when deduced into Facts, and we deſcend to Particulars, and attend diſtinctly to the ſeveral Parts, innumerable Difficulties ariſe, which before did not appear. The viſionary Expeditions this Author recommends to the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, are a little like the Voyages of *Aſtronomers* to the *World of the Moon*, where ſome of them have figured out to

themſelves very fine Countries; and ſome half-witted Folks have been very fond of the Journey, but all Men of Skill have laugh'd at it as impracticable. Beſides, the *Moon* is a Body, which the more they conſider and ſee of it, the more it puzzles them; and it is much the ſame with the unknown World of the *Weſt-Indies*, for ſo the *Spaniſh* Parts of it are to us. It is as fine a Country as any can be imagin'd in the *Moon*; there is an infinite deal of Gold and Silver to tempt us; and if we can get a good Share, it would be of vaſt Advantage to us, and put an effectual End to the War: Why then ſhould not we try? It is very eaſy to take theſe Mines over a Bottle, it is by the Map but ſo many Leagues to them; a good Imagination can readily conceive the whole Deſign, calculate exactly the Charge of ſuch an Enterprize, embark Troops at the proper Seaſon, arrive at the Nick of Time, beat all before them, beſiege and take Towns and Ports; and, in ſhort, do every Thing that is needful to make a compleat Conqueſt. Nothing ſo eaſy as to form ſuch imaginary Schemes; and they have, I doubt not, been often form'd when the Head was hot; but they will vaniſh with the Fumes of Wine, and a ſober Man, if he be not a little

Lunatick,

Lunatick, will ſoon find they are impracticable.

The ſame able Politicians, who can ſo readily talk you into an Expedition to the *Indies*, do the ſame Feats every Day in Matters nearer Home, where it is much more eaſy not to be deceived. They can, upon a Map of *Flanders*, ſteal Marches, paſs Rivers, and ſurprize the Enemy as often as they pleaſe, eſpecially if they have five or ſix honeſt Fellows to ſecond them, who having been in the Service, and perhaps in ſome Degree of Confidence with the General, can let them into ſome important Secrets, and make it evident, that if they had been in the D. of *M.*'s Place, they would have done as much again, and have been long ſince at the Gates of *Paris*: Not that if we were there, nay if *Paris were ours, would it be any Allay to our perſonal Sufferings at Home*, as a great Author is pleaſed to tell us; no more than the Winning a Battle or Taking a Town is any Satisfaction to thoſe who loſe their Lives or Limbs in the Service. A noble Argument to put an End to a War at any Rate; which, if ended ill, will ſoon put an End to us, and to every Thing we can think valuable!

But to be ſerious; if we lay aſide theſe viſionary

ſionary Schemes, and conſider Things coolly and diſtinctly, it is no hard Matter to ſee that a ſucceſsful War by Sea is utterly impracticable; and that is the true Reaſon ſo little of that Kind has been attempted by the late M———y. It was not becauſe they did not think of the Sea; they did not want to be put in Mind of it by the Stile of *Maritime Powers*; an Expreſſion, which no Mortal before this Author was ever malicious enough to take Offence at: No, they often thought of it, but were always diſappointed or diſcouraged, Witneſs the unſucceſsful Expedition to *Cadiz* the firſt Year of the War, and the ſecond to *Guadalupa*; which was intended to be puſhed farther, but for Want of Men and Officers, eſpecially the laſt, was forced to be laid aſide: Witneſs the ſeveral Deſcents attempted on the Coaſt of *France*, and other deſigned Expeditions to the *Indies*, which have, by contrary Winds, been ſo long retarded, that they have not been able to be carried one Step from our own Coaſt, and no Remembrance has been left of them, but the Expence they have put us to. This ſhews ſufficiently the Sea was not forgot; it was often thought of, but it is ſo difficult an Element,

ment, that it has generally been to very little Purpoſe.

But to examine this Matter a little more diſtinctly, and take a View of the ſeveral Things that muſt concur to a ſucceſsful Expedition to the *Weſt-Indies*; till we had beat the Navy of *France*, we could not think of ſending any conſiderable Squadron ſo far from Home, ſince that would leave ourſelves too much expoſed. For the three firſt Campaigns therefore of the War, this was not to be thought of; and even after that, when the Ships neceſſary to guard our own Coaſt, and protect our Trade, and maintain a Superiority on the Coaſt of *Portugal* and in the *Mediterranean*, are taken out of the Number; there will not be any left for any great Enterprize. And if there were, I preſume, even this Author does not think any great Number of Troops could be embark'd for ſuch an Expedition. Our Tranſportations to *Portugal* and *Catalonia* ſhew the Embarkation of Troops to be a more difficult as well as more expenſive Thing, than thoſe who have not tried would think it is. And therefore I believe our Author would hardly propoſe ſending above Ten Thouſand Men, which muſt be all Foot; for no body can think it practicable

cable to ſend any Number of *Horſe* ſo long a Voyage; during which, if a Storm happens, as it is Odds but there does more than one, all of them will be thrown over-board, before they reach their deſtin'd Port; and of theſe Ten Thouſand Men, it is well if two Thirds are at the End of their Voyage fit for Service. But if they are, what ſhall they do? Shall they go as Enemies or Friends? The laſt is practicable on no other Foot, but on a Suppoſition of Succeſs in *Spain*. Could King *Charles* have ever kept for any While Poſſeſſion of *Madrid*, it was always deſign'd to iſſue Orders from *Old Spain* to demand the Submiſſion of the *New*, and that theſe Orders ſhould be back'd with a Squadron and Troops; for which Purpoſe our Admirals had ſuitable Inſtructions, that no Time might be loſt by waiting for Orders from *England*, and fitting out a Squadron from hence. And as ſoon as King *Charles* was Maſter of *Barcelona*, which gave us Hopes of a farther Revolution in Favour of him, in *December* 1705, the M——y ſent to my Lord *P. a Declaration of the Emperor for the* Weſt-Indies, and *full Powers of the Emperor's Commiſſioners to the* Weſt-Indies, to ſerve as Hints for King *Charles*, whenever he

he ſhould find it proper to take Part in that Matter: For the Truth of which, I refer myſelf to Sir *Ch. H.*'s Letter in the *Impartial Enquiry*, p. 64. But the King had not the good Fortune to be in Circumſtances to make Uſe of theſe Powers or Commiſſion; and therefore to go to the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies* under the Notion of Friends, and ſummon them to acknowledge and obey King *Charles*, would have been a mere Farce: If therefore we go, we muſt go as Enemies. Let us now ſee what we could do in that Character.

Now that muſt neceſſarily be one of theſe three Things: We muſt either attempt to poſſeſs ourſelves of ſome of their Ports, or to deſtroy them, or content ourſelves with making a *Piratical* War, to act meerly as Privateers, and infeſt the *Spaniſh* Seas to interrupt their Trade. But the firſt of theſe, I am humbly of Opinion, we could not do; nor if we could, would it give us Poſſeſſion of their Mines; without which, having a Port would be of no Uſe to us. To take a Port in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, and keep Poſſeſſion of it, requires not only a much greater Quantity of Proviſions than a bare Voyage thither would, but likewiſe ſufficient Stores to provide the Place when taken, for the Subſiſtence of the Troops, till a new Supply

ply of Proviſions can be ſent; for they are ſure to find little or nothing upon the Place, which naturally yields little, and what there is, the Enemy will remove or deſtroy. But to furniſh ſuch a Supply, takes up a great deal of Time; whether it comes from *England*, or our own Plantations; which laſt cannot furniſh any great Quantity at a ſhort Warning, nor otherwiſe than at exceſſive high Prices; and what is to come from *England*, is by contrary Winds expoſed to too great Uncertainties to be depended on. How then can our Troops, ſuppoſe they ſhould make themſelves Maſters of a *Spaniſh* Port, be able to ſubſiſt in the Poſſeſſion of it? Beſides, to maintain ſuch a Conqueſt, they muſt likewiſe have a much greater Quantity of Ammunition than is wanted merely for a Bombardment or a Siege; ſince they muſt expect to be beſieged in their Turns, and therefore muſt be in a Condition of Defence. But if ſuch Quantities of Ammunition and Proviſion, as ſuch a Conqueſt makes neceſſary, could be had, where are the Men? The Ten Thouſand that firſt ſet out, it is probable, at the End of their Voyage won't be Seven Thouſand effective; and if the Siege ſhould be of any Continuance, the Kill'd and Wounded will

will ſoon exceed Two Thouſand; and after a long Voyage, it is Odds but the Fleet may want ſome Hands to bring it back. So that there will hardly be Four Thouſand left to defend the Place; and though no malignant Diſtempers ſhould get among them, which is very common in thoſe Parts, in the natural Courſe of Things, theſe Troops will moulder away inſenſibly, and be reduced to a very ſmall Number, before they could be reinforced. The Enemy, in the mean Time, will ſpare no Pains to diſpoſſeſs them of their new Conqueſt; which they will have all the Opportunity to do that can be, being poſſeſs'd of all the Country round about, by which Means they can want nothing that is neceſſary; and if they did, they could be ſupplied from *France* more eaſily than our Troops could be from *England*, ſince our firſt Convoy will have made a ſecond more difficult in every Point, with reſpect to Men, and Ships, and Stores, and Money; and if all theſe could be found as ſoon in *England* as in *France*, they are leſs liable to be ſtopt by Winds than we, and have ſomething a ſhorter Paſſage, and can conceal both their Motions and the Strength of what they ſend, till it is too late for us to take the neceſſary Meaſures to prevent them,

them, or to be ſuperior to them. So that I do not ſee how it is poſſible to ſupport ſuch a Conqueſt if it were made, unleſs all our Attention were turn'd that Way, and we ſent ſo great a Fleet to the *Indies*, as to leave ourſelves quite defenceleſs at Home, which the *French* would know how to make a better Uſe of, than to follow us.

But ſuppoſe we could keep Poſſeſſion, which I take to be impoſſible, what Uſe would it be of? Are the Mines we want, in their Ports, do we think, or juſt upon the Coaſt? No ſuch Matter, they are a great Way up in the Country, and we are ne'er the nearer for being in Poſſeſſion of a Port; we could not oblige them to trade with us, we muſt do all by Force; and what would be the Conſequence of that? The Natives would in a Land-Expedition againſt them, probably be too hard for us by their great Numbers; and if they were in any Doubt they ſhould not, they would run away, where we could not follow; and their Mines, for Want of Hands to work them, would be wholly uſeleſs to us. So that which-ever Way we turn ourſelves, ſuch a Deſign could not ſucceed: We could not keep Poſſeſſion of a Port; nor if we could, could that give us the Trade;

nor

nor could we by Force make ourſelves Maſters of their Mines to any Purpoſe. But if a Port would not give us the Trade, yet it may be ſaid, it would deprive the *Spaniards* of it, and conſequently hinder *France* of thoſe Supplies, which have enabled them to ſupport the War ſo long. But why ſo? Does any body think, there is but one Port in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies?* Let them look into a Map, and they will ſee if one Paſſage be ſtopt, they have enow left open to carry on their Trade. This Project therefore can neither diſtreſs them, nor enrich ourſelves.

Let us now ſee, in the ſecond Place, what we ſhould get by an Expedition deſign'd to deſtroy any of their Ports. This muſt be allow'd to be more feaſible, but yet very difficult, and of no Uſe, but rather a Prejudice to us. For, firſt, ſuch an Expedition on our Part could hardly be concealed from the *French*; the very Nature of our Government makes it more difficult for any great Deſign to be concerted with Secrecy with us, than it is with them; beſides, there is ſuch a Faction among us devoted to their Intereſt, that they never want Spies to give them the earlieſt Intelligence of all we do. Nor is it poſſible the neceſſary Preparations can be made for ſuch

an Expedition, without giving the Enemy a Suſpicion of the Nature at leaſt of our Deſign, though the Particulars of it ſhould not be known; and upon that they will diſpatch Notice to all their Ports to be upon their Guard, and prepare themſelves a Squadron to watch our Motions. If the Preparations we make are proportion'd to the Deſign, the Suſpicion they give will be little ſhort of a Diſcovery; and if to conceal the Deſign, the Preparations are not proportion'd to it, it is next to impoſſible it ſhould ſucceed. But the *Repreſentation* of the Commons laſt Seſſions ſuggeſts to me another Objection, which I think unanſwerable, againſt the Poſſibility of carrying on ſuch a Deſign with the neceſſary Secrecy; and that is, that *they declare it to be illegal and a dangerous Invaſion of the Rights of Parliament, to enlarge the Service beyond the Bounds preſcribed by Parliament:* They condemn *the Applying of even unappropriated Money to Uſes not voted or addreſs'd for by Parliament, and judge it to be a Miſapplication of Publick Money*; and this without any Exception, though the Service were ſudden and extraordinary, and no Parl——t were ſitting at the Time, and by that Means it be impoſſible their Concurrence ſhould be had.

Now if no Money may be applied to Uſes not voted or addreſs'd for, then if any Sea-Expedition be intended, it muſt be laid before the Parl——t: Where then is the neceſſary Secrecy?

For theſe Reaſons, I cannot but think it is very difficult that any Enterprize againſt the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, though it were only to deſtroy a Port or Town upon the Coaſt, ſhould ſucceed: But if it could, what would the Publick be the better for it? The Officers perhaps, that ſurvived the Service, would be well recompenſed, and might return laden with rich Plunder; and if they were kinder to their Men than they were at *Port St. Maries*, the private Soldiers perhaps might have a little Share. But what is this to the Nation? What Compenſation is this for the very great Expence ſuch an Expedition coſts? What Amends for the Loſs of ſo many Men, as are conſtantly devour'd by theſe Services, or for the Ships that are ſure to be very much damaged by ſuch a Voyage, if not deſtroy'd? What Satisfaction is the Booty of a few Officers, if our Ships in their Return, when very foul and ill-mann'd, ſhould be met by a clean Squadron of the Enemy? To bombard, or plunder, or deſtroy a Port in the *Weſt-Indies*,

is dearer Work than *breaking Glaſs Windows with Half-Crowns*; which was ſaid once of an unſucceſsful Bombardment of *Namur*. For it is of no Advantage to ourſelves, and the Damage done the Enemy is very inſignificant: The poor Inhabitants may be ruin'd perhaps, but the Enemy in general loſes nothing by it, nor will the War end one Day the ſooner for it. But that is not the worſt of it: Such an Expedition would not only be of no Advantage to us, but might be really a very great Prejudice, not only in waſting our Men and Money and Shipping to no Purpoſe, but in another Senſe; it would infallibly alienate the Minds of the *Spaniards*, and create the greateſt Averſion to us in thoſe who, we hoped, were favourably inclined to a Revolution. It was upon the Aſſurances we had of their Diſpoſitions to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, that we were encouraged to carry the War into *Spain*, which we did not pretend to reduce by Force of Arms; and while we had ſuch Expectations, nothing could be more abſurd than to attempt to diſturb their Settlements in the *Weſt-Indies*; that muſt needs have created in them an irreconcilable Averſion to the *Engliſh*, and conſequently to the Cauſe we are the chief Support of. This, I ſay, would have been

been the Conſequence of attempting to deſtroy any of their Ports in the *Weſt-Indies*, though we had not ſucceeded; and if the *Spaniards* have not appear'd ſo well inclined to us, as we were made to expect, perhaps it is owing to nothing ſo much as to what we did of this Kind in our memorable Expedition againſt *Cadiz*, or rather againſt *Port St. Maries*; by which Name both we and the *Spaniards* have moſt Reaſon to remember it.

The laſt Thing we could propoſe by theſe Expeditions to the *Indies*, is to act the Part of *Privateers*, and infeſt thoſe Seas, in order to intercept their Galleons, or interrupt their Trade. And this, indeed, ſeems to be what our Author chiefly has in View. For the Trade the *French* carried on in thoſe Parts, he ſays, *we tamely ſaw and ſuffer'd without the leaſt Attempt to hinder it, except what was perform'd by ſome private Men at* Briſtol, *who, with a few Veſſels fitted out at their own Charge, made a moſt ſucceſsful Voyage into thoſe Parts.* And what then? How does this *ſhew us what might have been done with the like Management by a publick Undertaking?* Can a *Fleet* do what a few *Privateers* can? Can a conſiderable Squadron of Men of War

be as eaſily ſupplied with Neceſſaries, or give the Enemy as little Suſpicion of their Deſign at ſetting out, as two or three private Ships from *Briſtol?* Or can they keep the Sea as long, or ſail as well, or hinder their Diſperſion by a Storm? Can they, when they are in thoſe Seas, take their Opportunity, and go out upon as ſhort Warning? Can their Motions be as much unobſerved? Can they ſteal in and out of Port as they pleaſe, or skulk about the proper Stations with as little Danger of Diſcovery? If all this be Nonſenſe, as it is in my humble Opinion, then there is no Arguing from the Succeſs of a few *Privateers*, to what a Squadron of *Men of War* might do. One may as well imagine an Army can move as readily, as ſecretly, and as nimbly, as a Handful of private Men; as fancy a Fleet can do what two or three ſmall Ships can. What can be done of this Kind, muſt be done by a very few Ships, and that has been done. We have always had ſome Men of War in the *Weſt-Indies*, which have given Umbrage to the Enemy, and ſometimes have had the good Fortune to fall in with their *Galleons*; and we may remember when a very good Account would have been given of them, if every body had done their Duty.

But

But a large Squadron could not have done the ſame Thing; their Motions would have been known, or at leaſt ſo much ſuſpected, that the Enemy would not have put to Sea, while there was any Danger from them: It is very great Odds whether we could, in many Years, with a Fleet take their Galleons; all we could promiſe ourſelves, with any Certainty, would be to interrupt their Commerce; wholly hinder it we could not, ſince they are not obliged to take one *Route*, and if they had but a ſingle Port, we may ſee from what we have often tried before *Dunkirk*, how hard it is to block up a Port effectually; they have got out, even while we have lain before it, or taken their Opportunity, whenever Water or Proviſions or high Winds have obliged us to remove for a little While from them. How then can we expect to hinder wholly the Commerce to the *Indies*, where they have ſo many Ports, and where our own are at ſo much Diſtance, as to give them abundant Time to get in or out, before we can go back to any Port of our own and return?

It is plain, nothing can be hoped for but an Interruption of their Trade, and that has been made by the few Ships we have had in

thoſe Seas. The Returns of their Galleons have neither been ſo rich nor ſo regular as they would be in Time of Peace. In ſhort, all that a great Number of Ships could do, may be and has been done by a few; and to employ more, would by no Means anſwer the Expence, which would be exceeding great. And I appeal to all Experience, if Expeditions into thoſe Seas have not generally proved the Ruin both of Men and Ships. This is ſo known, that it is almoſt impoſſible to find Men or Officers for this Service, for they think they are going to be ſacrificed; which obliges the Government, in all Embarkations for the *Indies*, to conceal as much as poſſible the Deſign from the Men till they are put on board, which otherwiſe could not be done without the greateſt Difficulty; for the *Indies* is to them as bad as certain Death, and they go thither with as much Reluctancy. And for the Officers, there is ſcarce a Man, who does not uſe all the Intereſt he can make to be excuſed; and if that cannot be, if he can poſſibly find Bread any other Way, he will throw up his Commiſſion. All this is notorious Fact: And is it not a great Crime in the late M——y, that they did not put our beſt Troops on this ungrateful Service, and run madly

madly into theſe expenſive and in Truth deſtructive Expeditions; which, whatever View we conſider them in, it is plain could never turn to any good Account?

It was for theſe Reaſons the late M——y did not go into this Author's viſionary Schemes for the *Weſt-Indies*; not *becauſe the Sea was not the D. of* M.'s *Element, or that the* Dutch *would have been uneaſy at it.* The firſt is mere Calumny, and the laſt groſly miſrepreſented. If they were uneaſy, it was becauſe they were convinced ſuch Expeditions could not anſwer the Deſign of them, and promote the common Intereſt, not becauſe they envied *England* the Advantage of ſuch an Enterprize. This could not poſſibly be the Reaſon of their Uneaſineſs, ſince they have the ſame Right to the Advantages that may be made by theſe Expeditions with ourſelves, by the Terms of the Grand Alliance; by the ſixth Article of which it is ſtipulated, *That it ſhall be lawful for* England *and* Holland *by common Advice, and for the Benefit of Navigation and Commerce, to ſeize what they can in the* Spaniſh Weſt-Indies; *and whatſoever they ſhall ſo take, ſhall be their own.* If therefore theſe Expeditions were, in the Opinion of the *Dutch*, ſo very advantageous, they would be

as

as forward to come into them as we can be, ſince they have as good a Right; and for the ſame Reaſon they decline them themſelves, they would diſſuade us from them, becauſe they think no Good can come of them, and that they would only ſerve to drain our Wealth, and divert our Strength from thoſe Parts, where it might be uſed to very good Purpoſe, to employ it where it would be thrown away; and I believe they ſee no Reaſon yet to alter their Judgment. But to proceed:

What I have ſaid, I ſhould hope, might ſatisfy impartial Men that theſe Sea-Expeditions are impracticable; but becauſe my Author is not of that Number, I ſhall confirm it by two Arguments that will have great Weight with him; one taken from the *French*, and the other from the *New M——y*. And firſt, for the *French*: If it be ſo eaſy, ſo cheap, ſo practicable, ſo uſeful a Service to diſturb the *Spaniſh* Settlements, and either to take or deſtroy their Ports, or to interrupt their Trade; I would humbly ask, why the *French* have not all this War turn'd their Force this Way, to diſturb the Settlements of the *Engliſh* or the *Portugueſe*; eſpecially the laſt, which would at the ſame Time have been a moſt ſenſible Blow to us? Is it harder

or

or more expenſive for the *French* to make ſuch an Expedition than it is for us; or, are the *Portugueſe* abler in any Way to defend their Settlements againſt the *French*, than the *French* and *Spaniards* are to defend the *Spaniſh Indies* againſt us? Juſt the contrary; it is in all Reſpects much eaſier for the *French* to annoy the *Portugueſe* Plantations, than for us to annoy the *Spaniſh*. But as eaſy as it is comparatively, it is ſo hard, ſo impracticable, that the King of *France* has, till this laſt Year, thought he could employ his Men and Money to better Purpoſe. And this Argument taken from the wiſe Counſels of their favourite Monarch, will, I hope, with ſome Men plead ſtrongly in Favour of the late M------y, and convince them that theſe Expeditions were not forgot or neglected, but laid aſide upon mature Conſideration, to purſue more uſeful Services.

This laſt Year, indeed, the *French* have, in this Part, ſeem'd to differ from themſelves, by undertaking an Enterprize againſt *Brazil*: But if we enquire into the Occaſion of this Expedition, at whoſe Expence it was made, of what Force it conſiſted, and reflect on its Succeſs, as it is related in their own Accounts; we ſhall ſee, it is no Argument of their

their being grown wiſer, nor find in this Example any Encouragement for us to do the like. For as for the Occaſion of it, it is more than probable, that our own Expedition gave Birth to it; and that their principal Deſign was to watch our Motions, if, as was ſuſpected, we had made any Attempt in thoſe Seas. At leaſt our Expedition, join'd to ſome other Things I need not mention, made them pretty ſecure, that we ſhould neither ſend any Squadron after them, nor take the Advantage of their Abſence to inſult their own Coaſts; neither of which Points they could at all be ſecure of in former Years. And as to the Charge of this Expedition, it was not made at the King's Expence: He had Occaſions for his Money, where he thought it better employ'd. This Project therefore had never been undertaken, if private Perſons, in Hopes of being great Gainers, had not advanced the Money neceſſary for it; which, though it amounted to a very conſiderable Sum, and no leſs than eighteen Men of War were employ'd for this Service, the whole Force they carried was not Four Thouſand Men. And then for the Succeſs, what is it all come to? It was great Odds but they had miſcarried before they had landed, if by the

Negligence

Negligence of the *Portugueſe*, and by the Favour of a great Fog, they had not enter'd the Bay almoſt before they were obſerved. And after that, if the *Portugueſe* had made any tolerable Defence, they either could not have landed, or muſt have ſoon been obliged to retire to their Ships; or rather, they would have had no Ships to retire to. But when theſe Difficulties were overcome, and they had made themſelves Maſters of St. *Sebaſtian*, upon its being quitted by the *Portugueſe*; did they find any great Treaſure there? Or could they get any of their Mines? No, after a Stay of two Months, not daring, in all that Time, to advance farther into the Country, they were glad to ranſom the Town for what they could get, and to make the beſt of their Way back, without being able either to keep Poſſeſſion of their new Conqueſt, or to draw from it Contributions ſufficient to anſwer the Charge of the Expedition. A violent Storm overtook them in their Way Home, and one Half of them is not return'd. The King, in ſhort, has loſt his Ships, and the Undertakers their Money. Thus has ended this great Attempt; which, with all its Succeſs, I cannot but think a Confirmation of my Argument.

But

But what this Argument wants of Weight will be made up by a Second drawn from what has been lately done by the new M—-y. They have as great a Senſe of the Importance of this Service, as our Author has; and to convince Men of their Zeal, have made a Trial where it was moſt feaſible; not againſt any of the *Spaniſh* Settlements, but againſt the *French* Plantations in *Canada*. And to carry on the Deſign with all poſſible Secrecy, on which they knew the Succeſs did very much depend, they took the moſt effectual Meaſures, and did two Things which ſhew'd both their Courage and their Zeal. They ventur'd to form a very expenſive Project, without laying it before the Parl----t, though the Parl----t were ſitting; the very Parl----t, that had juſt then declar'd it to be their Senſe, *That to enlarge the Service, or increaſe the Charge beyond the Bounds preſcribed, and the Supplies granted, was illegal, and an Invaſion of their Rights.* Another Thing they did to keep the Deſign ſecret, was to victual the Fleet greatly ſhort of what was neceſſary; leaving them to take in a freſh Supply in *New-England*, which they would not before-hand give Directions for, though the Event ſhew'd it was exceeding neceſſary, for Fear that alſo ſhould occaſion

ſion a Diſcovery. This preſerv'd in ſome Meaſure the Secrecy, but deſtroy'd the Deſign; for though they had a very fortunate Paſſage to *New-England*, much better than a Fleet can ordinarily hope for, yet they were ſo long detain'd there, that the proper Seaſon, it is ſaid, was over, before any conſiderable Quantity of Proviſions could be procured; and the Whole was ſo ſhort of what they wanted, that when they fail'd in their Deſign againſt *Quebeck*, they were not able to ſucceed in the Under-Plot againſt *Placentia*, in which otherwiſe they apprehended no Difficulty.

But if the eaſieſt Expedition that could be undertaken of this Kind, has ſo unhappily miſcarried; if we could not ſucceed in our Attempt upon a Place, which we could attack both by Land and Sea; if barely the Want of Proviſions made us unable to undertake a Deſign againſt a Place that could have made no Reſiſtance; what can we hope for from Expeditions againſt Places more remote, better guarded, leſs known, and at a greater Diſtance from any Ports of our own, and that can be attack'd only from the Sea, without any poſſible Aſſiſtance or Supply by Land? This Experiment made by ſo able a

M----y,

M——y, ſo feaſible in the Nature of it, ſo well concerted, and conducted with ſo much Secrecy, and yet ſo unſucceſsful, is, in my humble Opinion, little ſhort of a Demonſtration, that nothing is to be expected from ſuch Enterprizes, but certain great Loſs, with a very uncertain Proſpect of Succeſs; and therefore by impartial Men muſt be thought, as to this Point, a full Abſolution of the late M--y. That unhappy Expedition furniſhes all People with a Multitude of Objections againſt others of the like Nature. And if it be now ask'd, why did not the late M——y conquer the *Weſt-Indies?* The very common People will be apt to ſay, that we do not know the Coaſt; that there may be other Rivers of St. *Laurence*; that their Towns and Ports are well fortified; that we have no *Pilots*; that the Country is entirely againſt us; that ſuch an Expedition would require a conſiderable Body of Land Forces; that this would employ a prodigious Number of Ships: And when all theſe Things are got together, it is a very great Way to go, Men die very faſt on Ship-board in that Climate; we have no Intelligence with thoſe Parts, it is at too great a Diſtance to ſupport them from hence with all Neceſſaries requiſite to make the Seat of War

War in thoſe Countries, and would be ſo great an Expence, that we could make no Effort any where elſe. The *Quebeck* Expedition has furniſh'd even the common People with theſe and twenty more Objections againſt theſe imaginary Schemes.

But to purſue my Argument ſtill one Step farther, let us conſider how theſe Expeditions to the *Weſt-Indies* will affect the War in other Parts. It is plain we muſt either increaſe greatly the annual Expence of the War, or it muſt in other Articles be leſſen'd in Proportion to the Charge of this. The firſt is not to be thought of: Our Author is ſo far from thinking the Charge of the War ſhould be increaſed, that it is already, in his Opinion, a great deal too big; but yet he does not tell us, where we ſhould retrench except in *Flanders*, the moſt material Article of all, where we ſhould not. For it is by Experience very evident, that we ſcarce have a Superiority on that Side; and had we for our Quota 24,000 Men leſs than we have at preſent, which is the Advice this Author gives, what could be the Conſequence? Could we gain any Advantage there againſt *France?* Could we ſo much as keep our Ground? Would not the great Superiority this would

have given the Enemy, make it impoſſible for the Allies to ſtand againſt them? Would not, inſtead of the Towns taken from the *French*, two or three taken from us have brought the *French* once more towards the Gates of *Nimeguen*, where the D. of *M.* found them, when he firſt came to the Head of the Army? And would not the Apprehenſions this would have given the *Dutch*, have forced them into an ill Peace on any Terms? Would they not have call'd to Mind 1672, and fear'd a Return of the Dangers that then threaten'd nothing leſs than the intire Ruin of their State? And can it be thought they would, by a Perſeverance in the War, run the leaſt Riſque of having Things brought to the ſame Extremity? This would have made an End of the War indeed; but what End? Such an one as every true *Engliſhman* muſt dread the Thoughts of. But if the *French* ſhould not turn their Arms with ſo much Fury againſt thoſe *Provinces*, when they might have ſo great a Superiority, (which there is not the leaſt Reaſon to think they would not) yet the Inability of the Allies to do any Thing in *Flanders* would leave *France* at Liberty to over-run the weakeſt and moſt defenceleſs Parts of the Alliance. And what could

could that end in, but a ſpeedy Diſſolution of the Alliance, and their Submiſſion to a ſcandalous Peace; which would fix upon them the Chains *France* has long been preparing for them, beyond their Power of ever ſhaking them off? Which ever Way the *French* ſhould turn their Arms, while for Want of our Aſſiſtance the Allies are much inferior to them, the Conſequence muſt needs be an *ill Peace*; and an *ill Peace* will make *France* the abſolute Miſtreſs of both Worlds, and leave her in Poſſeſſion of ſo much Power, as muſt be fatal to ourſelves as well as our Allies; and make not only our Trade, but our Liberty and Government precarious, and to be held only at her good Pleaſure. Theſe are the Fruits of our Author's Scheme, by which he would have the War managed, and what muſt be the unavoidable Conſequence of making expenſive Expeditions to the *Weſt-Indies*.

From what has been ſaid on this Subject, which I have conſider'd in the cleareſt and moſt diſtinct Manner poſſible, I flatter myſelf, that the Reader will conclude with me, that it is impracticable to make a vigorous War by Sea or in the *Weſt-Indies*; that this can be done only upon the Continent, and there on-

ly in *Flanders*, which has been done; and conſequently that the late M——y purſued the War in that Manner that would beſt anſwer the End we propoſed in beginning it; which was the Point I undertook to prove. And if I have proved it, they are clear of the black Charge brought againſt them, with reſpect to each of the three Propoſitions their Accuſer obliged himſelf to make Good: And conſequently the Concluſion to be infer'd from them is groundleſs, falſe, and ſcandalous, *That no Nation was ever ſo ſcandalouſly abuſed by the Folly, the Temerity, the Corruption, the Ambition of its Miniſters, or treated with ſo much Inſolence, Injuſtice, and Ingratitude by its Allies.* In Oppoſition to which, I have fully ſhewn, that the late Adminiſtration, ſo far as it is cenſured by this Author, was wiſe, prudent, honeſt, and uncorrupt, without the leaſt Mixture of *French* Influence, or any deſign'd wrong Meaſures; greatly tending to the Honour of her Majeſty, and the Intereſt of her People, and the Support of her Allies; and attended with ſuch Succeſs, as ſufficiently ſhews the Wiſdom and Ability of thoſe Miniſters, and which, if rightly purſued, muſt make us and our Allies all happy by a good and laſting Peace.

But

But in the grand *Concluſion* our Author was to prove, there is one Word puts me in Mind of an Objection againſt the Allies I had forgot, and that is *Inſolence*: In his Preliminary Reflections, which are all calculated for what is to follow, he has, *pag.* 10, theſe Words: *Surely he would think it monſtrous to find them intermeddling in his domeſtick Affairs, and preſcribing what Servants he ſhould keep or diſmiſs.* And *p.* 34. *This Kind of Treatment from our two principal Allies, has taught the ſame Dialect to all the reſt.* And *p.* 55. *This Treatment, which we have received from our two principal Allies, hath been pretty well copied by moſt other Princes with whom we have any Dealings.* And *p.* 58. where he ſums up the whole Charge, *If we have allow'd them to treat us with Inſolence and Contempt.* And *p.* 64. *Our two great Allies took immediate Alarm, applied the neareſt Way to the Throne by Memorials and Meſſages, directing her Majeſty not to change her Sec —— or Tr ——; who for the true Reaſons that* theſe officious Intermeddlers *demanded their Continuance, ought never to have been admitted into the leaſt Degree of Truſt.* So Monſieur *Menager* would talk, I dare ſay, who would recommend other M——rs as more agreeable to his

Maſter. But ſure, to hear ſuch Complaints of the *Inſolence* of our Allies in the tenth Year of the War, when we had not heard a Word like it for the nine Years before, muſt ſeem very ſtrange to any fair Reader, and make him ſuſpect it is done without Grounds, and for ſome very ill Deſign; but the Paſſage laſt quoted is the true Key to all the reſt. It was the Misfortune of the *States* and the *Emperor* to fall under the violent Diſpleaſure of ſome Men, for humbly repreſenting to her Majeſty the ill Conſequences to the Common Cauſe they apprehended from a Change of her M——y at that Juncture, when the Enemy were making Offers of Peace, and there was a fair Proſpect of bringing Things to a good End, if the Face of publick Affairs were not changed.

This is at the Bottom of thoſe Complaints, this the great *Inſolence*; *manet alta mente repoſtum Judicium* — But as much Offence as this Step gave laſt Year, it was not reſented in this Manner; they were deſired to be eaſy, and told it was a *domeſtick* Affair only, and ſhould no Way affect the Alliance or the War. Whether this were a true Anſwer, or the Fears of the Allies were well-grounded, and they had Reaſon to intereſt themſelves as they

they did, I ſubmit to every Reader, and appeal to what his Eyes have ſeen. It is ſurprizing to ſee how the Language of the Writers of the Party is changed in one Twelvemonth; while the Offence was freſh and moſt reſented, the Writers, who blamed it, did it with ſome Modeſty. The *Letter to* P——, *p.* 4. is pleaſed *to paſs no harder Cenſure upon it, than her Majeſty herſelf, who has only looked upon it either as the Effect of a* miſtaken Zeal *for the Common Cauſe, or the* crafty Suggeſtion *of the Friends of the late Tr*——. And *Faults on both Sides*, p. 37. confeſſes, *That this Meſſage from the* States *was deliver'd with as much Modeſty as the Subject-Matter would bear; and that though it could not be void of ſome Offence, her Majeſty would take every Thing as well intended, that came from a State for whom ſhe has ever had ſo ſincere a Regard, and who have ſo ſignally exerted themſelves for the Good of the Common Cauſe.* Whence now comes it, that what was *Modeſty* a Year ago, is now term'd *Inſolence?* Why plainly hence: It was then convenient to be civil to our Allies, we had then ſome farther Occaſion for them, and the Nation would have been too much ſtartled to ſee them uſed in this ſtrange Manner.

But now we have no more Buſineſs for them, the Game is up, and they are to be diſmiſſed, plainly againſt their Wills; and were not Methods found to load them with Reproach, and render them odious, it would, they fear, be againſt the Will of the Nation too; whoſe native Juſtice and Honour cannot eaſily bear to have their beſt Allies treated with ſo much Indignity, nor can they be preſently ſo blinded as not to ſee it is inconſiſtent with their true and laſting Intereſt.

Thus we ſee in the Reaſon of this Objection to the Allies, the true Anſwer to it. As to what there is in this Objection that reflects on the late M——y, as if thoſe Memorials were preſented at their Deſire, I muſt take the Liberty to tell this Writer, that though he and his Friends may know very well what paſſes at *St. Germains* or *Verſailles*, they do not ſeem to be much acquainted with the Sentiments of our Allies, and with what is done at *Vienna* and the *Hague*; if they did, they would know that my Lord *M.*'s Services are too well underſtood at thoſe Courts, to want his uſing his Intereſt with them to make them eſpouſe his Cauſe: It was not him they were concerned for, but themſelves; in his Intereſt they ſaw their own;

and

and I could appeal to a certain Great Man, if Monſieur *B----ys* did not intreat him laſt Year at the *Hague* with Tears, That my Lord *M.* might not be ill uſed, upon Account of the very preſſing Occaſion there was for his Service: To which Requeſt, a clear and favourable Anſwer could not be obtained. And this, I preſume, won't be ſaid to have been at his Grace's Importunity by any but ſuch who are hired to ſay any thing.

But to proceed: After our Author has miſrepreſented the Conduct of the Allies and the late M——y, in Purſuance of the three Propoſitions he was to prove, he comes, *p.* 58. to *lay open the real Cauſes of our preſent Miſery*; but I think, the *real* are the only ones that are concealed. But what he has to offer is ſum'd up in theſe few Hints; *p.* 62. *All this we were forced to ſubmit to, becauſe the General was* made eaſy, *becauſe the* Money'd Men *at Home were fond of the War, becauſe the* Whigs *were not firmly ſettled*; *and becauſe that exorbitant Degree of Power, which was built upon a ſuppoſed Neceſſity of employing particular Perſons, would go off in Peace.* And we are told, *p.* 63. that *the Truth of this will appear indiſputable, by conſidering with what Unanimity and Concert theſe*

ſeveral

ſeveral Parties (of which our Allies are one) *acted towards that great End.*

After ſo full a Defence as has been made, a very ſhort Anſwer will ſerve for each of theſe groundleſs Calumnies. As to the firſt, the General was not *made eaſy* by the *Dutch* in the Senſe of this Author; he had never any *Preſent* from them, nor any annual Pay; no Part in the *Contributions*, nor any *Profits* ſhared between him and the *States*; no *Preſents* from any of our Allies for theſe five or ſix laſt Campaigns; no *Perquiſites* but what have been allowed to other Generals, nor any *Stoppages from Subſidies*, but what have been applied to the Service. He has in none of theſe Reſpects been made eaſy, but has indeed had great Uneaſineſs to bring the Parts of ſo great a Confederacy into vigorous and right Meaſures, during the Continuance of a very difficult and troubleſome Command.

His ſecond Reaſon is, *Becauſe the* Money'd Men *were fond of the War*. If the Intereſt of Money advanced to ſupport the War, had been, during the late Adminiſtration, as high as it was before, or has been ſince, there might be ſome Colour for this Inſinuation, which is wholly groundleſs; for the *Money'd Men* had no Reaſon to be particularly fond

of

of the War on this Account; they had but Five *per Cent.* for their Money almoſt the whole Time, which would have turned to much better Account, could they have had thoſe Opportunities of employing it in Trade, which a good Peace would bring with it. And the great Loſſes many of them have ſuffer'd this War, even to the Ruin of them and their Families, are too ſenſible a Proof that they cannot but wiſh a good End to it. But what makes this Inſinuation more unjuſt, that which is here intended for a Reproach to the *Money'd* Men, is really a great but falſe Reflection on the landed Gentlemen, as if they were as much againſt the War, as the others are for it; whereas it is notorious this War was begun by a Parliament in which the *Land* had a great Majority over the *Money*; and for their Honour it muſt be ſaid, that they have very heartily concur'd all along in the vigorous Proſecution of it, as being intirely convinced of its Neceſſity. Nor is any Thing more ridiculous, than the Attempts that have been made of late to divide theſe two Intereſts, which in Truth are inſeparable; as the Country-Gentlemen will ſoon find by the Fall of the Value of their *Lands*, if they can be prevailed on to neg-

lect

lect or diſcourage *Trade*, by thoſe who make their Court to them in this abſurd Manner, for no other Reaſon but becauſe they are at preſent the Majority. The preſent War is a War not of a *Party*, much leſs of a ſingle *Family*, but of the whole *Nation*. All Sides were convinced of the Neceſſity of entering into it; all Sides have chearfully agreed to aſſiſt her Majeſty in the carrying it on, and will, it is to be hoped, continue the ſame vigorous Reſolutions till the Ends of it be obtained. However we may have been divided in other Matters, we have all hitherto united in this Point, not to leave *France* in Poſſeſſion of ſuch a formidable Power, as nothing would be able to reſiſt; which Power, it has been by all thought, they would have, if they were left in Poſſeſſion of *Spain* and the *Indies*, which a little more Perſeverance will effectually oblige them to recede from; and then the *Money'd* Men will be as glad to to ſee an End of the War, as the Landed Gentlemen can be thought to be.

The third pretended Cauſe for the Continuance of the War is, *That the* Whigs *were not yet firmly ſettled.* And how is this proved? Why becauſe the Parl——t in *December*

her 1707. humbly offer'd it to her Majeſty, *as their unanimous Opinion, that no Peace could be ſafe or honourable, if* Spain *or the* Weſt-Indies, *or any Part of the* Spaniſh *Monarchy were ſuffer'd to remain in the Houſe of* Bourbon. And how came the P——t into this Vote? Why becauſe the G——l and the M——y *having refuſed to accept very advantageous Offers of Peace, after the Battle of* Ramellies, *were forced to take in a Set of Men with a previous Bargain, to skreen them from the Conſequences of that Miſcarriage.* By this Account the *Whigs* were not taken in till the End of 1707. and this Vote about the *Spaniſh* Monarchy was to skreen the Miniſtry, for refuſing the Terms offer'd after the Battle of *Ramellies*. To which I anſwer, Firſt, That if they were not taken in till then, the rejecting thoſe Offers does not lie at their Door. *Secondly*, If they were not taken in till that Time, then the Alliances with *Portugal* and *Savoy*, in which the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy is moſt expreſly ſtipulated, and for the Sake of the firſt of which, the then Emperor was prevailed with to declare the Arch-duke King of *Spain*, were not the Effect of *Whig* Counſels; but by theſe Treaties the Reſtitution is made

made as neceſſary to be inſiſted on, as it could be by any Vote of P——t in 1707. In ſhort, neither the Grand Alliance, nor the ſubſequent Treaties, were made by the *Whigs*; the Intereſt of their Party at Court was, for the firſt Years of this War, very low; but yet, which is greatly for their Honour, they did not, like the diſcontented Party of the other Side during the laſt War, oppoſe every Thing, and hang upon the Wheels of the Government, becauſe they had not themſelves the Direction of it; and the publick Spirit they ſhew'd in this, removed the Prejudices that had been entertained againſt them, and procured them ſome Degree of Favour with her Majeſty, who declared herſelf not the Patroneſs of a Party, but the Common Mother of her People. If therefore the *Whigs*, at the End of 1707. declared for continuing the War, it was only till thoſe Ends could be obtained, which the *Tories* had all along thought neceſſary to be inſiſted on; and that thoſe Ends might be obtained ſoon, they did every Thing that was poſſible to be done by Men who were moſt in Earneſt. But the Account this Author gives of this *Vote* is wholly falſe; it was not to *skreen the M——ry*, or ſo much as oblige them by it;

it; but the contrary. It was indeed to prevent, what there was no Reaſon to fear at that Time, the clapping up an inſecure Peace, contrary to our Alliances, and to what had been always the Senſe of the Nation. This, and nothing elſe, was the Intention of the *Vote*; they were right in thinking the Reſtitution of the whole *Monarchy* neceſſary, if it could be compaſs'd; but they had no Reaſon to think the M——ry were not of the ſame Mind.

I cannot but take Notice, on this Occaſion, of the Inconſiſtency of this Author and his Friends, and how ſtrangely they have varied from themſelves in ſo ſhort a Time, as ſince the late Change. Then the *Whigs*, it was ſaid, were taken in to skreen the M——ry for their Neglect of the War in *Spain*; but now, ſince that Matter has been ſet in ſo full a Light, it ſeems it was to skreen them for refuſing the Offers that had been made of Peace, which is juſt as true as the other Imputation: For the M——y wanted not to be skreened on that Account; what was offer'd was nothing but the *Partition*-Treaty; for which, had they accepted it, they would have deſerved an Impeachment much better than their Predeceſſors; though were it never

ver ſo wrong to reject theſe Offers, this Author, methinks, might be content to drop it, unleſs he could prove the Sec——— diſapproved it; which, I take upon me to ſay, he was ſo far from doing, that there was *not any one Step taken in that Affair without him, nor any one Anſwer made to the Offers of the* French, *which were not conſider'd with him, and entirely approved by him.* In ſhort, both he and the Tr——— (for my Lord *M*—— was then Abroad) rejected thoſe Offers, as what no true *Engliſhman*, or *good Servant of the Q*—— could adviſe her to accept. So much for this Author's third Reaſon; if the *Whigs* were for continuing the War, it was not from any ſelfiſh View, but for the Good of their Country; not becauſe they were not *yet firmly ſettled*, but becauſe the Enemy were not yet reduced to ſubmit to thoſe Terms, which the *Tories* themſelves, which her Majeſty and her Allies without Exception, had always thought neceſſary.

The laſt Reaſon aſſigned for continuing the War is, becauſe the *exorbitant Power of the T——r and G——l, built on their ſuppoſed Neceſſity, would go off in Peace.* I will readily diſcharge the preſent M——y from any ſuch Imputation, no body can ſuſpect their Continuance

tinuance is *neceſſary* to ſupport the War; but I muſt ſay, that the Charge on the *late* M---y, of continuing the War with this View, is as falſe as it would be on the *new*. No, they had no Reaſon to think they held the Place they had in her Majeſty's Favour by ſo precarious a Tenure; they had not impudently thruſt themſelves into the Adminiſtration, or by any ſudden or indirect Methods advanced themſelves to the Head of her Affairs. Her Majeſty had had a very long Knowledge of them, and had received from them the ſureſt Proofs of their ſteddy and unſhaken Fidelity and Zeal for her Service; the Experience ſhe had of them before ſhe came to the Crown, or had any reaſonable Proſpect that ſhe ever ſhould, convinced her ſhe could no where better place her Confidence; and the entire Satisfaction ſhe always expreſs'd in their Service, a Satisfaction known to few Princes, left no Room for them to ſuſpect, that any little Arts were requiſite, much leſs any deſperate Meaſures, to make themſelves neceſſary to her. Inſtead of being ſolicitous on this Account, the Event ſhews their Merit made them too ſecure; they ſpent in the Service of the Q---, and to promote her Intereſt, the Time which others ſpend in

Tricks and Cabals to promote their own. But I cannot better expreſs the true Character of theſe two M----rs, than in the Words of Dr. *D----t*, upon two other Great Men in a former Reign: "Their Services and Merit did ſtrongly induce her M—— to put "the Adminiſtration of her Affairs into their "Hands; they were both Perſons of Age "and Experience; they underſtood the Nature of our Conſtitution; and the general "Abilities of both made them eſteemed by "the People, and gave a Weight to all their "Counſels. They had Authority enough in "their Perſons to be liſtned to, when they "ſpoke neceſſary Truths; having ſuperior "Knowledge and Deſert too, to be heard, "they did not ſtand in need of ſaying al-"ways what was pleaſing, which is the mi-"ſerable and ſervile Condition of upſtart, "weak, and obſcure Stateſmen. Having a "Foundation of Merit, they ſcorned the "mean Aid of any dark Cabal. Knowing "what was the Q—'s and the Nation's In-"tereſt, and intending to promote both, they "gave wholſome Advice without Fear of "offending." *That there was, for eight Years together, ſuch a mutual Confidence between Prince and People, and that Things were*

were managed with ſuch Temper, Credit, *and* Unanimity *at Home, and with ſo much* Vigour *and* Succeſs *Abroad, was chiefly owing to the* Wiſdom *and* Integrity *of theſe two Miniſters*; whoſe Merit increaſed with the Length of their Service; and their Adminiſtration having been as ſucceſsful as it was wiſe and honeſt, they had no Reaſon to apprehend, but that their Perſons and Service would be as acceptable, when the War was done, as they had been for many Years before it began. Nothing therefore can be more groundleſs, than to accuſe theſe M----s of a Deſign to perpetuate the War, to keep their Power. The War indeed, ſo great and difficult a War, has made their Abilities appear glorioufly; it was a Work few Men beſides could have been ſo long equal to; but able M----rs are as uſeful in Peace as War, or at leaſt honeſt ones: And ſince their Talents made them fit for either, they little thought that if they put an End to the War, that would put an End to them, and that from thenceforth they ſhould be laid aſide. Men, who come by their Power no body knows how, may be perpetually afraid of loſing what they are conſcious they have no Right to, nor Abilities to execute; But true Merit excludes ſuch

Fears, and is above them; it is active for the Publick while employ'd, and can be eaſy in Retirement when laid aſide: And whether employ'd or laid aſide, it is ſtill the ſame, it is ſtill

Virtus *Scipiadæ & mitis* Sapientia *Læli.*

But theſe Cauſes, falſe as they are, are proved to be indiſputably true, *from the Unanimity and Concert the ſeveral Parties acted with.* And what are the Proofs of this *Concert?* Why the Vote about *Spain*, and the Endeavours of the *Bank* and the *Allies* to hinder the late Change. The *Vote*, I have already ſhewn, was not the Effect of Unanimity, but of a Want of it. And as for the other two, I think they ſpeak for themſelves, or rather, Time has anſwer'd for them better than any body elſe can. However, our Author thinks he has notably proved this Point: *Thus it plainly appears*, ſays he, *that there was a* Conſpiracy *to go on with thoſe Meaſures which muſt perpetuate the War.* In Anſwer to which, I own, by the Conduct of the late M——y there was a *conſpiring Harmony* among all Parties concern'd in the War, to continue it with Vigour till ſuch a Peace could be

be obtain'd, as would ſecure the Commerce of *England*, the Welfare of our *Allies*, and the Liberty of *Europe*. To create Jealouſy and Diſcord, to deſtroy Credit and break Alliances, is ſuch eaſy Work, that any M----y is more than ſufficient for it; but ſure it requires very great Abilities, and an equal Integrity, to keep up *Credit*, and preſerve a perfect *Union* among ſo many Parts; an *Union* ſo firm, that our Author is *aſtoniſh'd how it came to be broken*, and ſo I confeſs am I. But there is one Thing our Author ſays on this Occaſion, I am more aſtoniſh'd at, That her M----'s *Judgment has directed her to the Choice of perhaps the* only *Perſons, who had ſtill Credit and Reſolution enough to be her Inſtruments in overthrowing ſo many Difficulties.* It is ſtrange this Writer ſhould accuſe the *late* M-----y but juſt before for thinking themſelves neceſſary to her M----, when they had given ſo long a Proof of their great Abilities; and yet almoſt in the ſame Breath run into the ſame Fault, in ſpeaking of the *new*. The *new* M----y may indeed be very fit Inſtruments to *overthrow*, as fit as any, nay the moſt fit; but they are not, I believe, the *only* Perſons: Her M----- was not under an abſolute Neceſſity of making this Choice;

ſure there might, in ſo great a Number of Nobility and Gentry, among ſo many *true* Sons of the *Church*, among ſo many zealous Friends to the Monarchy, have been found ſome other Perſons who had Skill, Credit, and Reſolution; or elſe the Vertue of the Nation is ſtrangely ſunk, and both *Church* and *State* are in a very ſad Condition.

But to come to the next Paragraph, *p.* 65. which as it is the laſt upon this Subject, ſo is it of all moſt admirable: *Some*, ſays he, *would pretend to leſſen the Merit of this, by telling us, the* Rudeneſs, *the* Tyranny, *the* Oppreſſion, *the* Ingratitude *of the late* Favourites *towards their Miſtreſs, were no longer to be born.* It is pleaſant to ſee, that this Author and his Friends cannot agree what to put this wondrous Change upon. In all their Libels laſt Year, it was imputed not to their *ill Conduct* in the Management of the War, to any *Conſpiracy* between them and our Allies, but to their *Rudeneſs* and *Inſolence* to the Q—. Now they do not think it ſo meritorious to put it upon that, but upon other Cauſes not then found out. But it is the Nature of Falſhood and Impoſture to be inconſiſtent with itſelf, and change its Shape as often as the Weather. But that the late Favourites were *rude*, and *tyrannical*,

tyrannical, and *ungrateful*, is evident from this plain Inſtance; *Her M----y was purſued through all her Retreats, particularly at* Windſor, *where they attack'd and ſtorm'd the* Caſtle, *forcing the Q---n to fly to an adjacent* Cottage, *purſuant to the Advice of* Solomon. If the Hiſtory, they promiſe us of the late Change, be of a Piece with this Story, it will outdo all the *Legends* that were ever writ. For this is not only falſe, but what all the World knows to be ſo; and theſe modeſt People affirm it for the greateſt Truth. The Q---n is *at laſt driven from her Caſtle, and forced to fly to a Cottage!* Strange News indeed! I have heard there is a little Houſe near the Caſtle, which her M---- bought many Years ago of my Lord *G----*, and is very fond of, as being warmer in it and more retired than ſhe could be in the Caſtle. Behold now the Impudence of theſe Men! A good convenient Houſe is with them a *Cottage*; the Place her M---- *loves* to be moſt in, they ſay ſhe is forced to *fly* to; and the Caſtle ſhe does not like, they would make us believe, ſhe would never leave, if it were not *attack'd and ſtorm'd, and forcibly taken from her*. The Houſe ſhe delighted to ſee her Servants in, when they were moſt in her Favour, and which ſhe had

bought even before we was Q----n, you would think ſhe never ſaw, till ſhe fled thither for a ſafe Retreat from them. The *Sauſage-maker* in *Ariſtophanes*, though he could *mix*, *jumble*, and *confound* with great Dexterity; when he would give a Specimen of his Abilities in Impudence and Lying, could ſay nothing that comes up to this. But we have not done yet: The Perſon that *purſued* the Q---n thus terribly at *Windſor*, we are to know, by a profane Application of *Scripture*, is my Lady *M*——, who was ſo far from *purſuing* her M—— there, that theſe very People, at other Times, make it her great Crime that ſhe neglected the Q——, and hardly ever came near her. And it is but too certain, that to avoid the Envy of being perpetually about the Q----n, which is eaſily called *beſieging her*, ſhe was too much abſent from her. But were ſhe much or little with her M----, it is all one: Theſe Writers ſtick at nothing, there are no Contradictions they won't affirm, to blacken any one that ſtands in their Way. This is the Inſtance they choſe to give of the *Rudeneſs*, and *Ingratitude*, and *Tyranny* of the late Favourites; and from this they have produced,

duced, we may judge of the Truth of all the reſt.

But before I leave this bright Part of the *Conduct*, let me give the Reader, out of the 63d and 64th Pages, a Specimen of this Writer's great *Conciſeneſs*, which I own inimitable; for he gives us in about ten Lines the Hiſtory of five Years; which I ſhall repeat without any other Addition but that of *Dates*. *The Miniſtry having refuſed advantageous Offers of Peace in* 1706, *were forced to take in a Sett of Men to skreen them*, at the End of 1707. *and accordingly upon the Prince's Death*, October 28. 1708. *the chief Leaders were brought into ſeveral great Employments. So when the Queen*, in 1710, *was no longer able to bear the* Tyranny *and* Inſolence *of thoſe ungrateful Servants, our two great* Allies *took the Alarm.* This our Author calls *laying open the real Cauſes of our Miſery*; but I am much miſtaken, if it does not to all ſober Men ſeem to be no better than a Heap of incoherent Lies, full indeed of deadly Poiſon, but not ſo much as gilded over with a Shew of Probability.

In Return for this very conciſe Hiſtory, to conclude my Anſwer to ſo much of his Book as the Title of it properly belongs to, I will give

give him a ſhort Vindication of the late M--y, from ſuch Arguments as are like to weigh moſt with him. That they began their M--y in 1702, with great Applauſe, and continued for ſome Time to do all Things well; I appeal to the Confeſſion made by *Faults on both Sides*; the Author of which, *p.* 26. acknowledges, *That they had acted wiſely, they had reſtored the* Credit *of the Nation, managed the Affairs of the* War *well, and manifeſted ſo careful a* Conduct *in every Thing, that hitherto they had given no Occaſion to thoſe that watch'd for their Halting.* Here is our Entrance into the War, our Conduct in it at firſt, our Alliances with *Portugal* and *Savoy*, juſtified by a great Authority, one who writ ſince the Change and for it. Spring 1704, Mr. *H----y* and Mr. *St. J---* were taken into the Offices of *State* and *War*. So that if all Things ſhall be allow'd to have been right till then, from that Time it will, I preſume, be granted all was ſafe and well till *February* 1707-8. For as for the Offers of Peace that had been made in 1706, I have already ſaid, nothing was done in that Affair without Mr. *H----y*, who entirely approved all the Steps that were taken in it; nor did either of *them*, as far as I can learn, in all that Time, blame

or

or oppoſe the chief M----rs in any Part of their Conduct in the War, which has been ſince found Fault with. And ſince that Time, though we had the Misfortune to want the Aſſiſtance of thoſe two able M----rs, we have made every Campaign with great Succeſs in *Flanders*, and maintain'd our Ground in *Spain* beyond Expectation, while the late M——y continued in; and had like to have gain'd the whole Monarchy by two unexpected Victories, juſt as they were removed. And during this Interval, from the Beginning of 1708. to their Removal, *Credit* continued to flouriſh, no new *Alliance* was made, but that of the *Barrier-Treaty*, which I have at large vindicated in the Second Part of this *Defence*; no Augmentation of our *Forces*, but upon the ſame Foot as in former Years; nor is there any one Fault found by this Author with the *Emperor* or the *Dutch*, that is particular to this Interval; from whence I infer, that there either were no Faults in the Conduct of either, or if there were, there is no Pretence to blame the M——y for ſuffering it. Nor was there any Neglect of the *Sea* ſince 1708. more than there was before; and therefore I conclude there was no Neglect at all. In ſhort, with reſpect both to Land and Sea,

Sea, with reſpect to the Conduct of Affairs both at Home and Abroad, every Thing, I muſt preſume, was done with the Approbation of thoſe two M----rs, while they were in, unleſs it can be ſhewn, that they diſapproved any Part of it, which has not yet been attempted; and every Thing went as well after they were out.

I might, in Confirmation of all this, appeal to the Anniverſary Speeches of the late Lord *H*----; in which, as bitter as they were, our Entrance into the War was never blamed, nor the Reſtitution of the *Spaniſh Monarchy* denied to be the chief End of it, nor any Fault found with the Management of the War, or none but what affects that Period when the *two* I have named were in the Adminiſtration, at leaſt as much as any other. A later Proof of this Kind, are the *Libels* of the laſt Year, in which the late Change is put upon Reaſons purely *domeſtick*, none of our Allies or our Alliances are inſulted; no Blame, particularly, is thrown on the *Dutch*, and but little on the M----y in relation to the War. They promiſed, that our *Treaties ſhould be inviolably obſerved*; that *the War ſhould be purſued with more Vigour than ever*, and that *the Intereſt of our Allies ſhould*

be

be taken better Care of at the next Treaty *than before.* And that they might not be alarm'd at the Removal of the late M----rs, it is not denied in thoſe Libels, that they were *great* and *able* Men; but they are told, that *their Places are ſupplied by Men of* equal *Merit, and no leſs zealous to advance the Intereſt of their Country, than to promote the Good of the* Common Cauſe; and it is particularly declared, to make them eaſy, that *my Lord* M. *ſhould be continued in his Command.*

This was the Language of the *Libels* of the Party laſt Year: How very different from that of the *Conduct!* Had their Writers ſaid then, what they have ventured to ſay ſince!--had any body in anſwer to them foretold all that has ſince happen'd, what an *Incendiary* would he have been thought! or had he been believed, how would the Nation, as well as our Allies, have been *alarm'd!* The Account now given of our *Alliances*, and of the Conduct of the Allies and the late M----y, was too monſtrous to be ſhew'd the World at once; there can be no other Reaſon for publiſhing now, what was not thought fit to be ſaid then; which is a ſufficient Proof, that in the main it is ſcandalouſly falſe.

But there remains ſtill one other Way of vindicating

vindicating the late M——y, which carries with it a more ſenſible Conviction than all the reſt; and that is, the Conduct of the preſent M——y. For have they remedied the Abuſes complain'd of in their Predeceſſors? Have they reduced the Intereſt of Money? or found out eaſier Methods to purſue the War? Has the *South-Sea* paid the publick Debts? Had not the Creditors rather have their Intereſts paid them without the *Trade*? And are any conſiderable Funds provided for that Intereſt? Are the *Ways* and *Means* for carrying on the War any Thing but a Repetition of thoſe that were uſed before? Have they carried the Streſs of the War into ſome *more proper* Place? Has the War in *Spain* been puſh'd with more Vigour? Has any Thing been done in *Savoy*? Have we been able to be any where on the Offenſive but in *Flanders*, the old Seat of our Succeſſes, and from whence alone we muſt expect *a good Peace*? In ſhort, have the new M——y done any one Thing, that has given more Life to the War, or that has made *France* more willing to put a good End to it; good, I mean, for us and our Allies? They have indeed attempted one Thing the late M——y did not, I mean the *Expedition to the* Weſt-Indies:

But

But to what Purpoſe has it ſerved, but to ſhew us, that no Succeſs is to be hoped for from theſe Expeditions; which the late M—y, without making ſo chargeable an Experiment, were perſuaded could not ſucceed? For it is plain by the Accounts given of that Expedition, that it was not merely *an Accident*, or any *Treachery*, that was the Cauſe of that Miſcarriage, but a Complication of many Difficulties: For, firſt, we are told, that the River *St. Lawrence* is navigable only at one Time of the Year; we let that ſlip. But if we had nick'd the Time, we could not have ſail'd up that River without very able *Pilots*; we had none. If we had taken the proper Time, and been provided with good Pilots, none but *Ships* of a certain Burden can go up the River; all our Men of War were too big. But if *Time*, and *Pilots*, and *Ships* had been the moſt proper for the Enterprize, we ſhould have had *Proviſions* for more Months than we had Weeks, to ſubſiſt the Fleet and Troops during the Winter. And what is more, if we had gone in the proper *Time*, if we had had good *Pilots*, if we had carried proper *Ships*, and had laid in ſufficient *Proviſions*, it is ſaid the Enemy were ſo well provided for a Defence, that our Forces were not ſufficient; though

though both Troops and Officers were ſo good, that nothing would have been wanting on their Side. So that it was next to impoſſible that this Expedition, though it was ſo very well concerted, ſhould ſucceed. But a bare Miſcarriage is not the worſt of it. It is not only ſo much Money loſt; it was not only a Weakening of our Strength in other Parts: Seven Tranſports with ſix and twenty Companies of Foot periſh'd on a Rock; and after ſo unſucceſsful an Attempt. the Remains of our Troops return'd in a very miſerable Condition. And to compleat the Misfortune, the Flag-Ship blew up at *Spithead*; and with it, I fear, great Part of the Stores that cannot be otherwiſe accounted for. But ſince the Miſcarriage of this Expedition is not the Effect of an Accident only, or indeed chiefly, (though Storms in ſuch a Voyage is no uncommon Accident) I cannot but think it a full Vindication of the late M——y in this Point. And, in general, all I would deſire of any fair Reader is, that when any wrong Meaſures are imputed to them, he would ask, How it is mended by their Succeſſors; and if he finds it is not, that then he would have the Candour to conclude, either that it is ſomething that really does not want mending,

ing, or that it cannot be mended by all the Endeavours that the ableſt and wiſeſt Men can uſe.

Upon this Foot I am content to leave intirely the Vindication of the late M——y, and paſs on to make a few Remarks upon the remaining Part of the *Conduct*, in which the Author begs Leave to reaſon a little with thoſe who are againſt any Peace *without the entire Reſtoration of* Spain *to the Houſe of* Auſtria: Againſt which he brings five Reaſons, which fill up almoſt a third of his Book; but it being in great Meaſure nothing but a Repetition of what he has ſaid before, a very ſhort Anſwer will ſuffice.

His firſt Reaſon is, That *a Reſolution againſt a Peace without* Spain, *is a new Incident*: To which Purpoſe he cites the eighth Article of the Grand Alliance. But this Objection I have fully confuted in the Firſt Part of this *Defence*; wherein I have ſhewn, how ſhamefully this Article is falſified in the Tranſlation this Author has made of it; and yet ſuch is the Impudence of the *Examiner*, that he has ſince that given us this Article in the ſame Words; ſo neceſſary is it the Nation ſhould be impoſed on in this Point. Nothing can be more groundleſs than to ſay, *That our* Victo-

ries *only ſerved to lead us on to further* Viſionary *Proſpects*; *and that* Romantick *Views were propoſed, and the old reaſonable ſober Deſign was forgot.* In Anſwer to which I affirm, that the Reſtitution of *Spain* and the *Indies* was always the Point in View; it was for this End the *Grand Alliance* was made, in Oppoſition to the *Partition*-Treaty the Emperor was ſo much offended at: It is this is expreſly ſtipulated in the Alliance made by *England*, the *Emperor*, and *Holland*, with *Portugal*; and this Treaty was not only negociated, but actually ſigned within one Year from the Date of her Majeſty's *Declaration of War*. And in virtue of it, King *Charles* was declared King of *Spain* on the 12th of *September*, *N. S.* 1703. But did we inſiſt on his being declared King of *Spain*, without intending to inſiſt upon its being reſtored to him? Or can this Writer tell us of any *Victories* we had then gained? Has not this been the Senſe of all our Allies from that Time to this? So early as *October* 1703. when by the Defection of the Elector of *Bavaria*, and the Succeſs of the *French* on the *Rhine*, Affairs were in but a very ill Condition, the *States* repreſented to the Miniſters of the *Emperor* and *Empire*, "That there was no Way to

"prevent

" prevent the Danger that the Liberties of " the ſeveral States of *Chriſtendom* were in, " by the Acceſſion of the Duke of *Anjou* to " the *Spaniſh* Throne, and to recover a juſt " Balance of Power, than by a firm and vi- " gorous Union of all Princes and States for " *reducing the exorbitant Power of* France, " *and reſcuing* Spain *from the Houſe of* Bour- " bon; *and that in order thereunto, they had* " *concluded the Grand Alliance.*" But becauſe the Teſtimony of an Enemy perhaps will weigh more with this Author and his Friends, I will add that of the Elector of *Bavaria* himſelf; whoſe Manifeſto, publiſhed *June* 1. 1703. declares, That *the Emperor's beginning the War in* Italy *was for the Succeſſion of the* Spaniſh *Monarchy*. And that this was then the Senſe of our own Nation, is paſt Diſpute. For the *Portugal* Treaty was in the *November* following laid before the Commons, and examin'd by a Committee; and both Lords and Commons gave her Majeſty their Thanks for having made ſo uſeful an Alliance for Recovering the Monarchy of *Spain* from the Houſe of *Bourbon*, and reſtoring it to the Houſe of *Auſtria*. Thus early was the Reſtitution of *Spain* and the *Indies* ſuppoſed on all Hands to be the chief End of the War. And in all

the Overtures made by *France* towards a Peace, this was always laid down as the firſt Preliminary, conſtantly taken for granted by the Allies, and never diſputed by the Enemy; and yet it was for this Point, and this only, that the Conferences at *Gertruydenberg* broke off. How now can this be called *a new Incident?* or where are theſe *Romantick Views* complain'd of? or how have our *Victories been abuſed?* Though had we riſen in our Demands, we had a Right to it, ſince by this Author's own Confeſſion, *the Conditions of Peace do certainly turn upon the Events of War.* A Propoſition he intended, I believe, to make another Uſe of, when he writ it; expecting then that nothing would be done in *Flanders*, and that all our Hold would be loſt in *Spain.* So much for his firſt Reaſon.

His Second, *p.* 75. is, That the Face of Affairs ſince the *Emperor's Death hath been very much changed.* They have ſo, but it is for the better; the Acceſſion of King *Charles* to the Empire having enabled him to aſſert his Right to the *Spaniſh* Monarchy with much more Vigour, and conſequently with a much ſurer Proſpect of Succeſs than before. But this Union of both Crowns in one is a *dread-*

ful

ful Conſideration: To whom? To *France* perhaps, but to nobody elſe; at leaſt not to *England*, whoſe Fleets will be always neceſſary to render *Spain* and the *Indies* uſeful to him: Which is a full Anſwer to all that can be objected on the Part of *England* againſt ſuch a Union. But the *Dutch*, we are told, *p.* 77. *like this* Union *as little as any body, whatever they may now pretend, and* reſolved *thoſe two Powers ſhould not be joined in the ſame Perſon.* Let thoſe that ſay this, produce this *Reſolution* of the *States*, if they expect to be believed. It may be true perhaps, that the Death of the *Emperor* did at firſt ſtartle them; and before they recover'd the Surprize this unexpected Incident threw them into, ſome, who hoped this Event would forward the Peace they wanted, took Advantage of it, and would have drawn them into a ſpecious Scheme in Favour of the Duke of *Savoy*; which, when they had well conſider'd, they found ſufficient Reaſon to reject. For that Duke had no Right to the *Spaniſh* Succeſſion till after King *Charles*, and his Election to the Imperial Crown did no Way vacate or extinguiſh his Right to *Spain*; and if he had been willing to quit it, how would a Scheme in Favour of the Duke of *Savoy*

have mended Matters? Would *France* be more willing he ſhould have that Monarchy than King *Charles?* or could he maintain better his Pretenſions to it? Would he, if the Allies had declared for him, made any other Uſe of it, but to compound with *France*, and renounce his Title to *Spain* and the *Indies* for ſome valuable Conſideration in *Italy?* And would not all that ſhould have been given him there, been given to the Prejudice of King *Charles* and the Houſe of *Auſtria*, who have got Poſſeſſion of *Milan* and *Naples* by the Sword, and at a great Expence both of Treaſure and Blood? What good Purpoſe then could this Scheme have ſerved to? How would it have reduced the *Exorbitant Power* of *France*, or excluded them from the Trade of the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, which is in the fulleſt Words ſtipulated in the Grand Alliance, and is *England*'s great Concern? What End would it anſwer, but to make an ill Peace ſeem more neceſſary, and ſave thoſe the Diſcredit of doing it, who are in moſt Haſte for it? This is evidently the Tendency of this noble Scheme, and for that Reaſon, I preſume, the *States* rejected it. And yet is it not for this, we are at preſent ſo fond of the D. of *S.* and make ſuch Court to his M——rs? Is it not

for

for this we hear no Complaints againſt our Alliance with that Duke, nor againſt his Inaction for theſe four Campaigns? Which would otherwiſe have been fine Topicks, and made ſome of the moſt ſhining Parts in this great Performance.

The third Reaſon for an ill Peace is, That *our preſent Condition makes it impoſſible for us to carry on the War*. And upon this Head, our Weakneſs is expoſed to publick View at full Length, and in ſuch a Manner, as would be thought highly criminal in any other Country. For what can be a more wicked Attempt, or of more fatal Conſequence to any Government, than to weaken the Hands and Hearts of the People, while a Peace is in Suſpence, and the Terms of it will turn upon the Condition the Enemy think we are in to purſue the War? Could any *French* Writer have ſpread with Impunity ſo much Poiſon through that Kingdom, ſix Years ago; the Clamours of the People would have been too loud to be withſtood, and their King would have long ſince been forced to give us a Peace on our own Terms. But why do I make ſo abſurd a Suppoſition? Such a Betraying of their Country would be ſuffer'd in no Nation but our own: And if it might be done with

Impunity, it would be hard to find a *Frenchman* of any Figure, abandon'd enough to be guilty of ſo foul a Villany; much leſs a *Deſmanets* or a *Torcy*. It would be an Injury to them to ſuſpect they could encourage ſo infamous a Work, or be any Way acceſſary to the Diſperſing of it through the Kingdom; much leſs would they proſtitute their own Names to ſo vile a Purpoſe, and give ſo inſolent a Libel a ſafe and eaſy Paſſage, frank it with their own Hands; and leaſt of all could they be capable of being themſelves the Authors of ſo black a Treaſon againſt the State, as this Libel is; a Libel that diſarms the Crown of its ſureſt Support, the Spirit and Vigour of the People uniting chearfully in its Defence; and at the ſame Time proportionably encourages a vanquiſh'd Enemy, to ſtart new Difficulties, and to refuſe thoſe Terms they would otherwiſe ſubmit to; the very Terms they had ſubmitted to, when their Diſgraces and Misfortunes were much fewer than they are, could it have been ſafe for the Victors to accept them. Nothing of this is to be found in *France*. It is purely of *Engliſh* Growth, or at leaſt the Inſtances in other Parts are very rare, and their Deſigns are co-

ver'd

ver'd with the Darkneſs that alone becomes them.

But to come to this pompous Shew of our Inability to purſue the War, I think a very ſhort Anſwer will ſerve to all that is or can be ſaid in Proof of it. *Strength* and *Weakneſs* are comparative Terms; and that Side that can hold out longeſt, will by the Conditions of a good Peace be made ample Amends for the Expence they ſhall have been at. Our Author indeed would perſuade us, that we are *more exhauſted* than either *Holland* or *France:* But the Contrary is certainly truer than any one Thing in his whole Book. How Things ſtood with reſpect to each of *them* compared with *us*, at the End of the laſt War, we may ſee in Dr. *D——nt's Diſcourſes on the Publick Revenues*, publiſhed in 1698; which, with his *Eſſays* in 1701, I preſume to recommend to this Writer and his Friends. In the firſt of theſe he ſhews, "That *Hol-*
"*land* paid a *third* Penny of their annual In-
"come, and *France* a *fifth*, during the laſt
"War; whereas *England* paid but an *eighth*;
"which is but little more than *France*, in
"Proportion to its Income, paid in Times of
"Peace. That at the End of the laſt War
"they owed a *Hundred Millions* Sterling, and

England

" *England* but a little above *Seventeen.* The " annual Income therefore of the two King- " doms being computed to be in the Proportion " of 84 to 43, it is plain *France* was indebt- " ed almoſt *five Fourths* of their Income, and " *England* little more than *two Fifths* of theirs. " And ſince their annual Revenue is *not double* " to ours, and their Debt was then near *ſix* " *Times* more, it is evident, that had the Peace " continued, the Debt of *England*, with any " tolerable Management, would have been " ſooner paid."

But if this was the State of Things at the End of the laſt War, I leave it to any Man of common Senſe to conſider, whether the Proportions of the Strength of the two Kingdoms have not all along this War alter'd in our Favour; and conſequently whether, compared with *France*, we are not much abler to carry on the War to a good End, than we were to begin it. But this is a Matter proper to be left with the P——t, whoſe Buſineſs it is to conſider (and no doubt they will do it well) the Difference between a good and a bad Peace, and the Condition we are in to make the neceſſary Efforts for finiſhing the preſent War in ſuch a Manner, as may put us for one Age at leaſt out of Danger of another.

And

And to them I leave what this Author advances on this Argument. But I cannot but take ſome Notice of many curious Remarks he has mixed with it.

Did Credit ſink upon the Change of the M——y? He was *ſingular enough to think it a good Omen*, p. 83. But his Maſter *D——t* tells us, it is then only Men give over *truſting the Publick, when they perceive Fraud or evil Faith in their Proceedings, or when we judge their Affairs deſperate.*

Is the general Diſcourſe of the City againſt a Peace without *Spain* and the *Indies?* it is nothing but the Talk of *Stockjobbers.* Are they as little for ſuch a Peace at the other End of the Town? they are all *Officers*, who would fain keep their Commiſſions a little longer. *p.* 78.

Is it ſaid, the Court of *Vienna* and the *States* diſlike ſuch a Peace? This Author aſſures us, *p.* 83. *They cannot any longer keep up their Proportions.* And this we muſt believe, though both the Emperor and the *Dutch* have given us the fulleſt Aſſurances to the Contrary; and the firſt engages to bring above a *Hundred Thouſand* Men into the Field; and the Senſe of the *Dutch* cannot be better

ſeen,

ſeen, than in the laſt *Petition of their Council of State.*

But *if we do not hearken to a Peace, others certainly will*, p. 84. If that be true, I confeſs, there is a Neceſſity of putting an End to the War, or to thoſe Meaſures that have created ſuch a Jealouſy. In the mean Time, is it not a very juſt Reaſon for deceiving our faithful Allies, to affirm roundly, that if we do not deceive them, they will deceive us? Which, it muſt be owned, it is probable enough they might have done, could they have foreſeen what has ſince happen'd; could they have known, how the firſt Clauſe in the eighth Article of the *Grand Alliance* would be obſerved, or how ſhort-liv'd another Treaty, that much concerns them, was like to be. But *to think* Britain *muſt be ruined without the Recovery of* Spain, *is*, he tells us, *p.* 86. *a ſtrong Deluſion; as if Princes and Great M——rs could find no Way of* ſettling the publick Tranquillity *without changing the Poſſeſſions of Kingdoms.* To which I beg Leave to anſwer, that the Poſſeſſion of *Spain* is a moſt violent and unjuſt Uſurpation; that the Reſtitution of it to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, whoſe undoubted Right it is, is a ſurer as well as juſter Way of ſettling the publick Tranquillity,

Tranquillity, than to ruin a great and ancient Monarchy, by parceling it out into ſo many Pieces as is intended in the new Scheme, which neither Princes nor People can poſſibly be long eaſy in: That the Recovery of *Spain* is not impacticable, or at leaſt was not eighteen Months ago, when the *French*, in the moſt ſolemn Manner, conſented to give up the whole Monarchy: That this is neceſſary for the Safety of *England* and of all *Europe*, has been the conſtant Senſe of all *Princes* and *States* engaged in the preſent War, and of M——rs as great and able, as the *few*, who now, it ſeems, are not of that Opinion. Great M——— rs are not a jot wiſer for being M——rs than they were before; nor can they, as ſuch, find out any Ways of *ſettling the publick Tranquillity* that are hid from other Men. It is *Wiſdom* and *Experience* enables Men to find out Expedients, whether they be M——rs or not; but if any ſecret Knowledge be infuſed into Men, upon their being made M——rs of State, this is an Advantage the late M———y had as much Right to, and as great a Share in, as the preſent; and, in other Reſpects, I am humbly of Opinion, they were not leſs qualified than their Succeſſors. They were at leaſt as well acquainted with

with Foreign Affairs, and with the Intereſts of the ſeveral Powers in Alliance with us; and if they had not very weak Underſtandings, they muſt by ſo much Experience know what is a good Peace for *England*, and what are the eſſential Points to make it laſting, and what the moſt effectual Methods for obtaining it. And therefore whatever great M—rs this Author may have on his Side, there are at leaſt as great that differ from him: Indeed all the able M——rs in *Europe* are of one Mind in this Affair, except two or three in this Part of the World, to whoſe Opinion it is no Advantage that the *French* agree with them.

But for a Proof how inſufficient all other Expedients are for a laſting Peace, I beg Leave to refer my Author to ſeveral Pamphlets written lately on this Subject, which have had no Anſwers made to them, or ſuch weak ones, as ſhew they are unanſwerable. But if the new Schemes *are but probable, it is enough: Probabilities are cheaper by ſix Millions a Year.* But we had better be at the Expence of twice Six for a Certainty, than pay ſo dear as we ſhall by truſting to a Probability, if we happen to be miſtaken, which is not improbable; and then the Liberty of us and our Allies will infallibly be ſwallow'd

up

up in Univerſal Monarchy. But, what I take to be a very ſtrange Confeſſion, this Author allows, *p.* 87. that *we might have had a* better Peace *two Years ago than we can now, and that by Parity of Reaſon we muſt expect one juſt ſo much* worſe *about two Years hence.* By this Account it ſhould ſeem, that the Hopes of a good Peace went off with the old M—y, and that the longer the new continue, the worſe Condition our Affairs will be in every Day than other. And, indeed, were what is ſaid true, it would puzzle one to give any other Reaſon for it; for when the Face of Affairs, in all other Reſpects, continues as it was, how ſhould our Hopes of Peace be changed? The Increaſe of our Succeſſes for eight Years, increaſed the Expectations we had of obtaining the Ends for which we began the War. How then came our Succeſſes for theſe two laſt Years to operate quite contrary to what they did before, and indeed to all Reaſon? Have the Towns the *French* have loſt in this Time, made them ſtronger? or has the Continuance of the War made them *richer?* Is the King of *France* more averſe to Peace, the nearer the Dangers of the War are brought to him; ſo near, that one Defeat, nay one Siege, would lay his whole Kingdom open

open to us, and render him unſafe even at *Verſailles?* Why then may we not expect a better Peace now, than we might have had two Years ago? When there is no other Change but in the M———y, I muſt differ with our Author in this Point; and ſince the late M———rs, by their Credit and Succeſs, brought *France* ſo low, as to offer good Terms, I ſhall hope for as much better now, as this M——y exceeds the laſt.

A fourth Reaſon for an ill Peace is, That *the Condition of* France *is not ſo low, nor the Conſequences of our Succeſſes ſo great, as is commonly imagined.* But if this be true, what is it has made ſuch an Alteration in the Counſels of the *Immortal Man*, who would not have given the leaſt Village in *Flanders* to prevent the War? Is not this the Effect of the Succeſſes we have had, and will not more Succeſſes procure proportionably better Terms? But what our Author advances on this Argument, need only be repeated, to be expoſed; and if it can paſs upon us for Reaſon, we are *Fools* enough to be made *Slaves* of. He would make us think a good and a bad War are all one, and that there is nothing now *deciſive* in Succeſs. For *the laſt War they grew weary as well as we, and at laſt conſented to a Peace,*

Peace, which might have been happy enough. Indeed! Cannot this Author ſee what made the King of *France* end the laſt War as he did? Does not every Child know, it was to diſſolve the *Confederacy*, that he might ſeize the *Spaniſh* Monarchy before any Power could be in a Condition to oppoſe him? But what is it has made the Power of *France* ſo *exorbitant?* Is it not the Acquiſitions gained by every Peace he has made theſe ſixty Years? And what enabled him to obtain them, but his great Succeſſes in his Wars? Or what obliged the Allies to ſubmit to ſuch diſhonourable Terms as they did, but a Want of the like Succeſſes? I muſt tell this Author, that Succeſſes are of ſo much Conſequence, that the tenth Part of what the Allies have had againſt *France*, would have been deciſive againſt them. But for the great Advantage of the *French* King, *his Money is ſpent in his own Country.* This is, indeed, a mighty Conſolation, that beſides the Loſs of the Revenue of many great Towns and entire Provinces, he is forced to ſuffer his Country to be ravaged by his own Armies, and thoſe of the Allies. His Subjects muſt needs be the abler to pay Taxes, and ſupport the War, for paying large Contributions, being perpetually harraſs'd by Par-

ties, finding Forage for a prodigious Number of Horſes, and feeding on one Side only 300,000 Men for ſix or ſeven Months in the Year. Another Proof this Monarch is not *ſunk in his Affairs* is, that he is not able to *put out a Fleet*. But *every Town we take coſts us fifty Times more than it is worth*. Does it? It is the *Dutch*, we know, pay for it, and not *England*. But *he has been told there is no Town but may be taken, if you will be at the Charge:* Witneſs *Barcelona*, and *Turin*, and *Gibraltar*, in which Sieges we are ſure no Pains or Coſt was ſpared, and very lately *Cardona*. The *French* have been able to take none of theſe Places, though the Succeſs of them would long ſince have determin'd Affairs in *Italy* and *Spain* in their Favour.

But it is trifling to argue againſt ſuch nonſenſical *Scepticiſm*, by which this Author may prove all Things equally well; for a good and a bad Peace are as much alike, as a good and a bad War. And at the ſame Rate he may prove the State of Credit is indifferent, or rather beſt, when other People think it worſt, and that all Miniſtries are alike; though this perhaps is a Point this Author would himſelf except, as much as thoſe who differ moſt from him.

But

But to give the Reader a Taſte of the miſerable Condition *France* is in, let me cite a Paſſage or two out of the Letters of Monſieur *Flechier*, late Biſhop of *Niſmes*, publiſhed not long ſince at *Paris*. In a Letter writ in *April* 1707. to Monſieur *Pelletier* Miniſter of State, he has theſe Words: *Theſe Times we may truly call* miſerable, *of which nobody ſees better than you, the paſt and preſent Evils, and thoſe which ſtill threaten us, if Heaven don't ſtop the Courſe of them by ſome* miraculous *Events, or by a ſpeedy and ſolid* Peace. And in *December* the ſame Year, he ſums up the Miſery of his Province in theſe Words: *A Free-gift of three Millions, two Millions Capitation, an Infinity of Creations of Offices, and Taxes, which we muſt buy off or bear, and Money-Bills above all; the King muſt be ſupported, his Wants are great, and ſo are our Miſeries*: Peace, Peace. And in another in *Jan.* 1707-8. *Taxes, Creation of Offices, Suppreſſion of others, Money-Bills, exceſſive Loans, and other* facheuſes & inevitables Ruines nous affligent fort, *and make us moſt earneſtly deſire Peace.* And to name but one Paſſage more, in *March* he ſays, *That the King could not lay a heavier Burden on Monſieur* Deſmarets, *than in giving him the Charge of*

his Finances *in ſuch Times, when he muſt find wherewith to furniſh a bloody and ruinous War, at the Expence of the Life and Subſtance of the People, and exerciſe a Sort of* ſavage Juſtice, *exhauſting the Strength of the State in order to defend it, and afflicting both Rich and Poor with hard but neceſſary Laws.* This is the Language of a *Court-Biſhop*, and a great Favourite of Mareſchal *Villars*, before not only the hard *Froſt*, which was a very great Addition to the Miſery of *France*, but even before the Siege of *Lille*; for Monſieur *Deſmarets* ſucceeded Monſieur *Chamillard*, at the very Time the firſt open Attempt was made to remove the late Tr—, and this Letter was to congratulate on that Occaſion.

But to come to our Author's laſt Reaſon for an ill Peace, he tells us, *There is a Cloud gathering in the North, which we have helped to raiſe.* What he means by theſe laſt Words, I cannot underſtand; for inſtead of *raiſing that Cloud*, both the Q—— and the *States* have always done all they could to hinder its Gathering, and to diſperſe it in Time. But all he ſays on this Head, is anſwer'd by theſe Words of his own, *The Succeſs of that War is various.* So it has been many Years, and

ſo

ſo it is like to continue; and ſo long there is no great Harm done by it to the *Common Cauſe*. And if the Evils apprehended from it be kept off but a little longer, we ſhall not only be in a Condition not to be hurt by it, but be able to mediate effectually Terms of Peace between thoſe Potentates, inſtead of receiving Terms from them. But among the other Dangers apprehended from the *Northern* War, one is, *That it may oblige the Elector of* Hannover *or King of* Pruſſia *to recall their Troops in the Midſt of a Siege, or the Eve of a Battle.* So thought, and ſo, I believe, writ this Author in *May* or *June* laſt, when ſomething of this was apprehended; but the D. of *M.* ſhew'd he was able, by his great Dexterity, to parry ſuch a Blow. But if it ſhould happen ſo, what Harm is there in it, or what Reaſon has this Author to complain? *To prevent a Battle*, would ſave a great deal of *Blood*; and *to interrupt a Siege*, would be greatly beneficial, by preventing a huge Waſte of *Men* and *Money* both. He ſeems to have forgot himſelf, and to have thought Succeſs worth ſomething, when he made this Objection.

But I muſt not paſs by a remarkable Touch of this Author's Skill in Hiſtory. King *Au-*

guſtus, in the Beginning of 1709. reſumed his Pretenſions to the Crown he had been forced to quit. How now came this to paſs? Why it is plain the D. of *M.* put him upon it; for he had the Year before *made the Campaign with him in* Flanders. Which is full as juſt as it would be to impute to Count *Gallas Guiſcard*'s ſtabbing Mr. *H*——, becauſe he was by Chance walking with the Count in the Park, a little before that villanous Attempt.

The laſt Thing I would take Notice of in this noble Work, is the *laſt Paragraph*; which tells us, That *if the preſent M——y could get over the Obligations of Honour and Conſcience, they could no doubt find their Advantage in the* Continuance *of the War, as well as the laſt.* But I muſt beg his Pardon, if I cannot implicitly ſubmit to this Aſſertion; becauſe, though it may be true of the preſent M--y, yet it is poſſible there may be a M——y to whom *Peace* would be more advantageous than *War*. It is poſſible to violate *Honour and Conſcience* more in ending a War, than by continuing it: It is poſſible for a M——y to be ſo corrupt, as to *ſell a Peace* to thoſe who cannot get it by their Sword; and more Money may that Way be got at once, than by

by a War of many Years. I remember the Count *de Bergheick*, in his Letter to the D. of *M.* gave broad Intimations how grateful the Duke of *Anjou* would be, if his Grace would favour his Pretenſions. And it is well known, *France* is never wanting on ſuch Occaſions. Laſtly, it is poſſible for a M——y to have ſo *little Credit* with the People, or to be ſo unable for the Weight that lies upon them, as to make it neceſſary for them to purchaſe Peace at any Rate, to extricate themſelves from the Difficulties they are plunged in, and maintain their Poſts, which the Continuance of a War might make impracticable. Theſe are poſſible Caſes; and there are others perhaps I do not think of. But that the *preſent M——y may make their Advantage by the War as well as the laſt*, I have no Inclination to diſpute. There are, no doubt, Ways of getting Money, which the late M——y never tried; whether they ſhall have been uſed ſince or not, Time only can diſcover.

Thus I have at Length got to an End of this prodigious Heap of Scandal; in which, if there be the leaſt Regard to Decency, Juſtice, or Humanity; if there be one good

Reaſon, or one true Fact in the whole Book; if there be any one Page, one Sentence, one Expreſſion, in which there is the leaſt Candour, or Equity, or Ingenuity; if there be any Allowance for thoſe Failures and Accidents, and Imperfections, which all human Affairs, eſpecially thoſe of War and Alliances, are unavoidably attended with; if there be a Word in Favour of any one of our Allies, or againſt the Perfidiouſneſs and Treachery of the common Enemy; if there be any the leaſt Regard or favourable Notice taken of the *Revolution* and *Proteſtant Succeſſion*; if there be any Diſlike expreſs'd to Popery and Arbitrary Power; in a Word, if there be any Thing in this whole Book that an *Engliſhman* would ſay, or a *Frenchman* would not, I am content one ſuch Paſſage ſhould attone for all the reſt: But if there be nothing of this, I ſubmit it to the Wiſdom of the Nation to conſider what Notice ſuch a villanous Book deſerves, that is fill'd with the moſt abſurd and the moſt envenom'd Lies, and whoſe Poiſon is of the moſt extenſive Nature, and reaches to the greateſt Diſtance; that reflects highly on ſo many Years of a moſt glorious Reign; that inſults in the moſt inſolent Manner thoſe Allies whoſe *Intereſt her Majeſty declares to*

be

be inſeparable from her own; and to *enter*, I ſuppoſe, *the better into the ſtricteſt Engagements with them*, adviſes the Diſſolution of all our Alliances in Being; that diſquiets the Minds of her Majeſty's good Subjects, and creates in them a Diſtruſt of her M----y's Juſtice, and of the *Credit* of the Government; that declares againſt our inſiſting upon the Reſtitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*, which the Nation has always thought abſolutely neceſſary to a good Peace, and which her Majeſty has aſſured her People ſhe would uſe her utmoſt Endeavours to obtain; and, in a Word, oppoſes every Thing that the Juſtice, and Honour, and Intereſt of the Nation is concern'd to purſue, in virtue not only of our Alliances, but of that ancient Enmity to *France*, which is born with us, and which will ſubſiſt as long as *Engliſhmen* are touch'd with any Care for their Religion, Trade, or Liberties. This is the Book ſo much admired by *Abel* and his Friends, which if it can prevail againſt Truth and Reaſon, (for Truth and Reaſon, I have ſhewn, is againſt it in every ſingle Point without Exception) *France* will be too hard for us; but if Truth and Reaſon can prevail againſt the falſeſt blackeſt Calumnies, we may ſtill hope to be too hard for *France*; and that they

they will either consent to give us by Treaty the Terms of a good Peace, or be forced to it by the Continuance of a good War. Hopes so reasonable, that they could not easily have fail'd, though the late M——y and Gen—l had been continued, nothing can defeat now, when Credit is restored, our Allies corrected, and all Parts made to do their Duty better, when we are under an abler M———, and a greater Gen—l; if we are not fatally deluded by the Tricks of a few Men, who are pitying us at the Expence of our Allies, and are destroying both to serve themselves and their new *French* Friends.

POSTSCRIPT.

IT would seem very extraordinary in any Writer, but the *Author of the Conduct*, to take Notice, as he does in his *Remarks on the Barrier-*

Barrier-Treaty, of what I have writ in Defence of the Allies and the late M——y, and yet not ſay a Word to that Part which relates to that Treaty, and contains a diſtinct and full Anſwer to every particular Objection he had made againſt it. What can the Meaning of this be, but *diſplicet iſte locus!* Had the Anſwers been weak or falſe, they would certainly have had the Honour to be taken Notice of; and there can be no Reaſon for his not caring to meddle with them, but that it is not for his Turn. They are too true to be denied, and too material to be owned. They are a Vindication of the Treaty not only from what he has ſaid, but can ſay againſt it. For his *Remarks*, take away the Pieces he has added to recommend his Book, have little in them but a Repetition of the ſame Objections, and thoſe urged in a worſe Manner than before, rather than improved. This the impartial Reader will ſee is the true Reaſon of his ſaying nothing to that Part of my *Defence*, which is the only one he ſhould have ſpoken to, in Purſuance of his Argument. But *he pities Anſwerers with all his Heart, for the many Diſadvantages they lie under*; preſs'd, I ſuppoſe, with the Difficulties he felt himſelf, whenever he thought

thought of replying, as perhaps he did ſometimes, in Defence of a Cauſe that won't bear Examination. He therefore prudently paſſes over in perfect Silence what call'd for a Reply; and inſtead of taking any Notice of the Second Part of my *Defence*, where this Matter of the Barrier is conſider'd, he is pleaſed to tell us, he has been lately looking into the Third; where he pretends, I have, in Oppoſition to him, affirm'd a Falſity in one Place, and wilfully perverted his Meaning in another. The Particulars he finds Fault with are but two, and neither of them of the leaſt Conſequence to the main Subject, though what he ſays were true, which I ſhall ſhew it is not. And may not one from hence conclude, he could make no more Exceptions, not one of any Moment? And is not ſuch a ſilent Confeſſion from an Enemy the moſt ample Teſtimony that could be given to the Cauſe I maintain, and to the many important Truths urged and proved in its Defence?

But to come to his Particulars: I had, *pag.* 14. *Par.* 3. affirm'd, "That the Deſign "on *Thoulon* was not diſcover'd by the Crea-"ture of the *Great Man* he points at, but "by the Clerk of another Great Man, who

"was

" was then Sec——— of S——." To this he replies, " That it is neither wiſe, nor for " the Credit of my Party, to put People in " Mind either of that *Secretary* or of that " *Clerk:* However ſo it happens, that no- " thing relating to the Affair of *Thoulon* did " ever paſs through that Secretary's Office; " which I here affirm, ſays he, with great " Phlegm, leaving the Epithets of *falſe*, *ſcan-* " *dalous*, *villainous*, and the reſt, to the Au- " thor and his Fellows." In Anſwer to which, I muſt tell this Author, firſt, that he is miſtaken in thinking I meant *Greg*; no, I meant a Perſon now alive: Nor did I mean a direct Diſcovery made to *France*, but ſuch a one as he ſpeaks of, occaſioned by laying Wagers; a Folly which the Perſon hinted at has paid dearly for: And that ſo much of the Buſineſs of *Thoulon* paſs'd through that Office, as was ſufficient to give Room for ſuch a Diſcovery, I appeal to a Letter from Mr. *H*—— to the Earl of *M*——*r* then at *Vienna*, and another to Count *Gallas*, dated in *March* 1706-7. and printed in the *Impartial Enquiry into the Management of the War in* Spain, *p.* 219. to which the Author ſubjoins theſe Words: " I could have added, " ſays he, ſix or ſeven Letters more from Mr.

" Sec.

" Sec. *H.* to my Lord *M——r*, and to Sir *Ph.* " *M——ws* upon the ſame Subject; but I " think theſe are ſufficient to prove what I " have aſſerted concerning the true Project " upon *Thoulon*."

Let now the Reader believe if he can, upon this Author's Word, that no Clerk of this Sec— could diſcover this Affair, becauſe nothing relating to it ever paſs'd through his Office. It is plain ſomething of it did paſs through his Office, and it is certain, from very good Authority, the firſt Intimation the Town had of ſuch a Deſign, came from a Clerk in it; who had he been *Greg*, I cannot ſee where the *Folly* would be to put the World in Mind of him, or whoſe *Credit* it could hurt beſides his Maſter's, unleſs it could be ſhewn, that the *Repreſentation* of the Lords on that Occaſion was falſe, or that their Committee had not acted with the greateſt Integrity and Honour; which, till it is better proved than by the poor pitiful Libels of *Abel* and his Friends, honeſt Men will not believe; and till then I take the Liberty to affirm, that they acted not only with Honour, and with a perfect Agreement among themſelves, but with great Tenderneſs, that the Innocent might not be involved with the Guilty. And

even

even the great *Negligence* diſcover'd on that Occaſion, was not the Effect of the Enquiry of the Lords, but the voluntary Confeſſion of the Clerk. And if in the Correſpondence, that was then found to have been carried on with *France*, there appear'd ſome odd Circumſtances not very eaſy to be accounted for, as that the Letters were directed to be thrown over-board, if they met an *Engliſh* Ship, but not if they met a *French* one; and that no one Advantage could be proved to have accrued to *England* by the Correſpondence, more than having by the ſhorteſt Way a *Paris-Gazette*; whereas *France* could make great Advantage of it, by facilitating their Intelligence with the Faction that is avowedly in their Intereſt: Yet this was what the Lords had no Suſpicion of, when they firſt examin'd *Greg*; nor did they afterwards make any Uſe of it, to the Prejudice of the *Fidelity* of his Maſter, though they might think it a Reflection on his *Prudence*, and that neither his Correſpondence nor the Management of his Office were much for his Credit: But this by the by. As to the Point in Diſpute, what I have affirm'd is true; and if it were not, it is of no Conſequence, nor have I affirm'd it with any Warmth, or uſed

any

any one of the *Epithets* he is offended with. And as to the Uſe of injurious Epithets in general, I muſt take this Occaſion to ſay, that I never uſe them, where I am not convinced they are applicable with the ſtricteſt Regard to Truth; that I never uſe them upon trifling Matters, where either the Dignity of the Perſons, or the Importance of the Subjects, will not juſtify ſome Warmth in their Defence; laſtly, that I never uſe them inſtead of Arguments, but after my Point is proved. And when they are uſed with theſe Limitations, I cannot think they want an Excuſe. I cannot write, I confeſs, with this Author's *Phlegm*, (who could have laugh'd with *Nero* to ſee *Rome* on Fire) when I am oppoſing the moſt pernicious Deſigns, or be indifferent, when the Safety of *England* and the Liberty of *Europe* are at Stake; when the *Proteſtant* Intereſt is weaken'd and betray'd, and ourſelves as well as our Allies are expoſed to the Deriſion and Contempt of thoſe, to whom our Arms have made us terrible. If the Reſentments I feel on ſuch Occaſions, break out into Words proper to the Falſity, Ingratitude, and Treachery I would detect and expoſe, I follow Nature, Reaſon, and Example, the Examples of the beſt Patriots as well as beſt

Writers,

Writers, as all know who have ever look'd into the admirable Writings of the Ancients.

But to come to the other Fault this Author finds, he pretends I have twice miſrepreſented his Senſe in one Sentence: "That "when he talks of the *moſt petty Princes*, I "ſay he means *Kings and Crown'd Heads*; "and when he ſays *the Soldiers of thoſe petty* "*Princes are ready to rob or ſtarve at Home*, "I ſay, he calls *Kings and Crown'd Heads* "*Robbers and Highwaymen.*" This laſt I have not directly ſaid, nor uſed theſe Words: But that the Reader may judge fairly between us, I will give him the whole Paragraph.

This Kind of Treatment, ſays he, p. 34. *from our two principal Allies* (the Emperor and the States) *hath taught the ſame Dialect* to all the reſt; *ſo that there is hardly a* petty Prince *whom we* half maintain *by Subſidies and Penſions, who is not ready, upon every Occaſion, to threaten us that he will recall his Troops,* (*though they muſt* rob *or* ſtarve *at home*) *if we refuſe to comply with him in any Demand, however ſo unreaſonable.*

Now that in theſe Words, by *petty Princes* he means *Kings* and *Crown'd Heads*, I muſt with his Leave ſtill affirm; the Kings of

Denmark, *Pruſſia*, and *Poland*, being the petty Princes, who have threaten'd to recall their Troops. This is ſo notorious in Fact, that it is very needleſs to ſay more in Proof of it. And as to the other Words, *though* THEY *muſt rob or ſtarve at home*, if I thought *THEY* refer'd to *all the reſt*, that is, to the *petty Princes*, *whom*, he ſays, *we half maintain*, (who therefore muſt be reduced to great Straits, when that half of their Maintenance is loſt) I had no Deſign to ſtrain his Words, but took them in what ſeemed to me the natural and obvious Senſe of them; nor was I in the leaſt conſcious, that they were capable of any other, till upon ſeeing this Senſe denied, I again look'd upon them. But ſince he declares he meant not the Princes, but their Troops, their brave victorious Troops, which, according to him, whenever the War ends, will have no Choice left but to *rob* or *ſtarve*; I ſhall not pretend to ſay his Words were made ambiguous on Purpoſe, but allow them in his own Senſe. And though among ſo many Injuries thrown on the Allies, one more or leſs is of very little Conſequence, and will not make any body think better or worſe of his Performance; yet to ſhew how ready I am, in Juſtice to him, to correct any the leaſt

leaſt Miſtake, even in Points that do not at all affect the Merits of the Cauſe, I promiſe him, this Paſſage ſhall be alter'd in the next Edition, that no Senſe may be affix'd to his Words, but what himſelf allows; and this, without pretending to expect the leaſt Juſtice of this Kind in Return from him. For how can that be expected from *a Man* who pretends he *ſtopt the* ſecond Edition *of his Book, that he might have Time to make Enquiries, in order to correct any* Error *he could hear of*; when yet the Third was publiſhed within a Week after the Firſt. *A Man*, who *ſolemnly declares that he has not wilfully committed the leaſt Miſtake*, and yet retains, in all the Editions of his Book, the groſs *Corruptions* he has made in the eighth Article of the Grand Alliance; an Article of that Importance, that he lays it down as the Baſis and Foundation of his whole Scheme. In Repreſentations of Facts, where the Springs are ſecret, the Circumſtances many, the Scene remote, and the Time perhaps long paſt, there is Room for Cavil and Diſpute; but the Tranſlation of a plain Article is a Matter of ſo ſimple a Nature, that it will admit no Shuffle or Chicane. The Clauſes of it he has tranſlated truly, or he has not: If he has, it was eaſy for him to

ſhew I have accuſed him falſely; but if he has not, which is moſt certain, he ſhould own his Miſtake, and correct it. But that would not be acting conſiſtently with himſelf; the Corruption was wilful, and for what Reaſons it was made, for the ſame it is perſiſted in. And it were indeed very unreaſonable to expect it ſhould be otherwiſe, for his Buſineſs is to deceive; and to retract his Errors would in Effect be to unwrite his Book; which I have ſhewn to be, from the Beginning to the End, one continued Cheat, the Work of a Man, who plainly ſhews he knew too much, to miſtake for Want of Knowledge. The *ſolemn Declaration* of ſuch a Man is of a Piece with all the reſt; the uſual Artifice of thoſe that would delude; who, to gain Credit to what they know is ſcandalous and falſe, are obliged to affect an Air of Sincerity and Truth. But theſe affected Airs will have no Weight with diſcerning Men; they will ſee through the thin Diſguiſe, and diſregard the moſt ſpecious Words, where the Force of Reaſon and the Evidence of Facts is plainly on the other Side. *Falſhood* on the Wings of Power moves ſwift, and ſpreads apace, but in the Nature of it is ſhort-liv'd, and dies ſoon; while *Truth*, to uſe this Author's

Words,

Words, *limps but ſlowly after*; but where it is received, its Impreſſions laſt; and though it may perhaps, as he ſays, *arrive too late*, arrive it will; and ſooner or later we ſhall all ſee, that the Scheme of this Author and his Friends is as contrary to our Welfare and common Safety, as the Methods taken to ſupport it are to Truth and commmon Honeſty.

FINIS.

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